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ABSTRACT
The devolution of authority from central to regional and local governments is a 
widespread trend in many countries. Differences in the outcomes of devolution 
reforms are often significant, between countries as well as within a country. The 
work assumes that an important part of the explanation of such differentiation 
derives from the dynamics of the implementation process: the first research 
question is addressed to explaining the substantial differentiation of outcomes 
that in many instances can be observed at the local level in the implementation of 
the same institutional design of devolution (what is the process dynamics of the 
organisational transformations occurring in public entities in the implementation 
phase of a cycle of a devolution policy?).
Italy has gone through a deep transformation of a strongly centralised state into a 
“regional” one, occurred in subsequent waves of devolution. Alternative courses 
of events seem to have characterised the implementation of devolution in 
different localities and policy sectors; in this scenario, the case of devolution in 
agriculture in Lombardy over the period 1998-2002 is striking for the magnitude 
and rapidity of change, as well as for the way the reallocation of workforce to the 
lower levels of government occurred. The study of the Lombardy experience 
provides the basis for some tentative theorisations about the dynamics of 
devolution processes.
Drawing on these results, the question of how top executives should lead an 
intervention of devolution is addressed (second research question). Practices for 
the management of devolution processes are designed on the basis of the study 
of the Lombardy experience. The protocol of organisational analysis for the 
design of practices is drawn from the literature on “smart practices analysis”, a 
stream of literature in public policy and public management quite critical about 
current research conventions as regards the identification of “best” practices to 
be used for managing public sector organisations. Lessons for public managers 
about how to lead an intervention of devolution are proposed.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Devolution: a global trend
In the last two decades, devolution reforms have been on the governmental 
agenda of many nations (Keating, 1996, OECD, 1997, p. 19): jn Europe, where 
there is evidence of trends to devolution in the (once) very centralised 
“Napoleonic” systems of the Southern, Mediterranean countries, as in the already 
decentralised Nordic, Scandinavian countries. The democracy with the longest 
history in the world, the United Kingdom, and the very young democracies in 
Eastern Europe have in common a recent experience of significant interventions 
of devolution (Brusis, 2002, Keating, 2001). Devolution is a trend also in other 
OECD countries (OECD, 1997) as well as in many developing countries (Guess, 
2005, Tendler and Freedheim, 1994). Also already “decentralised” or “federal” 
countries1 experienced processes of devolution in specific policy sectors.
In different policy fields, reforms aim at replacing centralised modes of policy 
delivery with multi-level institutional settings in which a plurality of tiers of 
government share responsibility and tasks in both policy formulation and the 
delivery of services. Such reforms are complex processes that entail the 
redistribution in decision powers and the responsibility for tasks execution among 
levels of government, and the reallocation of personnel and other resources; they 
may have significant and long-lasting impacts on constituencies.
The question of what impacts devolution reforms produce, and why, is 
disputed (Pollitt, 2005). In the number of the “big issues” prominent in the public 
debate in countries where devolution is high on the governmental agenda there 
are questions about whether devolution actually makes politicians more 
accountable; whether citizens are encouraged to play a more active part in the 
democratic process; whether public policies are actually differentiated according 
to locally determined priorities, and public services more effective; and, regarding 
the “side” effects of devolution, whether inconsistencies between central and 
local governments may intensify; whether inequality of treatment of the citizens 
across the country may occur, especially concerning their fundamental rights; 
and whether a devolved public sector costs more (as it is usually held) or less 
than a centralised one. Such issues are widely debated in the important
1 Decentralised countries are unitary states in which, though a significant authority is delegated to 
sub-national tiers of government, there is no constitutionally entrenched division of state power; in 
a federal state the constitution itself prescribes some division of sovereignty between different 
levels o f government (see e.g. Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, pp. 41-43).
production of works that can be found in the national academic discourse of 
countries affected by devolution reforms (in Italy, see e.g. Antonini, 2001, Ongaro 
and Valotti, 2005; in France: Guyomarch, 1999, Montricher, 1996; for a review of 
the public debate in the United kingdom as regards devolution to Scotland, see 
Keating, 2001, Laffin, 2001, Midwinter and McGarvey, 2001; in Eastern European 
countries, Horvatt, 2000). The inclusion of decentralisation in the doctrinal core of 
the New Public Management (NPM2) has further elicited interest as it has set the 
debate on devolution within the stream of a broader strand of academic and 
policy discussion and argumentation3 (Hood, 1991, Pollitt, 2003, chap.2). 
Explaining the differentiated results of the establishment of multi-level institutional 
settings has thus become in the last two decades a debated topic, reviving the 
interest for the long-standing issue of the degree and modalities of 
centralisation/decentralisation in the State apparatus that can best fit the diverse 
and changing circumstances in which public policies are delivered.
Such broad questions about the effects of devolution are in general “too big” 
for straightforward answers to be provided, depending on a range of concurrent 
factors that operate in conjunction with the quality of the design and 
implementation of the devolution reform itself, which include, inter alia, the 
functioning of the national and the local political systems, the status of previous 
and contemporaneous administrative reforms, the specific policy contents and 
process of the sector affected by devolution.
In order to have an improved understanding of the cause-and-effect 
connections4, the focus can be moved from “final” outcomes (the impacts) to 
“intermediate”, more direct outcomes of a devolution reform (on the distinction 
between intermediate and final outcomes of a public sector reform, see Boyne et 
al., 2003, and Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, chap. 5); outcomes like: the changes 
in the programmatic activities executed by both central and local governments 
(have the “core tasks” of public entities actually changed as a result of 
devolution?), the changes in the organisational arrangements set to work in order 
to perform the new programmatic activities (have structure and routines been 
adapted to the new tasks?), and the reallocation of resources (have workforce
2 For the purposes o f the present work, we can refer to the NPM as a set o f doctrines about 
“organisation design issues” (in a broad sense) relating to the public sector (see Barzelay, 2000, p. 
234, and Hood and Jackson, 1991, p. 33-34). A seminal article on NPM is Hood (1991); for an 
approach to the NPM as a “consolidating field of discourse”, see in particular Barzelay (2001); for 
an overview of some current trends in NPM, see McLaughlin et Al (2002).
3 Pollitt’s recent review of the debate on the topic is significantly titled: “Decentralization: a 
central concept in contemporary public management” (Pollitt, 2005).
4 Or, in other words, to define “doable” research questions by limiting the boundaries o f the 
problems addressed.
7
and the other resources required for executing the new tasks been reallocated to 
the local levels of government?). Differentiation remains significant, within a 
country as well as between countries, also when such direct outcomes of a 
devolution reform are focused. Variation in outcomes of devolution has attracted 
academic attention (Brusis, 2002, Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, Pollitt etal., 1998).
Italy is a case of wide differentiation in the outcomes of devolution in different 
regions and policy sectors. The country has gone through a deep and 
problematic transformation of a strongly centralised state into a “regional” one, 
occurred in subsequent “waves” of devolution since 1970, when regional 
governments were established (Gourevitch, 1978, Tarrow, 1974). Putnam, 
Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) have addressed the question of why some regions 
were so much more successful than others at governing and traced differences in 
performance back to historical differences in civic engagement. The most recent 
devolution exercise started in 1997 and, though its final effects are still unclear, 
some intermediate effects can be detected and there is evidence of the 
devolution reform being implemented in substantially differentiated ways in 
different regions and policy sectors.
Alternative courses of events seem to have characterised the implementation 
of devolution in different localities and policy fields. But what has triggered one or 
the other course of events? What explains such differentiation? A useful starting 
point is the consideration that there seem to be plausible explanations for failures 
of implementation of devolution in “legalistic” countries like Italy. Considering the 
personnel to be reallocated first, there are good reasons why rational actors 
should resist downsizing and reallocation under circumstances quite common in 
countries characterised by an administrative system in the French, “Napoleonic” 
tradition (a point that is argued in detail in chapter 3). And, moving “upwards” in 
the hierarchical layers and focusing the top management, a culturalist 
perspective about the persistence of the administrative law paradigm dominating 
in Italy (Capano, 2003) can be interpreted as providing good underpinnings for 
explaining behaviours by public managers consistent with the widespread 
evidence about the formalistic compliance to administrative acts replacing the 
substantive implementation of the devolution reform. Then, why cases of 
innovation5 and adaptation of the organisational arrangements could be observed 
in some instances? What kind of organisational transformations do occur in 
public entities in the implementation phase of a devolution policy? Before 
proceeding to the examination of such issues and to identify and address the
5 Following Wilson (1989, chap. 12), we define “innovation” the kind of change that alters in a 
significant way the core tasks of an organisation. Hence, the title of the work about “innovation” in 
the Lombardy experience (both at the regional and at the Local Governments level).
research questions, definitions are introduced and a review of literature 
proposed.
Devolution is a specific type of the broader phenomenon of decentralisation (in 
the definitions we follow Pollitt et al., 1998, and Pollitt, 2005). Decentralisation 
can be defined as the process of spreading out of formal authority from a smaller 
to a larger number of actors. Formal authority may be decentralised in a number 
of different ways: within an organisation or to external bodies, which in turn may 
be run by elected representatives or appointed; appointed bodies may be public 
or private, selected by competitive or by non-competitive means. Devolution is 
the decentralisation of formal authority to external, legally established 
organisations run by elected representatives.
The authority transferred usually, though not necessarily, concerns both 
decision powers and operational tasks; actors devolving authority often retain 
significant portions of it, and seldom they entirely “leave the game” in the policy 
sector in question; the devolution process affects the tier of government 
devolving authority and not only the recipient one; constituencies of both are 
deeply affected.
1.2 Literature review
The literature about devolution and the establishment of multi-level frameworks of 
governance is growing. A prominent production of works can be found in the 
national academic discourse of countries affected by devolution reforms. In the 
United kingdom, the issue of devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
was prominent in the Labour electoral programme. When Labour came to power 
in 1997, the government issued two White Papers on devolution in Scotland and 
Wales and called a referendum, in which the “YES” obtained a strong majority. 
The most radical case of devolution was Scotland. The Scotland Act in 1998 
established the Scottish government and Parliament; the first elections were held 
in 1999.
The academic debate as regards devolution to Scotland has been echoed 
especially in Public Money & Management The works of Carmichael (1996), 
Hogwood (1996), Midwinter and McVicar (1996) and Thomas, A. (1996) examine 
issues of design of devolution in the United Kingdom “regions”, while Keating 
(1998) provides an historical perspective of devolution in Scotland. Subsequent 
contributions are more directly concerned with the issues of the effects of 
devolution, at least in the sense of examining the functioning of the Scottish 
governmental system: Midwinter (2002) illustrates regional-local financial
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relations in Scotland and financial management in the Scottish government 
(Midwinter, 2004, and Midwinter and McGarvey, 2001); Laffin (2001) addresses 
the question of whether patterns in politicians-officials relations in the UK regions 
follow the “Westminster model” or depart from that.
Eastern European countries, especially those that have recently joined the 
European Union, have in some cases gone through radical devolution processes. 
These processes have in at least one important respect been similar to 
devolution in Scotland: the devolved government has been at the same time 
established (institution building) and allocated significant powers. Brusis’ 
comparative study of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia 
examines the effects of the EU accession policy as regards its influence on the 
reforms of regional administration (Brusis, 2002). According to the study, the 
main factors that combined in shaping the different trajectories of regionalisation 
of these countries were the historical legacies of the pre-socialism State and 
times of the democratic transition; the competition between political actors with 
centralist and political actors with localist approaches; the existence of historical 
or ethnic regionalism (regional identities). They determined different trajectories 
in terms of the legal and financial autonomy of regions/local governments, 
relationships between central and local governments, the way the territories of 
the regional governments were defined.
The “centralist” France has experienced some forms of devolution too. The 
1982 reform removed the prefect’s tutelle and created local collectivities as 
autonomous authorities, regional councils were directly elected and given taxing 
and budget-making powers. Interpretations of administrative reforms in France 
(Guyomarch, 1999, Montricher, 1996) emphasise continuity in the administrative 
tradition and the actual limited degree of change that occurred; such 
interpretations -  though applied to a range of reforms wider than the devolution 
interventions - seem to provide an indirect confirmation about the difficulties of 
implementing devolution in administrative contexts in the Napoleonic tradition.
Many studies in the national public debate in countries affected by devolution 
address evaluative and policy questions. They discuss “how well” devolution was 
designed and implemented (i.e. whether it achieved the declared goals), and how 
the specific intervention of devolution under examination could be improved (by 
changing the way the reform is being conducted, or by changing the goals and 
scope of devolution); they are mainly addressed to a domestic audience.
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Some studies of experiences of devolution produced results that transcend the 
boundaries of the domestic public debate. Putnam’s investigation of 
regionalisation in Italy (1993) started from addressing the question of why some 
regions were so much more successful than others at governing and ended up 
with outlining a theory of the influence of social capital on institutional 
performance6. Social capital in the work of Putnam refers to “features of social 
organization such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency 
of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993, p. 167) -  a notion 
that has been criticised especially as regards how it can be operationalised. The 
study presented in this work -  though broadly consistent with Putnam’s analysis 
in addressing the issue of the influence of context on regional governments’ 
effectiveness - is at a finer-grained level, examining specific and alternative 
chains of events in the course of a devolution intervention that determine different 
outcomes and affect the way devolved authority is exercised by regional and 
local governments.
Another study focused on a single country but whose results transcend the 
specific boundaries of an evaluative study is the work by Pollitt, Birchall and 
Putman (1998). The authors examine decentralisation in the United Kingdom in 
three sector (NHS trusts, secondary schools, socially rented housing). The main 
questions addressed have an emphasis on performance and a prescriptive 
thrust: “1) What seems to have been the effect of decentralisation on the 
performance of the organisations concerned? 2) What lessons can be learned 
from looking at different approaches to decentralisation in different settings and 
sectors? 3) What message does the experience of the reforms of the decade 
from 1987 hold for the organisation of representative democracy?”. In the 
conclusion of their analysis, the authors sketch the possible outline of a theory of 
“implementation habitats”, a theory that should identify the influence of different 
context factors affecting the implementation of an intervention of decentralisation 
in different localities and policy sectors. Given the importance of this study for the 
purposes of our work, its main findings are illustrated more at length.
The authors classify context factors into two categories: local characteristics of 
the implementation habitat, which are spatially specific, and service 
characteristics, depending on the policy sector in which the devolution reform is 
implemented.
6 See also Leonardi, Nanetti and Putnam (1981), Putnam, Leonardi, Nanetti and Pavoncello 
(1983), and many other publications by the authors.
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Considering the local characteristics, a first important factor is the current 
socio-demographic composition of the local community: a population mainly 
affluent and well-organised is likely to be in a stronger position either to support a 
reform of to offer “recalcitrance” to it; at the opposite, a community internally 
divided and with problems of deprivation is in a weaker position to make citizens’ 
views felt.
A second characteristic is the degree and nature of party political competition, 
at the local level and between local and national governments. There are multiple 
ways in which this factor can be characterised and its influence on reforms 
interpreted: the authors focus the consensual-conflictual poles as features of the 
political scene at the local level and consider situations closer to the consensual 
pole as being relatively more facilitating habitats for implementing 
decentralisation reforms than circumstances characterised by conflictual politics. 
When examining that specific type of decentralisation that are devolution reforms, 
the vertical dimension (local-central) is likely to be the most significant aspect.
A third local characteristic is the degree of potential competition for a local 
service-providing organisation -  a dimension that seems to be especially 
significant for competitive decentralisation, a phenomenon lying outside the 
scope of the present research.
As regards service characteristics, the authors propose a list of factors that 
are likely to influence the receptivity of a given organisation to particular types of 
administrative reforms. The first is size of the recipient organisations: scale 
factors may operate in the direction of making it more expensive (and in some 
instances also technically difficult or impossible) for smaller organisations to 
produce the expected outputs. Indeed scale factors have historically been a 
major argument for “centralisation”, at least in the commercial sector, in markets 
where costs, more than differentiation of products (premium prize), is a key 
competitive factor. The issue of size is relevant as a design feature of the 
devolution intervention, affecting its feasibility; more problematic is interpreting 
the influence of size on the dynamics of the implementation process.
A second characteristic is the nature of contacts with users, spanning from 
remote and episodic to face-to-face and continuous contacts, with intermediate 
combinations being face-to-face but episodic contacts and remote but frequent 
contacts. Both “closeness” and “frequency” of contacts, according to the authors, 
seem to have an influence on the degree with which users of services will 
become influential actors in the change process: their attitudes towards reform 
will be more or less important for the outcome of the devolution reform according 
to the actual level of influence they have on the change process. Another
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characteristic regards whether the service is universal (open to and used by all or 
most citizens) or selective (limited groups of citizens are the only recipients of 
services); it seems to be significant with regard to the numerousness and internal 
cohesion of the groups affected by the policy in which authority is devolved, 
somehow combining with the previous characteristic concerning the nature of 
contacts with users.
Another feature discussed by the authors is whether the service is consumed 
on an optional or a mandatory basis (the administration of environmental health 
regulations being an example of a mandatory service, subsidies for businesses 
willing to operate in a less economically-developed area being an example of an 
optional service): the aspect seems to be significant as regards issues of equity 
of treatment of citizens across the country once authority is devolved to a plurality 
of organisations.
Services may be capital-intensive or labour intensive: the authors argue that 
capital-intensive services may require amount of resources not available on a 
local scale, thus somehow getting back to the issue of scale factors. In this 
respect capital-intensive services are deemed to be more difficult to run on a 
decentralised basis than labour-intensive ones. However, the authors seem to 
underestimate the difficulties in re-allocating personnel to lower levels of 
government in geographically dispersed localities. A point widely discussed later.
Some research agendas investigate the implications for public managers of 
major changes occurring in already decentralised or federal countries7. Agranoff 
and McGuire (2001) set the problem for public managers in the US federal 
system in terms of having to operate by taking into account multiple interacting 
governments and nongovernmental organisations, dealing with numerous 
programs emanating from the federal and state capitals, engaging in multiple 
intergovernmental transactions with an expanding number of intergovernmental 
instruments. They argue that different configurations of these features determine 
different systems in which public managers have to operate and focus on the 
question: what are appropriate management models in different systems of 
federalism? In addressing the question they identify four models of management 
suitable for different circumstances. The “Top-down model emphasises executive 
branch control and is embedded in enforcement and exchange related to the 
laws, regulations, funding rules, program standards, and guidelines associated
7 Following Lane and Ersson (1991), we refer to decentralised countries as those where a 
significant transfer of authority to regional or local governments has occurred, but there is no 
constitutionally entrenched division o f power; federal systems are those where sovereignty is 
divided between tiers o f government, and intermediary and local governments retain some degree 
of statutorily-protected authority.
with federal/state grant [..] managing through regional and local governments’ 
managers (local manager-as-agent perspective) [..] by ensuring standardization 
and enforcing co-ordination. The Donor-recipient model emphasizes mutual 
dependence or shared program administration, where two-party bargaining or 
reciprocal interactions among governmental officials is the norm [..] The Donor- 
recipient model [..] recognizes (that) policy is not easily or even hierarchically 
executed. Actors at the other end of the chain are involved in programming as 
well (Elmore, 1985). The Jurisdiction-based model is defined by the initiated 
actions of local officials and managers who seek out program adjustment and 
other actors and resources to serve the strategic aims of their governments [..] 
Unlike the Donor-recipient model, the jurisdiction-based model reflects the fact 
that grants in aids are just one policy instrument among many used to govern, 
and the federal government is just one governing actor among many in the 
intergovernmental system [..] far from carrying out a specific function on the 
intergovernmental organization chart, local managers [..] strategically interact 
with actors to design and administer policies that meet the jurisdiction goals. The 
Network model highlights the actions of multiple interdependent government and 
nongovernmental organizations pursuing joint action and intergovernmental 
adjustment”. These management models are often to be used in combination, 
according to the varied circumstances and problems public managers have to 
deal with. They are basically considered as templates for guiding public 
managers behaviour in already established decentralised institutional settings.
Other analysis on the functioning of multi-level governance settings can be 
found in the literature on policy-making in the European Union, with a varied 
focus on the pre-decision and decision phase, the implementation phase, or both 
(Hooghe, 2001, Laffan, 1997, Leonardi, 1994, Levy, 2000, Wallace and Wallace, 
2000). The European politico-institutional context has undergone a deep process 
of centralisation (to EU institutions) and decentralisation (within EU countries8) 
over the last half a century -  processes that have occurred in a politico-
8 It may be noted that the definition o f decentralisation and devolution adopted are general enough 
to be employed not only to processes characterised by a transfer of authority “downwards” across 
levels of government (though this is the most common and widespread type of decentralisation 
situations), but also to processes where authority is transferred “upwards”, provided that the 
outcome is a state of affairs in which authority is spread out to a larger number of actors, as is the 
case when authority is shared by national and supranational levels of government, in the face of a 
previously more “unitary” institutional setting. This broader conceptualisation o f decentralisation 
allows its application also to, e.g., the transfer of functions from national States to the European 
Union, whenever (as it is often the case) the outcome of such processes is a multi-level policy 
subsystem in which authority is shared between national and supranational governments, and 
independently o f the fact that the transfer of tasks occurred downwards or upwards. Other 
instances in which authority is aggregated at the supranational level are plainly cases of 
centralisation.
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institutional context radically “in motion”, especially if compared with the relatively 
stable US system. The present contribution aims at providing an understanding of 
the implementation processes of decentralisation interventions by which multi­
level governance frameworks in the European Union are so frequently being 
reshaped, proposing an explanation of the dynamics of a devolution intervention 
in the policy field of agriculture -  a sector in which EU institutions perform a 
prominent role. Such knowledge might enlighten some aspects of public policy­
making in Europe, by studying some consequences of the way devolution 
interventions are designed and managed on the capacity of implementation of 
European public policies by the local levels of government.
Other research agendas address questions about whether devolved 
institutional designs in specific policy settings can improve policy delivery. In 
many public policy studies a recurring -  though often implicit - question is: what is 
a proper balance between centralisation and decentralisation in the policy field 
investigated? This kind of policy question can often be found in the following, 
more prescriptive formulation: “given the current status and circumstances in the 
policy field under investigation, is decentralisation a good recipe for improving 
policy delivery?”; a formulation that reflects the almost universal favour for 
decentralisation among practitioners, and quite often also among academics.
Some contributions provide frameworks for measuring aspects of a 
decentralised institutional setting. Lane and Ersson (1991) define two indices, 
one of institutional autonomy and the other of financial autonomy. The first 
summarises aspects of discretion and functional autonomy from Central 
government control (it is the summary score of different aspects like: the 
existence of a special territorial autonomy, the degree of regional and local 
government direction, etc. -  the higher the score, the higher the degree of 
institutional autonomy), the second measures Central government final 
consumption as a percentage of general government spending (the lower, the 
higher the degree of financial autonomy of regional and local governments). Such 
contributions are important for descriptive purpose, but clearly do not address 
questions about the change processes leading from one institutional setting with 
a given degree of decentralisation and another one with a different degree of 
decentralisation.
Though unquestionably characterised by a wide differentiation in focus, all 
these research agendas seem to have in common a substantive orientation to 
investigating the functioning of stationary decentralised institutional settings, i.e.
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of devolved settings once they are established. They usually, implicitly or 
explicitly, compare different institutional designs of decentralised settings with 
each other and/or with more centralised settings. Important questions about the 
process dynamics of decentralisation and devolution and how public managers 
can improve the transformation process from a centralised into a decentralised 
framework of governance appear to have received only limited attention. Part of 
the explanation of the significant differentiation of the outcomes of devolution 
may lie in the process dynamics - an assumption consistent with the findings of 
the tradition of studies of the implementation literature (a recent overview is 
reported in Hill and Hupe, 2002) and that has strong roots in organisation science 
(March, 1999, Weick, 2001).
There are indeed some research agendas in political science more directly 
related to explaining the dynamics of decentralisation: “what explains the 
dynamics of decentralisation and recentralisation” is the question addressed by 
Christensen in his article in Public Administration (Christensen, 2000). However, 
it may be noted that this work is entirely focused on the pre-decision and decision 
phase of a cycle of policy devolution (the articulation of a policy cycle into three 
phases - pre-decision, decision, implementation - is borrowed from Kingdon, 
1994). The analysis of the organisational transformations occurring in public 
entities in the course of the implementation of devolution receives only limited 
attention. There seems to be room for a research agenda addressed to filling this 
gap and explaining the substantially different outcomes that can be observed in 
the implementation of the same institutional design of devolution.
Another significant study in that line is Brusis (2002). The outcomes explained 
(degree of legal autonomy of regional and local governments, financial 
autonomy, formal relationships between State Administration and Self- 
government, administrative division of the territory) are all related to the making 
of authoritative decisions about features (including the same existence) of 
regional and local governments, and not concerned with the implementation of 
such decisions. Moving form the East to the West of Europe, in a similar vein 
Keating (1996) examines some “main” factors stimulating regionalisation reforms: 
the crisis (occurred in the 70s) of a model of regional development and planning 
“guided from the centre”; the administrative and political overload of the central 
State; the reawakening of sub-national ethnic and cultural identities; demands for 
democratisation and participation; EU policies aimed at stimulating 
regionalisation (especially in the ‘80s), especially the economic and social 
cohesion policy (Allen, 2000).
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While the works of Brusis, Christensen and Keating provide significant 
contributions to the understanding of the decision process that leads to 
authoritative decisions about the establishment of a more decentralised 
institutional setting - an important range of questions about the process whereby 
such institutional frameworks are implemented appears to have been left aside 
or, at least, addressed only indirectly and in an incomplete way.
An exception is Guess (2005), that examines, at a macro-level, processes of 
decentralisation in three developing countries. Three broad types of constraints 
are identified as affecting the implementation of decentralisation, to which the 
author refers as: a) the support by the top level in the Central government and 
the technical capacity present at the local level; b) the political culture and the 
social capital (defined as in Putnam, 1993), c) the design, and especially the 
sequencing of phases, of the decentralisation intervention. However, in the work 
case outcomes are defined in such a way to make it difficult to discriminate 
between institutional design and implementation of decentralisation; for example, 
case outcomes include aspects like: the power of sub-national governments to 
set tax base and rate, or whether the mayor and/or the local council are directly 
elected. Employing these parameters as measures of “successful” 
implementation of decentralisation makes it hard to disentangle the outcomes of 
the pre-decision and decision phase of the policy process, from the outcomes of 
the implementation phase (whether devolved powers are actually exercised and 
tasks performed by the different levels of government). Another critical aspect in 
this work -  in our opinion -  is the fragile causal texture underlying the specific 
connections between the very broad groups of factors deemed to affect the 
process and the specific trajectory characterising the episodes of devolution 
examined.
Another interesting work is the study by Tendler and Freedheim (1994) 
reporting on the implementation of a programme of decentralisation in the health 
sector in Northeast Brazil. The study employs especially notions drawn from 
industrial psychology in order to explain the success of a significant intervention 
of decentralisation carried out under conditions of very limited resources and 
significant external constraints. The present work has many similarities with the 
study of Tendler and Freedheim, especially as regards the orientation to 
developing a process understanding of the dynamics of the devolution process; 
the main difference lies in the “source domain”, i.e. in the conceptual tools 
employed for interpreting the dynamics of the devolution process, having adopted 
in the present work an approach based on the analysis of the social mechanisms 
at work (see paragraph 1.8); an approach that seems to provide a broader range
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of conceptual tools for the interpretation of the varied and differentiated 
processes interacting in an episode of devolution.
1.3 Research questions and design
Review of literature highlights that many important research agendas, though 
highly differentiated in focus and contents, have in common a substantive 
orientation to investigating the functioning of already established, stationary 
decentralised institutional settings. In this work, it is assumed that part of the 
explanation of differentiation in the outcomes of devolution derives from the 
dynamics of the implementation process. Important questions can be formulated 
and addressed about the process dynamics of devolution, and about how public 
managers in countries where devolution is high on the governmental agenda can 
improve the transformation process from a centralised into a decentralised 
institutional framework of governance. Research questions have consequently 
been defined as follows:
1) What are the process dynamics of the organisational transformations 
occurring in public entities in the implementation phase of a cycle of a 
devolution policy?
2) How should the strategic apex of public entities devolving authority lead 
an intervention9 of adaptation of public sector organisations to 
devolution?
Considering the two questions together, the primary topic of the research can 
be labelled as “the management of devolution processes”, and the main issue 
addressed regards how top executives (the notion of strategic apex is borrowed 
from Mintzberg, 1983) can shape the process dynamics of the organisational 
transformations occurring in public entities in the implementation of devolution in 
such ways to perform policy delivery efficiently and effectively (given the 
circumstances they operate in) after the conclusion of the devolution cycle. 
Process dynamics refer here to types of concatenated causal scenarios, like, as 
we shall see, concatenations of social mechanisms.
Contributing to the advancement of an agenda concerned with lesson-drawing 
for public management in the context of devolution (research question 2) is the 
policy issue motivating the research project, whose underpinning lies in 
developing a social science understanding of the dynamics of devolution 
processes (research question 1). This first research question is addressed to
9 An intervention is the process by which an agenda is realised (Barzelay and Thompson, 2003).
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explain the substantially different outcomes that in so many instances can be 
observed at the local level in the implementation of the same institutional design 
of devolution; the typical story is that a country-level devolution reform is enacted 
by the national legislature and its implementation -  if it occurs at all -  shows 
striking differences across the localities where it is implemented.
The work is addressed to both academics and practitioners. The work 
contributes to a research agenda on the management of government operations 
and the design of programmatic organisations in the Context of devolution 
processes; the results may be significant for practitioners engaged in the issue of 
improving the policy-making of devolution.
In addressing the research questions, we assume that the politico- 
administrative context and the tradition of governance of a country have a central 
importance in explaining public sector reforms. The legalistic nature of the 
politico-administrative Italian system (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, employ the 
notion of Rechtsstaat systems, as opposed to public interest Anglo-Saxon 
systems, for characterising the culture of governance in continental European 
countries), and specifically its Napoleonic, France-derived features (Loughlin and 
Peters, 1997) do affect devolution processes. In a complementary, less static and 
more evolutionary perspective (following the idea of the tradition of governance, a 
notion that unpacks the idea of path dependency and gives relevance to the role 
of individual agency and specifically actors’ beliefs, see Bevir, Rhodes and 
Weller, 2003), it is assumed that the persistent influence of the administrative law 
paradigm characterising the Italian tradition of governance provides an important 
part of the explanation of the dynamics of administrative reforms in Italy. Though 
the present work is not a comparative study, the case analysis has been worked 
out in such a way to produce a comparable case study (Ragin, 1987) about the 
influence of the politico-administrative system on devolution processes, by 
explicitly drawing features of the politico-administrative system of Italy from the 
comparative literature in public administration and public management.
The case-oriented investigation has been conducted mainly in an exploratory 
way, for generating hypotheses about the causes of alternative courses of events 
in the unfolding of a devolution reform in a country.
In order to better appreciate this point, we can recall and discuss a conclusion 
of the work by Pollitt et al. (1998). In explaining decentralisation in a number of 
policy fields, the authors employ three theories: the bureau-shaping model 
outlined by Dunleavy in Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public choice (1991); the 
new institutionalist perspective, referring both to the logic of appropriateness as 
outlined in March and Olsen (1989) and to the concept of isomorphism (in the
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three variants: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism) in the original 
elaboration by DiMaggio and Powell (1991); and Hood and Jackson (1991) 
rhetorical analysis. In discussing the explanatory power of the chosen theoretical 
perspectives, though recognising that “each perspective has the potential of 
making a significant contribution to the understanding of those ideas and events 
upon which this book has focused", the authors come to the conclusion that all of 
them, both individually and cumulatively, are weak in interpreting the 
differentiated outcomes at the local level of the implementation of national 
policies of decentralisation (Pollitt et al., 1998, chapter 8). This conclusion drawn 
by Pollitt et al. in their work is an important starting point for the design of the 
present research. It indicates that, when questions about decentralisation are 
taken from a public management research agenda and policy issues are 
discussed (what we do in addressing research question 2), undertaking the path 
of producing a process understanding10 of the dynamics of the organisational 
transformations occurring in public entities may provide a substantive contribution 
to the progression of the research agenda; single causal explanatory models, 
though providing significant contributions, appear to be inadequate to the task of 
explaining such complex phenomena like processes of decentralisation and 
devolution11.
Pollitfs conclusion may be subject to different criticisms: other interpretations 
of the empirical evidence reported in their book, or in other studies, could be 
proposed, in an attempt to trace explanations of decentralisation back to a single 
theoretical framework (one in the above list, or another one). Indeed, a rational 
choice perspective can be interpreted to provide good underpinnings for the 
evidence observed in many instances of devolution in Italy and elsewhere about 
the behaviour of top managers in the public entity devolving authority. Dunleavy 
(1991, see pp. 200-205 in particular) proposes a model of the behaviour of top 
managers that attributes to them a preference for giving away routine, 
administrative tasks in order to be able to concentrate on tasks characterised by: 
a high-level of managerial discretion; a broad scope of concerns; innovative as 
regards the contents, and to be performed in small-size groups with elite 
personnel, instead of having cohorts of officials to direct. This preference 
structure seems capable of predicting important aspects of top managers
10 Intended as a set o f interrelated statements that could be described as a model -  from which to 
produce a framework for intervening in the circumstances of a devolution intervention (on the 
notion of process understanding, see Barzelay, 2003).
11 On the other hand, neither the work of Pollitt nor the present one undertakes the task of testing 
the predictive power of the theories under consideration per se, as general theories for explaining 
change or stability in the public sector (which could be a core task for research agendas centred in 
political science, or in organisation science).
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behaviours as regards decentralisation. However, as it is argued in detail in 
chapter 3, other important aspects of the actual behaviour of top managers in the 
experience of devolution examined seem to be characterised by different patterns 
of behaviour. Theories in the new institutionalism stream may explain evidence of 
patterns of behaviour showing the prevalence of formal compliance to the norms 
and a resulting substantive “hollowing out” of the contents of the reform itself in a 
cultural context dominated by the administrative law paradigm. However, these 
theories do not explain the substantive implementation of devolution that could 
be observed in other instances of devolution, like the Lombardy experience of 
devolution.
All in all, it seems that the general conclusion about the inadequacy of single 
explanatory frameworks for this kind of complex phenomena proposed by a 
prominent scholar in the field of public management, is worth picking up. Some 
form of middle range theorising, with elementary building blocks that can be 
arranged in different (but a limited number of) ways seems to be required for 
improving our understanding of devolution and decentralisation. The approach of 
the social mechanisms analysis, advocated by a number of prominent scholars 
(Boudon, 1991, revisiting the work of Merton, 1968; Elster, 1993; Stinchcombe, 
1989) is likely to bear important fruits also when applied to decentralisation and 
devolution phenomena.
The research design is a single case study. Case-oriented research seems to 
represent an appropriate strategy considering the type of research questions 
posed and the exploratory nature of the inquiry (Yin, 1994). Though we entirely 
agree with Yin that case studies (like other research strategies) can be employed 
in the explanatory as well as in the exploratory phase of a research, especially 
the use of a single-case research strategy can be particularly appropriate for 
exploratory, hypotheses-generating studies. The author also argues that case 
study investigations are especially fit to addressing “why” (i.e.: what explains) and 
“how” research questions, like the ones formulated in the present research -  
while it is unfit for other types of research questions.
The case selected for investigation is devolution in the sector of agriculture in 
the Italian region of Lombardy over the period starting in July 1998 and ending in 
May 2002. As we shall see in closer detail in the second chapter, in July 1998 the 
regional Legislature enacted a law on the devolution of important tasks in 
agriculture to local governments, in May 2002 a new mix of programmatic 
activities was performed by both the regional and the local governments, a new 
range of organisational arrangements were fully at work and a re-alignment of
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workforce across and within tiers of government had been successfully carried 
through.
1.4 Devolution in agriculture in the Italian region of Lombardy: an 
overview
In 1997, a major reform radically reshaped the Italian institutional setting (the 
“Bassanini reform”, named after the Ministro della Funzlone Pubblica - minister of 
the public function - of the time). Intermediary and local governments became in 
charge of performing most public functions; state-level competences were limited 
and explicitly listed. As a result, legislative provisions prescribed that important 
attributions were to be transferred to regions, provinces and municipalities.
Before the reform, Italy was a highly centralised state. This was part of the 
legacy of the legalistic, France-derived model of state established since the 
unification of Italy in the 19th century and remained almost unchanged until the 
mid ‘90s. The regions, provided in the 1946 constitution but established only in 
1970, had limited competencies until the last decade12. A partial exception was 
represented by Sicily, Sardinia, and three very small regions close to the national 
borders and characterised -  in two cases - by the presence of significant 
linguistic and ethnical minorities (these five regions are the so-called regioni a 
statuto sped ale, or regions with a special statute). These regions held some 
significant competencies since the aftermath of World War II, competencies that 
for the remainder of Italy were attributed to the National government. The only 
policy sector in which regions had significant competencies was the healthcare 
sector: in the period 1978-80, regions were given some attributions as an effect 
of a reform; further important attributions in healthcare were transferred to 
regions in the first half of the ‘90s.
The 1997 reform was followed by a “federal” reform of the constitution, in 
2001, enacted by the same political coalition that ruled the country since 1996. 
An effect of the 2001 reform was that the new repartition of powers became 
constitutionally entrenched, thus providing regions and local authorities with a 
stronger juridical basis for their new powers.
12 The first “wave” of devolution (as the 1970 reform is known in Italy) was investigated in the 
international literature mostly with regard to analysing the functioning of the public sector in the 
new (more decentralised) setting compared with the previous one (Gourevitch, 1978, and Tarrow, 
1974) or with reference to the influence of “social capital” on institutional performance (Putnam, 
1993, with Leonardi and Nanetti, and many other publications by the authors).
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Moving from the legislative design to implementation, it soon became evident 
that putting into effect the new decentralised institutional setting throughout Italy 
was extremely demanding. According to the results of an investigation conducted 
on 12 provinces in 8 regions in February 200413, in the field of agriculture only in 
three regions devolution was, in the perception of practitioners, deemed to be at 
a very advanced stage14. The actual execution of the formally conferred 
competences took place in many instances only after years. In some important 
cases, it never took place. Especially the reallocation of workforce across levels 
of government proved to be critical: many formally agreed plans for the 
reallocation of personnel from the central government to regions and local 
authorities were not carried out. For example, the transfer of the “Forest Corps” 
(specialised teams operating in the protection of the environment) from the state 
to regions was resisted and eventually abandoned. The context provided actors 
with means -  ranging from organised lobbying to going on strike - by which they 
could effectively resist pressures (in the form of exercise of formal authority) to 
being reallocated to another employer. Difficulties in the reallocation of workforce 
across the levels of government, a key requirement for the reform to be 
implemented, were present in many other instances of devolution (detailed data 
are provided in chapter 4). These and other implementation problems arose 
notwithstanding the fact that devolution remained high on the governmental 
agenda over the entire period.
As regards devolution in Lombardy, the regional government was ruled by 
Roberto Formigoni since 1995. He won the elections leading a centre-right 
coalition, just a few months after the alliance with the Northern League was 
broken at the national level, an event that had caused the fall of the first 
Berlusconi government. The Northern League was a former secessionist and 
anti-system party, whose electoral success at the beginning of the ‘90s in the 
Northern - and richest - part of the country, set the issue of the “federalist reform 
of the state” high on the political agenda. Formigoni, whose background was as a 
leader of a Catholic movement ideologically in strong favour of the “principle of 
subsidiarity”, soon became a champion of devolution in the Italian political 
scenario.
The sector of agriculture was the first policy field in which the central 
government provisions legally necessary for completing the design of devolution
13 SDA Bocconi School of Management, internal report, 2004.
14 The entire process of devolution of authority (from the state to regions, hence to local 
authorities), was considered. Regions are: Abruzzo, Calabria, Campania, , Emily, Lombardy, 
Marche, Tuscany, Veneto.
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outlined by the Bassanini reform were issued, in 1997; significant competencies 
were transferred to the regional governments. In 1998, the Lombardy regional 
assembly enacted the regional law on devolution in agriculture - Act 11 in 1998 -  
that in turn transferred significant attributions from the region to local authorities. 
Over less than one year after the enactment of the law, the devolved institutional 
setting had been established, personnel reallocated from the region to provinces 
(260 people, more than half the total staff of the Agriculture Directorate General) 
and major reorganisations were occurring at both the regiohal ahd the local level, 
reorganisations that would be completed over the two subsequent years.
In a very schematic way, it is possible to distinguish three phases in the 
attitude of elected officials about devolution, marked by electoral rounds. Before 
2000 regional elections, between 2000 and 2001 (when the national elections 
were held), after 2001. Before 2000, the devolution issue was central in the 
public debate at the national level, mainly because of the electoral success of the 
Northern League in the previous decade, which had reached its apex in the 1996 
elections. The Northern League could play an important role in determining the 
winner of the 2000 regional electoral round; indeed that was the case, since the 
party joined the ruling coalition and contributed to its electoral success (and the 
confirmation of Formigoni as president of the regional government). Thus, the 
issue of devolution was both high on the central government agenda and on the 
regional government agenda in the period 1998-2000, when opposite coalitions 
were running, respectively, the Lombardy region and the national government.
Between 2000 and 2001 (when national general elections were held), the 
political competition between the regional and the central government became 
even tougher: as national elections were approaching, both coalitions were 
struggling to show to voters, especially in the Northern area of Italy, their 
commitment to the progression of the devolution agenda.
After 2001, when the same coalition of parties ruling the Lombardy regional 
government won the national general elections, a different mood, less conflictual 
with the central government seemed to orient the regional government, more in 
the direction of “institutionalising” the results already achieved regarding 
devolution, while at the same time “consolidating” the public image of the regional 
government of Lombardy as the precursor and the champion of devolution in 
Italy.
Moving the focus from the wider political dynamic to the core of our interest, 
the episode of devolution in Lombardy, a previous event that proved to be
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particularly significant for the unfolding of the story of devolution15 was the 
adoption by the Lombardy regional government, in 1997, of an internal regulation 
that determined a very high level of discretion and flexibility in the appointment of 
tenured officials to different stints. The grasp of the government (elected officials 
and their appointees) on the “administrative machine” became very strong, also 
because this provision was adopted within the frame of a major reorganisation 
intervention that led to important changes in the responsibility and powers of 
managers and to a selective reduction of the total number of managers. The 
Lombardy region organisational structure had a divisional configuration; divisions 
were named Direzioni Generali, or directorates general, each competent for an 
area of public intervention. The figure of the director general, i.e. the head of a 
directorate general, became crucial in the functioning of the administrative 
machine. General directors were formally appointed by the regional government 
collegial executive body (the Giunta), but de facto selected by the president of 
the region and his closest collaborators.
Major internal transfers occurred, especially during and in the aftermath of the 
1997 reorganisation. In the agriculture directorate general, just before or during 
the period of observation (spanning from 1998 to 2002), there was a complete 
turnover in the top positions. Especially in two key positions for the devolution 
process to occur (the director general and the responsible of the “organisational 
unit for the management of the relations with local authorities”), charismatic 
people with reputation, skills and an orientation to interpret in an “entrepreneurial” 
way their role were appointed. Paolo Baccolo, director general, and Sandro 
Cioccarelli, manager of the organisational unit for the relations with local 
authorities, were under pressure for making the devolution agenda progress, and 
they became committed to this goal.
They called plenary and individual meetings with staff in local authorities, who 
manifested concerns regarding the wide structural re-organisations implied by the 
execution of the new tasks and the integration of personnel from the region: more 
than half the total staff of the agriculture directorate general of about five hundred 
people was going to be transferred to the local governments. Regional managers 
granted the financial and technical resources, including premises, and activated 
training courses jointly attended by personnel from the regional and the local 
governments. Cioccarelli and his collaborators run a project for developing the 
Information Technology (IT) platform that was supporting the delivery of services 
in agriculture; the platform was common to all staff in both the regional and the
15 The study considers both devolution from the Lombardy region to local governments and 
devolution from the central state to the region. A list of formal competences before and after the 
laws on devolution in agriculture is reported in Table 1.3.
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local governments. Baccolo and Cioccarelli performed a crucial role in setting to 
work a venue - the Tavolo Istituzionale per I’Agricoltura, or inter-institutional table 
for agriculture - for elected and tenured officials from both the region and local 
authorities to consult, which proved to be very important for the implementation of 
devolution.
Once negotiations with local governments on the contingents of personnel and 
with trade unions on labour conditions were concluded, regional managers 
proceeded firmly and rapidly to the reallocation of staff. There were no hotbeds Of 
protest, neither at the level of the individuals directly affected by the transfer, nor 
by trade unions’ representatives. During 1999, in a few months, a total number of 
260 people were transferred to local governments.
Managers in the region also cared about agricultural businesses, the final 
recipients of the agricultural policy. An “agricultural table” was established as the 
venue for engaging top managers of agricultural businesses’ associations in a 
formal consultation procedure, activated whenever an important legislative bill 
was under discussion. In 2001, the regional government established and 
introduced a formal accreditation procedure for the Centri di Assistenza Agricola 
(Centres for Agricultural Assistance - CAA). Promoted by agricultural businesses’ 
associations (though formally distinct and with the statute of Limited 
Responsibility Companies), the CAA were contracted important tasks in the 
delivery of funds to farmers and strongly contributed to the functioning of the 
newly established organismo pagatore regionale (regional funding body), that 
inherited from the central government most of the tasks in the execution of 
payments to agricultural businesses (as part of the implementation of the process 
of devolution of tasks from the national government to the Lombardy region). The 
story of devolution in agriculture in Lombardy is illustrated in detail in chapter 2.
1.5 The broader context (in motion) of the devolution process in 
Lombardy
In what frame of institutional rules did the events succinctly intorduced in the 
previous paragraph unfold? Assuming the perspective of the managers in the 
Lombardy regional government, a first important set of rules are those 
constraining the way financial, human, material, and informational resources can 
be acquired and utilised. The notion of public management policy is especially 
useful in this respect (Barzelay, 2001); outcomes of public management policies 
in a country are government-wide institutional rules and organisational routines in
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the areas of expenditure planning and financial management, audit and 
evaluation, civil service and labour relations, organisation and methods, and 
procurement that guide, constrain and motivate the public service. Outcomes of 
previous and contemporaneous events of reform in the areas of public 
management in Italy over the period spanning from 1992 to 2002 are reported in 
Table 1.116 (data have been elaborated from Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, pp. 
264-269).
16 Authoritative decisions in the area of “procurement”, treated separately by Barzelay (2001), 
have been included in the column “organisation and methods”.
Expenditure 
planning and 
financial 
management
Audit and 
evaluation
Civil service and 
labour relations
Organisation and 
methods
Provisions in
primary and
secondary
legislation
regulating
expenditure
procedures
(cash
constraints, 
block grants, 
and other 
procedures) 
(1992-93)
Legislative 
decree 77/95: 
regulation of 
local authorities 
accounting 
(1995)
Law 94/97 and 
legislative 
decree 279/97: 
State budget 
and accounting 
reform (1997)
Regional budget 
and accounting 
reform (2000)
Legislative 
decree 20/94 
and 24/94: 
regulation of 
powers, 
Competences 
and hiring 
procedures of 
the Corte dei 
Conti (National 
Audit Office) 
(1994)
Legislative 
decree 286/99: 
definition and 
regulation of the 
four types of 
“control” to be in 
use in central 
government and 
(on a non- 
mandatory 
basis) in 
regional and 
local
governments:
the
administrative 
control, the 
management 
control, the 
strategic control 
(a form of 
evaluation of 
public policies), 
the evaluation of 
public managers 
(“control of 
public 
managers’ 
performance 
and behaviour”) 
(1999)
Legislative 
decree 29/93: 
public
employment is 
subject to the 
general rules of 
private 
employment 
(1993)
Legislative 
decree 80/1998: 
regulation of 
public
employment
(1998)
National 
collective work 
contracts: 
flexible 
appointment 
procedures and 
performance- 
pay rules (1998)
Presidential 
decree 324/00: 
some changes 
in recruitment of 
executive 
management 
(2000)
Legislative 
decree 165/01: 
unification of 
rules governing 
public
employment, 
“spoils system” 
procedures
Provision about 
the
establishment of 
the offices for 
the relationships 
with the public 
(1993)
Provision about 
the adoption of 
the charters of 
services in many 
sectors (1994) 
Legislative 
decree 127/97 
on
administrative 
simplification: it 
includes the 
provision of 
compulsory one- 
stop shops for 
undertakings at 
the local level 
(1997-98) 
Legislative 
decree 300/99 
and 303/99: 
merger of 
Ministries and 
establishment of 
executive 
agencies ruled 
by performance 
contracts (1999); 
regulation of 
powers and 
tasks of 
territorial offices 
of the
government 
(prefects) 
Centralisation of 
public
procurement 
(compulsory for 
National 
Ministries); 
regulation of 
electronic bids 
(1999-2002)
Table 1.1: outcomes of main events in public management policy in Italy 
(1992-2002)
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It seems there have been two major policy cycles in public management over 
the time span considered, one taking place in the period 1992-94, the other 
taking place in 1996-99. As regards the 1992-94 policy cycle, it can be 
interpreted as starting with the Amato government, after the general elections 
held in the spring 1992, in which the Northern League obtained a significant 
success. The dynamic of the Italian politics was also affected by the “clean 
hands” inquiry on bribery, that began in the winter of 1992 and was something of 
a watershed: it discredited a large part of the political and business elite, and 
provided a catalyst for deep changes in the party system and the whole political 
class. The monetary crisis in the summer of 1992 was another event that made a 
major impact and led to a new attitude and approach to the management of the 
national deficit and to tremendous pressures on public organisations to find 
savings17. The main outcomes of the public management policy cycle that started 
in 1992 and unfolded under the Amato and the Ciampi governments (with Sabino 
Cassese minister of the public function) were: the profound change of the 
regulation of the civil service (legislative decree 29/93, that many Italian 
commentators deemed as a history-making event as regards public sector reform 
in the country), and the modifications in the rules and routines in expenditure 
planning and financial management.
The 1996-99 public management policy cycle - a period in which the public 
agenda was dominated by the goal of meeting the EU convergence criteria 
necessary for joining the European single currency (euro) - started with the Prodi 
government and ended with the first D’Alema government (Franco Bassanini was 
minister of the public function, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi minister of the economy). 
Main outcomes were the administrative simplification (legislative decree 127/97), 
the reorganisation of the central government (legislative decrees 300/99 and 
303/99), the reforms in expenditure planning and financial management 
(legislative decree 279/97 for the state budget followed by the regional budget 
and accounting reform of 2000), and the new regulation of the system of controls 
in the public sector (legislative decree 286/99).
A major outcome of the policy cycle of administrative reforms was also the 
enactment of the law 59/97 on devolution that starts the experience accounted in 
the present work. It is debated whether devolution is to be included in the public
17 In this overview of public management reform in Italy and the contextual events that affected it, 
we follow the model proposed by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004, chapter 2) and applied to Italy 
(pp.264-269 -  see also Ongaro, 2002). The model is based on the centrality o f the elite (executive 
politicians and top bureaucrats) decision-making, as affected by three main groups of factor: socio­
economic forces, the dynamics of the political system, and chance events (like scandals, etc.); the 
implementation of elite decisions is deeply affected by the features o f the politico-administrative 
context.
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management policy: according to the classification adopted by Barzelay (2001), it 
is outside the public management policy scope (and for this reason not present in 
Table 1.1, elaborated according to that classification); other authors put emphasis 
on decentralisation and devolution being interventions for improving performance 
in the public sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004) and in this respect it is included 
in the trajectory of reform in public management of a country. Independently of 
the classificatory categories adopted, it is undoubtedly within the policy process 
referred to as “the administrative reform of the state” which took place under the 
Prodi government that the legislative decree on “administrative decentralisation” 
was formulated and enacted18.
An interpretation of the consistent flow of authoritative decisions in the areas 
of public management is that these two periods were characterised by the 
opening of a policy window (Kingdon, 1994) that was utilised by some policy 
entrepreneurs (mainly the ministers of the public function of the time, and the 
economy ministers in the 1996-99 cycle) for making some ideas about the reform 
of the public sector be enacted - ideas that had been circulating in some 
academic circuits during the previous decade; a period of stability in the policy 
subsystem19 followed the opening of the policy window and allowed the flow of 
consistent decisions that could be observed (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), 
embodied in the many “delegated decrees” that followed the administrative 
simplification law, the decentralisation law and in the provisions that followed the 
state budget and accounting reform.
Major changes occurred also in the politico-administrative system of Italy, 
before and during the devolution process in Lombardy. A first set of events 
concerns changes in the electoral rules: a reform in 1993 introduced the direct 
election of mayors and presidents of provincial governments and a “majority 
premium” that ensured a sixty percent of seats to the coalition associated with the 
mayor/president that wins the election. The same year a majoritarian electoral 
system for the national assembly was enacted. A form of bipolar political system 
took place in the 1994 general elections, with a major repositioning of important
18 The term “decentralisation” translates the Italian “decentramento”; however, the actual content 
of the law is about devolution, according to the definition previously specified, of authority from 
the central to regional and local governments. Similarly, the term “administrative” translates the 
Italian “amministrativo”, which from a juridical point of view, in the Italian system, means that the 
reform is made via ordinary law without modifying the constitution (which can be changed only 
by constitutional laws, enacted with specific procedures and a qualified majority). However, the 
actual content is about political decentralisation of authority from the central to regional and local 
governments, i.e. devolution according to the terminology adopted. In the remainder of the work, 
we will refer to this law mainly as the “national law on devolution”.
19 The policy subsystem includes, from an institutional point of view, inter alia, the presidency of 
the council of ministers, the public function department, the ministry of the economy.
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segments of the electorate. Regional elections in 1995 unfolded according to this 
pattern, with two major coalitions running for the government. Electoral rules 
were modified also at the regional level in 1999, when the direct election of the 
regional president was introduced and a majority premium established.
After these reforms, at the local and regional level a fully majoritarian voting 
system was in place (though in two different versions, for local authorities and for 
regions), based on the direct election of the mayor/president and on a 
mechanism attributing an automatic majority of seats in the local or regional 
assembly to the coalition supporting the winner. At the central level, in the lower 
house there was a first-past-the-post system for three-quarters of the seats, and 
a proportional system for one-quarter of seats, with a threshold at four percent for 
parties to get a share of these seats. A similar system (mainly majoritarian but 
tempered by a proportional mechanism) was used in the upper house. Both in 
1996 and in 2001, one of the two major coalitions running for the government 
won the majority in both houses (notwithstanding some differences in the 
electoral systems).
At the local level, the power of parties and their “machineries” was much 
reduced in favour of elected officials (mayors and presidents). This represented a 
relevant shift: in the past, the nerve-centres of political power were held by the 
politicians able to dominate the complicate mechanisms of the party machineries, 
persons usually different from those in office; indeed both at the central and at 
the local level governments usually changed every 10-12 months, thus 
determining a very high turnover of people in office, though quite often the same 
people occupied a different position in the new government, a sort of “sliding 
doors” phenomenon which characterised the composition of governments in Italy 
at all levels. Another major change was that elected assemblies lost relevance in 
favour of directly elected, usually very popular, mayors or presidents. This 
determined a relevant change in the political component of the elite running 
public institutions in Italy.
Another contemporaneous event occurred in the specific policy sector of 
agriculture. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union had a 
formal planning cycle extending over seven years. The new planning cycle 
started in 2000. The outcome of the policy process that took place at the 
European level was a new set of rules, codified in the Regulation 1257/99 issued 
by the European Council on the 17th of May, 1999, that affected the process of 
devolution in agriculture in different ways. First, some decision powers as regards 
the planning of government intervention were devolved to the country level.
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Second, rules regarding compliance to EU norms and accountability were 
strengthened. The effects of the new CAP cycle were especially significant as the 
new regulation in Italy combined with the 1997 law on devolution: important 
regulatory powers devolved from the European level to countries were attributed 
to regional governments, not to the central one.
Another story is important for situating the process: the outcome of a 
referendum, a few years before, that abolished the national ministry of 
agriculture. The referendum was promoted against a symbol of bureaucratic 
inefficiency, and the YES won with a strong majority. A subsequent government 
intervention established a “new” ministry with a slightly modified name and 
competencies that were very similar to those previously held by the agriculture 
ministry. Politically, however, this “re-established” administration was quite weak 
in front of regional governments that had just been given some new important 
attributions in agricultural issues.
In the regulation of the economic development of the primary sector, regional 
governments exercised their new powers also by establishing systematic 
contacts with managers in the agriculture directorate general of the European 
commission in Brussels, which holds supervisory powers with regard to both 
national and regional Piani di Sviluppo Rurale, or “Rural Development Plans”, the 
formal documents defining public interventions in agriculture -  the national Rural 
Development Plan constituting a sort of general frame within which regional 
governments can specify the detailed contents of the public intervention in the 
territory of competence.
Another element to consider is that EU regulations, differently from EU 
directives, are immediately enforceable in all member countries; national and 
regional regulations represent only a form of secondary legislation, whose 
contents have to comply to the community-level rules. Attitudes of EU officials 
affect the actual discretion in the exercise of both the national and the regional 
governments’ regulatory powers.
An effective interpretation of the CAP as the purest template of a distinctive 
community method of policy-making -  and a critical analysis of the distance of 
the template outlined at the beginning of the ‘60th from its actual embodiments, 
especially for what concerns the influence of national politics on its outcomes - is 
reported in Wallace and Wallace (2000, fourth edition, chapters 1 and 7). The 
community method is indeed one of several -  the authors propose five - policy 
modes in the European Union. The most significant feature of CAP for our study 
of devolution processes is its corporatist nature. This feature affects reforms in 
this policy sector, especially as regards the influence key stakeholders have in
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either hampering or facilitating policies, like devolution, that entail the reshaping 
of the institutional balance of powers in the policy system. Indeed, having 
engaged stakeholders in the devolution intervention in the Lombardy case, and 
having had them to side with the regional top managers, was important for 
implementing devolution. People employed in agriculture shrunk from about 25% 
at the beginning of the ‘50s to about 3% of the working population in the period of 
observation. However, agricultural businesses’ associations remained especially 
important in the political arena, not only because of the inheritance of their past 
influence, but also because of their strong “corporatist” grasp on this potential 
pool of voters: votes could be easily concentrated on selected candidates. 
Moreover, farmers’ associations remained very influential as economic actors20. 
The three main associations, representing almost the entirety of agricultural 
businesses, were (are) named Coldiretti (representing in Lombardy about 50% of 
businesses), Confagricoltura (40%), and CIA (the remaining 10%).
The CAP represents a sector in which the public intervention is heavily 
influential on the economic results of businesses operating in the field; in effect 
the CAP can be considered a component of the Western European welfare state 
(following the interpretation proposed by Rieger, 2000), whose main goal is 
ensuring a high stability of farmers’ income, hence the consensus of this 
component of society and the economy towards the European integration 
process (or, at least, these were the intentions of policy-makers when such a 
system was established in the ‘60s).
1.6 The Lombardy experience of devolution: case outcomes
In the selection and analysis of the Lombardy case of devolution in agriculture, 
outcomes have been identified in the organisational transformations that 
occurred, and characterised in terms of some key functional requirements of the 
effective implementation of devolution:
1) programmatic activities performed: implementing devolution requires to 
radically alter the mix of programmatic activities performed by all tiers of 
government. The regional government changed significantly its core tasks: it 
almost entirely abandoned the delivery of services to agricultural businesses, 
whilst it strengthened some functions (the provision of advice to elected officials) 
and established entirely new ones: the delivery of subsidies to agricultural
20 The corporatist nature of the policy system is a context factor considered for proper 
generalisation o f findings (chapter 4).
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businesses (previously executed by a national agency, named AGEA); the 
provision of advice and services to local governments, as well as the back office 
for running a procedure of consultation with local authorities; and the provision of 
conditions facilitating the systematic engagement of farmers’ associations in 
policy formulation as well as in service delivery;
2) workforce realignment performing the new programmatic activities requires 
the reallocation of personnel across levels of government. In the Lombardy case, 
an important part of the workforce was reallocated from the region to local 
governments; another part of the staff was transferred to a new body (the 
regional Funding Body), as an effect of devolution of tasks from the central 
government to the Lombardy region. Changes occurred also in the job 
description of the staff that remained in the regional government;
3) organisational arrangements established: performing effectively the new 
core tasks requires a radically different organisational configuration in the public 
entities involved, in terms of: macro-structure, including the establishment of new 
bodies; individual positions; co-ordination mechanisms; internal 
decentralisation21. The agriculture directorate general of the regional government 
changed from a configuration that in a broad way could be characterised as a 
machine bureaucracy into an organisation having many features of the 
professional bureaucracy. Specific bodies were established (like the regional 
funding body, in charge of the delivery of public subsidies to agricultural 
businesses) and new co-ordination mechanisms were set to work (like the “inter- 
institutional table for agriculture”, a venue for elected and tenured officials in both 
the regional and the local governments to meet and facilitate joint decision­
making and implementation).
Case outcomes are reported in Table 1.2. Five outcomes have been identified 
and characterised according to the transformations occurred along the three 
dimensions (changes in the programmatic activities performed, the realignment of 
workforce and the organisational arrangements established). In the Lombardy 
case of devolution in agriculture, the innovation process was characterised by a 
radically new mix of programmatic activities and a deep redefinition of the 
organisational arrangements - a magnitude and a rapidity of change quite rare in 
the scenario of the implementation of the devolution reform in Italy -  and by a 
reallocation of workforce that unfolded as a smooth and undisputed process. 
Explanation of such outcomes may provide important elements for the
21 The scheme of analysis of the organisational configuration is taken from Mintzberg (1983).
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understanding of the dynamics of the implementation of devolution and the 
alternative courses of events that may occur.
The characterisation of outcomes has been suggested by a quite conventional 
consideration of literature: the performance of a different mix of programmatic 
activities is a common characterisation of change in public policy implementation 
literature, as the realignment of workforce (reallocation and/or reconversion to a 
different job description) and the establishment of new and different structural 
arrangements are a quite common way of characterising analytically significant 
outcomes of change in organisational literature. Change in the programmatic 
activities is a condition for putting into effect the new designed division of labour, 
a situation characterised by the fact each organisation in the policy subsystem 
routinely operates and sets targets consistently with its new attributions. 
Workforce realignment regards providing public entities with the skills required for 
performing the new tasks22. Organisational arrangements regard putting into 
effect the organisational solutions fit for attaining the new targets, and setting to 
work routines providing organisational stability (March, 1999, p.76) in the new 
circumstances of the devolved institutional setting23. By explaining such 
outcomes it is possible to improve our understanding of devolution processes24.
In examining the chosen case outcomes (Table 1.2), some considerations can 
be developed about the relations with (expected) “final outcomes” of a devolution 
reform (paragraph 1.1). The performance of programmatic activities like the 
provision of services to local authorities is likely to be conducive to reducing 
inconsistencies in the public sector (a potential “side effect” of devolution). 
Facilitating the execution of devolved tasks by local authorities may also create 
the conditions for having the local authorities to actually wield their powers in 
regulating the economic development of the rural sector in their locality, thus 
introducing some differentiation according to the local needs in the agricultural 
policy. The provision of conditions for the engagement of farmers’ associations in
22 Personnel resources are only one category of resources: material (premises, etc.) and financial 
resources are equally important for the running of the new tasks. However, they are less 
problematic, in the Lombardy case, in which the regional Government endowed Local Authorities 
with adequate financial and other resources, and more generally in other instances of devolution in 
Italy: financial resources were usually available, while it was the transfer o f personnel to be 
problematic -  for reasons that are widely examined in chapter 3.
3 Here, we put emphasis on routines as a source of stability -  i.e. we employ a more “traditional” 
view of routines as individual habits or programmes that allow an organisation to maximise 
efficiency and legitimacy, and minimise conflict and ontological insecurity -  though we agree with 
Feldman and Pentland (2003) that this represents only part o f the story, as routines may be sources 
of stability as well as of change, as the authors argue by introducing the distinction between the 
ostensive and the performative aspect of a routine.
24 Specific features of such outcomes depend on the policy package to be implemented (what 
programmatic activities will be performed by which level of government); in the analysis, 
transformations have been categorised in terms as abstract as possible from the detailed features of 
the policy package in the Lombardy experience.
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policy formulation and delivery may encourage recipients of the policy process to 
play a more active role in it. The reallocation of significant contingents of 
personnel to the authorities in charge of new tasks has important implications in 
terms of avoiding duplications and thus a likely increase in overall “costs” of the 
public sector after devolution.
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Programmatic
Activities
Workforce
Realignment
Organisational
Arrangements
Outcome 1) Elimination of service 
delivery function (at 
regional level)
Reallocation of
Establishment of the 
service delivery 
function (at local 
level)
personnel from the 
region to local 
governments
Set up of a machine 
bureaucracy for 
service delivery (local 
level)
Integration of former 
regional units with the 
“back office” of the 
organisational 
structure in local 
authorities
Outcome 2) Provision of advice to 
elected officials
Change of job 
description
Change to 
Professional 
Bureaucracy 
(regional level)
Outcome 3) Delivery of subsidies 
to agricultural 
businesses
Reallocation of 
personnel from the 
region to the funding 
body
Establishment of the 
regional funding body
Accreditation of the 
Centres of 
Agricultural 
Assistance (CAA)
Outcome 4) Provision of 
advice/services to 
local governments
Provision of 
conditions for the 
engagement of local 
governments in policy 
formulation and 
implementation
Change of job 
description
Change to 
professional 
bureaucracy (at the 
regional level)
Establishment of the 
procedure for 
consultation with 
local governments
Outcome 5) Provision of 
conditions for the 
engagement of 
stakeholders in policy 
formulation and 
delivery
Change of job 
description
Change to 
professional 
bureaucracy (regional 
level)
Establishment of the 
procedure for 
consultation with 
farmers’ associations
Table 1.2: case outcomes
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All in all, the intermediate outcomes selected for examination are likely to be 
conducive to at least some of the final outcomes usually considered as results 
that a devolution intervention should produce, though the linkage between 
intermediate and final outcomes is problematic. There are in fact a number of 
practical and methodological barriers in achieving a rigorous evaluation and 
attribution of performance changes (Pollitt et al., 1998, pp. 164-165): the difficulty 
in measuring performance (operationalisation of the dimensions of performance), 
the almost impossibility of collecting ex ante data (to make a before-and-after 
evaluation), the logical difficulties in attributing change in performance to 
devolution, because of the important contemporaneous changes occurring at the 
same time in the public sector (see also Table 1.1). Another difficulty is related to 
the specific policy sector in the country considered. The Common Agricultural 
Policy is primarily a “distributive” policy: the main output is the delivery of 
subsidies finalised to support the income of farmers - though there are also other 
goals of the CAP, including ensuring safety of food and safeguard of the 
environment, which determine the performance of a range of services and 
administrative tasks (from control over health standards in production processes 
to land drainage interventions -  see also Table 1.3) other than the delivery of 
funds. In this respect, programmatic and organisational changes concerning what 
levels of government administers the case management of farmers’ applications 
may have limited influence on the final outcomes (sustaining the income of 
farmers).
Some approaches could be proposed for overcoming, or at least attenuating, 
the difficulties identified. Instead of struggling in an impervious collection of ex 
ante data, perceptions by managers -  collected by interviews - about some 
profiles of improvement of policy delivery in Lombardy could be considered as 
indicators of a trend in the effectiveness of public services (whether improvement 
or worsening) before and after the devolution reform -  though with all the huge 
limitations of relying on perceptions about events that unfolded over a long period 
of time. Another approach is the investigation of the final recipients of the 
agricultural policy, i.e. businesses in the sector. A survey commissioned by the 
Lombardy regional government in January 2005 showed a high degree of 
satisfaction by agricultural businesses as regards the interface with the public 
sector for activities related to the delivery of public subsidies, a result that might 
provide an indirect confirmation about the quality of policy delivery in agriculture 
after devolution25. Quality of the interface with users may be an important part of 
policy delivery, even if the regulatory framework remains unchanged. Some other
25 SDA Bocconi School o f Management internal report, February, 2005.
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data are more “objective” and can be more easily collected: e.g. the volumes of 
administrative controls over the employment of public subsidies carried out 
before and after devolution (the assumption being that the more the controls, the 
less frauds and abuses are likely -  limiting the number and size of abuses being 
an important performance indicator in distributive policies), an indicator that 
indeed showed an increase - though again, attributing it to devolution is 
problematic. Another approach could lie in considering the overall process in 
Lombardy as a major intervention dominated by the priority of devolution, and 
accordingly attribute changes in policy delivery to devolution -  an approach which 
appears, at least, quite arbitrary.
These difficulties suggest the importance of explaining change in terms of 
outcomes like workforce realignment, programmatic activities performed and 
organisational arrangements established: they represent a direct result of the 
devolution process, whose dynamics are the subject of the present study, which 
in addition can also be reasonably considered as conducive to improved 
performance, as well as to other important results of devolution beyond improved 
service delivery, like enhancing citizens engagement in the policy process, 
increasing local differentiation of public policies, keeping cohesion and avoiding 
inconsistencies in the public sector (especially between levels of government), 
and reducing duplications. More importantly, as already made clear, these 
outcomes are directly linked to the organisational change that occurs in 
devolution processes, which is the proper focus of the research questions 
addressed -  understanding the dynamics of devolution processes and how top 
executives should lead such interventions.
Programmatic activities actually performed and the related changes in 
organisational arrangements and workforce in the Lombardy case (Table 1.2) can 
be contrasted with the mandatory tasks attributed by the national and regional 
legislation to the regional government (Table 1.3 reports the formal attributions of 
different tiers of government before and after the national law on devolution - Act 
143 in 1997 - and the regional law on devolution in agriculture - Act 11 in 1998). 
Competences in the delivery of subsidies were devolved from the central 
government to the Lombardy region, together with some regulatory powers. 
Delivery of services and other competences were devolved from the region to 
local authorities.
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Formal
competences
Lombardy 
region 
before Act 
143/97 and 
Act 11/98
Lombardy 
region after 
Act 143/97 
and Act 
11/98
Local 
authorities 
in Lombardy 
before Act 
143/97 and 
Act 11/98
Local 
authorities in 
Lombardy 
after Act 
143/97 and 
Act 11/98
Delivery of 
financial 
subsidies to 
agricultural 
businesses
Case
management of 
applications (no 
final delivery of 
subsidies)
Delivery of 
subsidies (by 
way of the 
regional 
Funding Body)
No tasks Case
management of 
applications
Control over 
proper spending 
of subsidies, 
production 
processes, 
health standards
Limited tasks Setting of 
control criteria 
and targets 
(e.g.: number 
of inspections, 
etc.)
No tasks Control of 
regularity and 
on the field 
inspections
Delivery of 
services for the 
territory
Service
delivery
Delivery of a 
few services 
(mostly 
contracted to 
the regional 
executive 
agency)
Regulation of
service
delivery
No tasks Delivery of 
most services
Regulation of the 
rights of 
utilisation of 
territory
Limited
regulatory
powers
Increased
regulatory
powers
Very limited
regulatory
powers
Very limited
regulatory
powers
Accordance of 
licenses (for the 
cultivation of 
specific 
products, for 
farm-holiday, 
etc.)
Case
management of 
applications
Limited
regulatory
powers
Regulation 
(direct 
provision of 
“quality and 
place of origin” 
certification)
Limited tasks Case
management of 
applications
Table 1.3: Formal competences before and after the national and 
the regional laws on devolution in agriculture
Especially from the standpoint of the administrative law paradigm dominant in 
Italy (Capano, 2003, see paragraph 1.1 and chapter 3), in which “not prescribed 
means proscribed”, some differences between mandatory and actual tasks 
performed are striking. So was the magnitude and rapidity of change, and the 
smooth way the reallocation of workforce unfolded.
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What explains the transformations that occurred in the agriculture directorate 
general of Lombardy region in the course of the implementation of devolution? 
The analysis has been developed by addressing three main questions:
1) What explains the actual behaviour of regional top managers in the 
Agriculture Directorate General and the way they led the intervention of 
adaptation to devolution to determine the outcomes observed?
2) What explains the scale of re-alignment of the workforce from the region 
to local governments?
3) What explains the significant degree of difference from the previous 
organisational arrangements?
The first question is in some sense preliminary and it is addressed to 
explaining the behaviour of regional top managers in the agriculture directorate 
general of Lombardy region and the consistency of the decisions that were made 
by them during the implementation episode. The second question is focused on 
explaining outcome 1, while the third one is concerned with the overall outcomes 
of the devolution process.
These questions are discussed in chapter 3, after the illustration of the 
Lombardy experience. On that basis, some theorisations are drawn about the 
dynamics of the implementation of devolution processes (chapter 4) and 
subsequently employed in the definition of practices for the management of 
interventions of devolution (chapter 5). We can now turn to preview the overall 
results of the research.
1.7 A preview of the results of the research
Three sets of factors have been identified that affect the dynamics of the 
devolution process. A first set relates to the cultural dimension and the features of 
the politico-administrative system, including the nature of the executive 
government and the type and degree of political competition. A second one can 
be expressed in terms of the rules and routines established by the public 
management policy in a given country (Barzelay, 2001 and 2003), especially the 
regulation of the civil service.
The third set of factors regards the organisation constitution and the 
management systems at the level of the individual public sector organisations in 
the devolution process, including the human resource management system, the 
organisational configuration, the budgeting system. They depend partly on public
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management reforms at the national level (which may provide important 
pressures on individual public sector organisations for changing their 
management systems) and partly on the specific history of the organisation and 
the way it has been run by elected and tenured officials.
As regards the way these factors affect devolution, a first tentative statement 
is that the joint presence of a) functional features of the executive government 
that favour the stability and cohesion of the dominant coalition and b) human 
resource management systems capable of providing incentives to performance- 
orientated behaviours and allowing flexibility in the appointment of top managers, 
enables a selection process likely to lead to appoint public managers with an 
entrepreneurial approach and to provide incentives that - especially when 
concatenated with a mechanism of actor certification26 - enhance the likelihood of 
them adopting a course of action conducive to the effective implementation of 
devolution.
A second set of claims that may be drawn from the analysis of the Lombardy 
experience is that monetary incentives or promotions are important but likely not 
to be enough for making the reallocation of personnel to lower levels of 
government a smooth process in countries in the Napoleonic tradition of 
governance - in which the status is higher and, quite often, the contractual 
conditions are much more favourable in the upper tiers of government. The 
forming of a belief of inevitability (Weick, 2001) and the contemporaneous 
inhibition of a mechanism of attribution of threaf7, and the triggering of forms of 
rational imitation at the individual level (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998) are 
important ingredients for explaining the realignment of workforce. The 
combination of these social mechanisms (see paragraph 1.8) provides an 
interpretation of why and how workforce realignment can occur in a smooth way 
under circumstance that should otherwise hamper the process. The realignment 
of workforce is a process sensitive to factors like the culture of governance and 
the high status and profile of career paths associated with working in higher tiers 
of government in the national tradition of governance in Italy (as well as in other 
countries with a similar administrative tradition). It is also sensitive to the set of 
options available to managers to lead the intervention, like the articulation of the 
legal instruments by which staff can be rewarded (in turn affected by the current 
regulation of pay schemes in the public sector); and by the set of options 
available to staff to resist change, which include means ranging from organised
26 Certification (MeAdam et al., 2001, p. 145) refers to the validation of actors, their performance 
and their claims by external authorities. This and the other mechanisms introduced here are 
examined later, see paragraph 1.8 and chapter 3.
27 Attribution of threat is an activating mechanism (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001, p. 43 and 
95) responsible for the mobilisation of previously inert populations (or social groups in general).
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lobbying to going on strike; the efficacy of such means vary considerably from 
country to country (and sometimes within the same country). There are also other 
factors, related to the organisation constitution, influencing the realignment of 
workforce: the culture bias of the organisation devolving staff and of the public 
entities to which personnel is reallocated, that affects the integration of staff in the 
recipient organisations; and the financial, logistical and other resources available 
to both the devolving and the recipient organisations for sustaining the 
intervention.
A third conclusion regards the importance of the concatenation of three social 
mechanisms for sustaining momentum of the implementation process: 
appropriation of mobilising structures28, brokerage29 and actor certification. The 
concatenation of the social mechanisms of appropriation of mobilising structures 
by the top management in the public entity leading the devolution intervention, 
brokerage of the devolution agenda with key stakeholders’ agenda, and actor 
certification by top managers of new and different behaviours in the middle 
management determines sustained momentum of the intervention of devolution, 
as well as providing an important contribution to increasing intra- and inter- 
organisational co-ordination.
Findings of the research are integrated with results reported in literature in 
order to draw a broader scheme that might be useful for advancing our 
knowledge about the dynamics of the implementation of devolution processes. 
We have seen (paragraph 1.2) that Pollitt et al. (1998) have sketched a possible 
outline of a theory of “implementation habitats for decentralisation”, or, using a 
more conventional terminology, a scheme of the main factors affecting the 
implementation of decentralisation. The notion of “habitat” should be interpreted 
in the sense that the logic of the analysis is to identify whether each factor 
facilitates or hinders the implementation of decentralisation -  i.e. whether it 
determines a habitat more or less “favourable” to decentralisation. Two 
categories of factors are identified by the authors: service characteristics and 
local characteristics.
28 Mobilising structures are social spaces put at the service of interpretations of situations and 
objectives -  it is a type of social mechanism employed by McAdam et al., 2001, for explaining 
change in social systems.
29 Brokerage is defined as “the linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit 
that mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet other sites [..] it can become a 
relational mechanism for mobilisation [..] brokerage reduces transaction costs of communication 
and co-ordination among sites, facilitates the combined use of resources located at different sites, 
and creates new potential collective actors” (MT&T, p. 26 and 102); this and the previous social 
mechanisms will be analysed more diffusely in chapter 3.
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The first building block of the outline of such theory is the analysis of how 
some service characteristics affect decentralisation. More in detail, the authors 
argue that the nature of the contacts with users (their frequency -  from remote to 
continuous - and closeness -  from face-to-face to remote) as well as other 
characteristics like whether the service is universal or selective, and whether it is 
consumed on an optional or a mandatory basis, have an influence on the degree 
with which users of services will become influential actors in the change process. 
In the outline proposed in the present work, illustrated and discussed in chapter 
4, service characteristics are included in the broader category of the 
characteristics of the sector in which devolution occurs, and in particular the 
nature of the policy process and the way stakeholders affect public policy­
making. Another aspect regards the implications of the nature of the service in 
terms of being capital-intensive “versus” labour-intensive: in the present work 
they are treated in a way which is partly different from Pollitt et al.’s approach. 
While agreeing with the argument that capital-intensive services may require an 
adequate size of the recipient organisations for the execution of the 
programmatic tasks devolved to be feasible, differently from the authors we argue 
that labour-intensive services may be the most difficult to implement as they 
entail massive workforce reallocation which, under circumstances present in Italy 
and probably common in a number of countries, may incur in a course of events 
likely to lead to a substantive halt of the process - though, as we have seen, 
alternative courses of events may occur, provided a concatenation of the forming 
of a belief of inevitability and the triggering of forms of rational imitation at the 
individual level takes place.
The second category of factors identified by Pollitt et al. (1998) are the local 
characteristics. In the analysis of local factors, we introduce a distinction between 
locality factors and the organisation constitution. By locality factors it is meant 
those factors like the socio-demographic composition of the community - the 
argument, as we have seen, is that a population mainly affluent and well- 
organised is likely to be in a stronger position either to support a reform of to offer 
“recalcitrance” to it - and the nature of party political competition -  the argument 
being that a less conflictual political competition may facilitate the implementation 
of decentralisation. An expansion of the argument about the influence of political 
competition proposed by Pollitt et al. is that when examining devolution (a 
specific type of decentralisation), the vertical dimension (local-central) is likely to 
be significant too, and in particular that a certain degree of competition between 
central and regional/local governments30, especially when matched with a
30 And possibly also a degree of competition among regions in the country.
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consensual dynamic at the regional/local level, may spur the implementation of 
devolution.
By organisation constitution it is meant the organisational culture, structure 
and routines of both the devolving and the recipient organisations. The 
characteristics of the routines for the management of human resource are 
especially significant as they may affect in a crucial way both the reallocation of 
personnel and the selection and appointment of public managers in the key 
positions for the devolution process to occur. Culture bias in the organisation, it is 
argued in chapter 4, affects inter alia the sensitivity to monetary incentives by the 
personnel to be reallocated (which in turn affects the likely magnitude of the 
resistance to change). The pre-existing organisational model (in the Lombardy 
case, a deconcentrated model, i.e. based on territorially-located offices) has a 
significant influence on the reallocation of personnel.
Regarding service and local factors, the Lombardy case is significant mainly 
for “adding confidence” to the results of the study by Pollitt et al. (1998), and as a 
way of expanding - especially by considering the ways the organisation 
constitution of public entities both devolving and recipients of authority affect the 
devolution process - and integrating the claims that have been formulated about 
the influence of these two groups of factors on the dynamics of devolution and 
decentralisation processes.
Besides the organisation constitution, most of the factors identified in the 
present work seem to be related to a third broad category, which we might refer 
to as “national factors”, as they refer to the politico-administrative context of the 
country in which devolution takes place. The administrative law paradigm, the 
social status associated with working for higher tiers of government, the nature of 
the executive government (majoritarian or consensual) are all factors related to 
the cultural and politico-administrative context of a nation: they combine with 
public management policies in affecting the dynamics of devolution processes in 
a given country.
The overall model of the factors affecting devolution is illustrated in detail and 
discussed in chapter 4. It represents a form of theorisation about processes of 
devolution in the public sector.
An improved causal understanding of the dynamics of devolution (how 
alternative chains of events may unfold) is the basis for designing practices that 
can be employed by public managers for leading devolution interventions. The 
analysis of the case has in fact been used for extrapolating some practices for 
conducting a devolution intervention, thus addressing the second research
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question regarding how top executives of public entities devolving authority 
should lead an intervention of adaptation of public sector organisations to 
devolution.
Extrapolation may be defined (Barzelay, 2005) as an interdependent process 
of learning from vicarious experience and designing practices, having the 
purpose of improving the performance of public sector organisations in one 
situation (target site) by employing experience acquired elsewhere (source site). 
As it is discussed in closer detail in chapter 5, extrapolation poses the problem of 
the intellectual division of labour between researchers’ and practitioners’ activity. 
Designing practices apt to solving extant problems is the daily concern of 
practitioners31. Consequently, in the present study, by the process of designing of 
a practice we mean the process of drafting practices apt to structuring situations 
in motion according to given purposes (Barzelay, 2005) under circumstances 
defined in sufficiently general terms by a set of context factors (whose 
identification is based on the causal understanding of the phenomenon). Such 
practices (examined in chapter 5) can subsequently be tailored by practitioners to 
specific situations by carrying out the detailed design.
Practices identified are, e.g., the use of a consultation procedure between the 
public entity devolving and the entities receiving authority (as it was the inter- 
Institutional table of agriculture employed in the Lombardy experience): on the 
one hand, it can be a powerful co-ordination mechanism (design dimension of the 
practice), on the other hand it can be employed as a mobilising structure that 
make change be interpreted as an opportunity and not as a threat (motivational 
and behavioural dimension), thus contributing to make the devolution process 
acquire momentum. The analysis of the inter-institutional table in.agriculture in 
terms of a mobilising structure allows to interpret it as an organisational 
instrument performing a crucial innovation function, in addition to the co­
ordination function usually attributed to these otherwise quite common 
administrative instruments.
Another practice is the approach employed in the transfer of personnel: it is 
based on a combination of the careful selection of personnel, monetary 
incentives and modalities of interface with the personnel that induced the forming 
of a belief (Weick, 2001) about the inevitability of devolution, which in turn 
facilitated the triggering of a mechanism of adaptive preferences (Hedstrom and 
Swedberg, 1998) and smoothed the process of reallocation of personnel to lower 
levels of government.
31 Though, clearly, not all practices are designed on the basis o f vicarious learning from other 
experiences.
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These and other practices can be employed by public managers for attaining 
the functional requirements of the implementation of devolution: the reallocation 
of personnel; the performance of a new mix of core activities; the adoption of new 
organisational arrangements apt to the new circumstances. The protocol of 
organisational analysis employed for the extrapolation of practices is illustrated 
subsequently (paragraph 1.8) and examined more closely in chapter 5. Results 
take the shape of a “menu of practices” for the management of devolution 
processes that public managers can decide to activate according to the 
conditions they operate in. Factors identified are considered for specifying the 
way the practice works and the domain of applicability of each practice. Such 
knowledge may prove usable by public managers in Italy and elsewhere for 
leading interventions of implementation of a devolution agenda.
1.8 The approach and conceptual tools employed in the analysis of 
the case
In order to characterise the approach adopted in the analysis of the empirical 
evidence, the notion of case-oriented studies (as opposed to variable-oriented) 
may be recalled (Ragin, 1987). Case-oriented studies are characterised by a 
holistic approach (cases are treated as whole entities and not as collections of 
parts: relations between the parts are understood within the context of the whole) 
and by a conjunctural understanding of causation (outcomes are analysed in 
terms of intersections of conditions). This approach is consistent with Pettigrew’s
(1990), according to which “the context, content and process of change together 
with their interconnections through time are explored [..] Where the change is 
treated as the unit of analysis, the focus is on [..] one episode. In this kind of 
holistic [emphasis added] analysis of change, it is assumed that target changes 
should be studied in the context of changes at other levels of analysis, and 
revealing temporal interconnectedness is crucial. Changes have multiple causes 
-  the convergent interaction of (context and design) features can explain 
change”. This approach is also widely consistent with a research tradition 
strongly oriented to producing a process understanding of the phenomena 
investigated.
In the concrete application of this approach, the narrative method (Abbott, 
1992a and 1992b, Ragin, 1987) has been employed for ordering and structuring 
the experience (which is the phase preliminary and preparatory to the analysis 
and interpretation of the case). According to this method, the case and its context
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is articulated into Events (see Appendix, Figure 1 in particular). Events have been 
identified and classified as: the Episode (further articulated into sub-events), 
Previous Events (PE) and Contemporaneous Events (CE), affecting the Episode, 
and Related Events (RE), affected by the Episode.
Previous Events regard setting devolution as a political priority in the 
Lombardy regional government agenda (PE1), devolving functions in agriculture 
from the state to regions (PE2), and reorganising the Lombardy regional 
government (PE3).
Contemporaneous Events regard public management policy-making at the 
national level (CE1), enacting sectoral laws on devolution in different policy 
sectors at the national level, and the “federal” reform of the constitution (CE2), 
holding electoral rounds at the regional and national level (CE3), enacting the 
secondary legislation (national ministry decrees) on devolution in agriculture 
(CE4), and setting a new regulation and arrangements in agriculture at the 
regional level (CE5).
A detailed set of questions has been produced about describing the Episode. 
Questions and sub-questions have been answered thus coding the empirical 
evidence collected and producing the narrative of the episode (see list of 
descriptive questions in Appendix).
Moving to the phase of the analysis and interpretation of the case, the main 
methodological problem has been the identification of the conceptual tools to 
employ in the analysis of complex change processes like those triggered by a 
devolution reform -  tools capable of revealing the multiple causes of change 
(Pettigrew, 1990) and specifying the social “cogs and wheels” of the phenomenon 
investigated (Elster, 1993). A research tradition from which important intellectual 
resources have been drawn for the purpose of improving our understanding of 
devolution processes is the one exemplified by the works of Kingdon (Agendas, 
alternatives and public policies, 1994) and McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (The 
dynamics of contention, 2001), and “imported” in the field of public management 
by Barzelay and Campbell (Preparing for the future, 2003); a research tradition 
strongly oriented to developing a processual understanding of the phenomena 
investigated. The main conceptual tools employed by these authors are social 
mechanisms and their concatenation. Another concept employed is the logic of 
appropriateness (March, 1994, March and Olsen, 1989).
The social mechanisms approach is a recently revived theoretical perspective 
to the study of collective social phenomena; Elster (1989) and Stinchcombe
(1991) interpret social mechanisms as “the building blocks” of an advocated
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middle-range theorising which, in their opinion, can provide an important 
contribution to revitalising the study of social phenomena. This approach has 
strong roots in sociology, as illustrated by Boudon (1991), revisiting the work of 
Merton who originally defined social mechanisms as “social processes having 
designated consequences for designated parts of the social structure” and 
argued that the main task of sociology was to identify mechanisms and establish 
under what conditions they “come into being”, “fail to operate”, and so on 
(Merton, 1968, pp.43-44). This approach has recently been applied to a number 
of topics like the dynamics of contention (McAdam et al., 2001) and public 
management policy change (Barzelay, 2003).
Social Mechanisms can be defined (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998) as 
unobserved analytical constructs that provide hypothetical links between 
observable events: “Assume that we have observed a systematic relationship 
between two entities, say I and O. In order to explain the relationship between 
them we search for a mechanism, M, which is such that on the occurrence of the 
cause or input, I, it generated the effect or outcome, O. The search for 
mechanisms means that we are not satisfied with merely establishing systematic 
covariation between variables or events; a satisfactory explanation requires that 
we are also able to specify the social “cogs and wheels” (Elster, 1993, p.3) that 
have brought the relationship into existence ... a mechanism can be seen as a 
systematic set of statements that provide a plausible account of how I and O are 
linked to one another” (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998, p. 7, emphasis added). In 
a similar way, and explicitly citing Hedstrom and Swedberg, McAdam et al. 
(2001) define social mechanisms as “delimited sorts of events that change 
relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways 
over a variety of situations”. Stinchcombe (1991) sheds further light on the point 
by arguing that mechanisms are “bits of theory about entities at a different level 
(e.g. individuals) that the main entities being theorised about (e.g.: groups) which 
serve to make the higher-level theory more supple, more accurate, or more 
general”. With an alternative, complementary definition (Schelling, 1998, p. 32): 
“a social mechanism is a plausible hypothesis, or set of plausible hypotheses, 
that could be the explanation of some social phenomenon; the explanation 
begins in terms of interactions between individuals, or between individuals and 
some social aggregate”.
Social processes (McAdam et al., p.24) are regular sequences of such 
mechanisms that produce similar (generally more complex and contingent) 
transformations of those elements. Concatenation of mechanisms is central in 
understanding change processes: “[MJechanisms seldom operate on their own.
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They typically concatenate with other mechanisms into broader social processes” 
(Gambetta, 1998, p. 105), and “[Explanations of most concrete social events or 
states require resort to several elementary mechanisms; one is not enough. 
Sometimes, these mechanisms counteract one another, and sometimes they 
work together” (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998, p. 21).
We consider that social mechanisms and their concatenation are affected by 
the institutional context: institutions affect the triggering or inhibiting of social 
mechanisms, thus influencing the concatenations of social mechanisms at work, 
which provide part of the explanation of differences in trajectory and outcome of 
the type of social processes under investigation. Individual agency is also central 
in determining which social mechanisms are triggered in a given situation.
Social scientists make use of a number of well-known mechanisms32. Among 
the most famous ones, there is probably the mechanism of self-fulfilling 
prophecy; in the number of social mechanisms employed in the present work, 
there is actor-certification, attribution of threat, brokerage, and appropriation of 
mobilising structures; they are discussed in chapter 3.
As to the logic of appropriateness, it is a logic according to which (March, 
1999, p. 44) “The actor is seen as a collection of identities that dictate appropriate 
action in particular situations. The problematics of choice are seen as lying in the 
definition of the salient identity and the classification of the situation” (see also 
March, 1994, and March and Olsen, 1989). Rules of action are derived from 
understandings of things, from self-conception and conception of society, and 
from images of proper behaviour. Fulfilling an identity through following 
appropriate rules involves matching a contingent set of rules to a contingent set 
of situations (and adapting identities, rules, capabilities to changing situations): 
“[An] appropriate action is one that fits the situation, given the agent’s evoked 
identity” (Barzelay, 2003).
Other important conceptual tools in the analysis of the process dynamics of 
devolution have been drawn from organisational studies on decision-making 
processes (March, 1999) and especially the notion of sense-making as 
characterised by Weick (1995 and 2001).
As regards the problem of conducting the extrapolation from the Lombardy 
experience of practices that public managers may employ in leading an 
intervention of devolution, a specific protocol of analysis has been elaborated 
from literature. Each practice is described and characterised in terms of: a) the
32 Though, unfortunately, a catalogue o f social mechanisms does not exist yet, even if it would be 
most probably welcomed, as claimed by Gambetta (1998, p. 103).
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functional requirement it addresses33 (e.g.: reallocating personnel), b) the way it 
works (by answering the two interrelated questions: how does the system as a 
whole operate34? and, how does the practice try to take advantage of the way the 
system operates?), c) the variations in performance (by answering a battery of 
questions about the possible side effects of the practice, the conditions under 
which performances are unusually satisfactory or at the opposite seriously at risk 
of breakdown), d) the context factors that determine the “domain of applicability” 
of the practice, or, in other words, the circumstances under which the practice is 
likely to produce the expected effects (the protocol of analysis is examined more 
closely in chapter 5).
The application proposed adopts the smart practices approach (Bardach, 
1994 and 2004, Barzelay, 2005), a theoretical approach to the issue of the 
extrapolation of practices. An assumption shared by advocates of this approach 
is that learning from second-hand experience (the extrapolation problem) is more 
complex than ascertaining whether a given practice is effective in the source site 
(the evaluation problem); it is also more complex than editing lists of practices 
that have been deemed to be effective in the source site; extrapolation is the 
process of learning from vicarious experience and designing practices fitting the 
(new and diverse) circumstances to which the practices are to be applied. At the 
core of the smart practices analysis there is the strong integration of the 
“technical”, design dimension, the understanding of the results that should 
characterise the operation of a practice truly apt to solving a managerial problem, 
with the motivational and behavioural dimension, the understanding of how the 
practice becomes mature (the development process) and why it is actually 
operated; champions of the smart practices approach argue that works in 
management literature too often underestimate the innovation process.
Another qualifying aspect is that this method carefully relates practices to the 
context conditions to which their performance is sensitive, thus avoiding 
inaccurate generalisation of the domain of applicability, i.e. the error of elevating 
to the status of “best practices” some practices that are instead applicable only to 
a very specific set of circumstances35. In the work it is assumed that this protocol 
of analysis, though it too has some risk areas, is capable of answering serious 
criticisms commonly addressed to the “conventional” research on best practices. 
These aspects are discussed in chapter 5, where the novelty of this approach 
emerges from the critical revisiting of the issue of whether current research
33 Studying a practice’s features is of analytic significance only insofar as their operation performs 
a purpose or function.
34 Which entails a causal understanding of the experience in the source site.
35 This approach also systematically employs the notion o f potential, and avoids assumptions of 
determinism about the social processes on which practices intervene (Bardach, 1998, pp. 46-47).
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conventions in public management are effective as regards the identification and 
supple elaboration of “best” practices to be used for addressing key problems in 
the management of public sector organisations. The work agrees with criticisms 
to current conventions and explores the potential of the smart practices approach 
applied to the management of devolution processes.
The narration of the history of devolution in agriculture in Lombardy is reported 
in chapter 2. The work then turns to the explanation of case outcomes (chapter 3) 
and, drawing on these results, addresses the issue of the significant differences 
in the courses of events that may occur in the implementation of devolution and 
examines the factors affecting such process (Chapter 4). Subsequently, the 
“extrapolation problem” is addressed and a menu of practices for the 
management of a devolution intervention is elaborated (chapter 5).
52
2. The establishment of the devolved setting: 
adaptation and organisational innovation in the 
Lombardy experience
2.1 The episode of devolution in Lombardy: previous and
contemporaneous events
Following up, on July 1998, the enactment of the law on devolution in agriculture 
by the regional assembly, a course of events leading to radical transformations of 
the institutional setting and profound organisational changes unfolded. The 
regional government changed significantly its programmatic activities: it almost 
entirely abandoned the delivery of services, while it started to execute new 
functions like the delivery of subsidies to agricultural businesses, the provision of 
advice and services to local governments, the provision of conditions facilitating 
the engagement of farmers’ associations in policy formulation and service 
delivery. Most services to end-users came to be delivered by local governments 
(provinces and for a limited part mountain communities), which were supported 
by the regional government in setting to work the devolved tasks1. An important 
part of the workforce was reallocated from the region to local governments; 
another part of the staff was transferred to a new entity, the regional funding 
body, that was established and given the task of delivering subsidies to 
agricultural businesses (previously a central government competence). The 
agriculture directorate general of the regional government changed from a 
configuration that in a broad way could be characterised as a machine 
bureaucracy into an organisation having many features of the professional 
bureaucracy.
The narration of the episode follows mainly an institutional view. At first, the 
devolution of tasks from the region to local governments (which includes the 
event of the massive reallocation of workforce) is illustrated (paragraph 2.2). This 
event unfolds over the period 1998-99. Then, the transformations in the regional 
government, that were linked to the acquisition of new attributions from the 
central government, are narrated (paragraph 2.3). The event unfolds over the 
period spanning from 1998 to May 2002, when the regional funding body was
1 The results of a survey showed that - at the date of April 2000 - most of devolved function were 
“fully at work” in the majority of provinces and mountain communities (Ongaro, 2001, pp. 404- 
407 -  responses were obtained from all the 11 provinces and 23 out of 30 mountain communities).
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fully operational. Before illustrating these events, some influential previous and 
contemporaneous events need to be recalled.
Prior to the devolution episode, important organisational modifications had 
occurred in the regional structure and routines, as a consequence of a major 
government-wide reorganisation that was carried through over the period 1996- 
97. A divisional organisational model was introduced, giving a significant 
autonomy to the Direzioni Generali, or directorates general, the “divisions”, or 
macro-units, responsible for a programmatic field and run by a director general.
A set of organisational mechanisms were established for assuring horizontal 
co-ordination at the top of the hierarchy; a “committee of the directors general” 
was established, that used to meet every week on Tuesday morning. It was 
chaired by Andrea Sanese, the secretary general of the Lombardy region, 
leading the powerful and well-staffed regional presidency directorate general.
Within each directorate general, there were three hierarchical tiers: 
organisational unit, sector, operational unit. Each organisational unit was made 
up of two or more sectors, which in their turn were articulated into two or more 
operational units
Especially significant for our story is also the establishment of the regional 
territorial offices: units placed in each locality of the Lombardy territory and 
operating as the front office in the relations with users. From an organisational 
point of view, they were cross-cutting the directorates general, forming a sort of 
organisational matrix - the second dimension being the territorial one. In fact, 
personnel was on the one hand functionally dependent on the directorate general 
they belonged to, while on the other hand all directorates could rely on them for 
specific issues to deal with - co-ordination of staff being, in the design, ensured 
by the director of the territorial office. Ten territorial offices were established, each 
operating on the same area of a provincial government, with the exception of the 
province of Milan that had to interface directly with the regional headquarters, 
without the intermediation of a territorial office. Before the 1997 reorganisation, 
the administration of agricultural affairs (like all other sectors) was centralised at 
the headquarters in Milan. After the establishment of the territorial office, the 
organisational model fell under the category of the “deconcentrated models”2.
2 We adopt the terminology provided by OECD/PUMA (1997), according to which 
deconcentration is an organisational model based on the establishment of territorially-distributed 
organisational units, while remaining from an institutional point of view within the borders of the 
upper level of government (the rationale for this model usually invoked is that of getting nearer to 
users -  compared with centralised organisational models - while at the same time guaranteeing 
uniformity of treatment towards users).
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The major revamping encompassed also financial management, in the 
direction of a significant budgetary autonomy to the directorates general 
(endowed with a sort of comprehensive budget, to achieve a set of highly 
formalised annual targets) and the human resources management system. 
Particularly significant, especially for the starting of the story of devolution, was 
the reform of the criteria for appointing managers introduced by the regional 
government. Managers were appointed for a relatively short term to a stint and 
formally evaluated against the achievement of the assigned targets -  in case of 
non-fulfilment, and in any case at the end of the term, managers could be 
removed. After the 1997 revision of evaluation routines, the performances of 
managers were assessed by the director general; performances of staff were 
assessed by the manager of the operational unit to which they were assigned. 
The director general and the deputy director general were assessed by the 
regional government (the Giunta), supported by a Nucleo di Valutazione, a 
committee in charge of supporting the regional government in designing the 
systems for the management of personnel -  the committee and the secretary 
general were key actors in this process. The regional government appointed 
directors general and their deputies.
Another provision was the establishment of the category of the “professionals”: 
experts performing on an individual basis tasks that require specialised skills. 
Previously, all staff that, by winning a public competition, had obtained the status 
of “manager” had both the duty and the right of managing an office, i.e. of being 
in the position of co-ordinating other people. After the reform, that occurred also 
as an effect of the implementation of the provisions contained in the national 
legislative decree Number 29 in 1993, civil servants could be employed, in 
alternative, in the position of professional (such mechanism was intended as a 
way of introducing differentiation in the employment of human resources). The 
mechanism further increased flexibility, since managers could not only be moved 
from the co-ordination of one office to another office, but also placed in “standing 
alone” individual positions -  that is entirely out of the hierarchical chain of 
command.
Examining evidence about whether such kind of rationalistic model actually 
worked -  and what intended and unintended consequences it produced -  is out 
of the scope of the present investigation3; but an effect needs to be pointed out 
for its influence on the development of the story: the reform led to a high level of
3 Though undoubtedly of theoretical interest.
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flexibility in the appointment of regional managers to different stints by the 
government.
This reform combined with another process, indeed occurring in many regions 
throughout Italy at the same time, but in a particularly radical way in Lombardy. 
Most of the regional managers that had the requirement in terms of length of 
service were “encouraged" to retire early (as part of a plan of downsizing of the 
Region that shrank the total number of managers from 380 at the end of 1996 to 
261 on the 30th of June, 2002). Only six out of the twenty managers in the 
agriculture directorate general in charge in 2002 were appointed before 1998; 
fourteen managers entered the agriculture directorate general during the 
devolution process. In the six top positions of general managers, the turnover 
was complete (including the director general and the deputy director general).
The 1997 revamping of the organisational structure and routines highlights 
the influence of previous and contemporaneous public management reforms that 
occurred in Italy (and were briefly summarised in paragraph 1.5). Especially 
influential was the reform of civil service and labour relations (legislative decree 
29/93), which created the conditions for the adoption in the Lombardy region of 
new routines for the management of human resources.
The legislative decree 59/97, that started devolution from the central 
government to regions, was followed up by some sectoral decrees establishing 
the provisions for devolution in a number of policy sectors beyond agriculture. 
This event contributed to keeping the issue of devolution high on the 
governmental agenda of both the central and the regional governments, at least 
until the 2001 general elections (see paragraph 1.4).
In the specific sector of agriculture, a number of decrees were issued by the 
national government following up the law 143/97 concerning devolution in 
agricultural affairs. It was a body of secondary legislation (decrees are issued by 
the executive government, in the case the ministry of agriculture) of extreme 
importance for the implementation of devolution to occur. Decrees of the ministry 
of agriculture provided the legal basis for important interventions like the 
establishment of the regional funding body, or the development of the 
computerised inter-organisational information system4.
Another influential event was the regulation 1257/99 issued by the European 
Council in May 1999, defining the contents of the new Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) cycle for the period 2000-06. The new regulation devolved some
4 Though actual responses at the regional level to modifications in the normative environment 
were extremely diversified, which is another reason of our interest in the Lombardy case.
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decision powers concerning the planning of government intervention to the 
country level. Some provisions of “Agenda 2000”, as the new regulation was 
known, opened an opportunity for a more incisive role of the regions in the 
regulation of the programmatic field of agriculture. Though the contents of 
Agenda 2000 were negotiated at the EU level by representatives of member 
states, and sub-national governments in Italy did not take part to the negotiation 
rounds, the regions were allowed a great discretion for elaborating the public 
programme regulating the development of the agricultural sector in their own 
reference territory. The regional regulation of public intervention in agriculture that 
each regional government had to enact as part of the implementation of the EU 
Common Agricultural Policy was labelled Piano di Sviluppo Rurale, or Rural 
Development Plan, and made reference to the same temporal horizon of the 
European Agenda (the period 2000-06). Instead of one nation-wide public 
programme, there were twenty regional plans, each one subject only to some 
general guidelines set at the national level5.
Since the new scenario shaped by Agenda 2000 began to take shape, the 
regional top management started to consider the Rural Development Plan as the 
legal instrument enabling the regional government to make important 
authoritative decisions. In fact, though being an instrument of implementation of 
the financial measures set in Agenda 20006, the Rural Development Plan left 
some significant room for manoeuvre to the Lombardy regional government 
about the specific targets to pursue.
The regional top management gave priority to getting the Rural Development 
Plan to be approved in a very short time. A team was established and allocated 
to the preparation of the Rural Development Plan, having the mandate of drafting 
a proposal “as soon as possible”. EU officers were contacted in order to 
anticipate possible remarks and incorporate them in the proposal (Rural 
Development Plans proposed by the regional governments had to be validated 
and approved by the agriculture directorate general of the European 
Commission), in order to draft a version that could easily be accepted by the 
European Commission. The proposal was sent to the agriculture directorate 
general of the European Commission in Brussels on the 2nd of January, 2000,
5 The attribution to the regions of the responsibility of planning the development of the agriculture 
sector was one of the outcomes of the national law 143/97. The European Commission, in drafting 
Agenda 2000, favoured the strengthening of the role o f regions in programming and implementing 
public interventions in agriculture and in so doing it further enforced the provisions of the National 
Law 143/97.
6 Overarching declared goals of the Common Agricultural Policy were: increasing the 
competitiveness o f European agricultural businesses, limiting unemployment, ensuring safety of 
food and safeguard of the environment.
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(the first useful date from a procedural point of view) and approved by the 
European Commission, after EU officers had checked its consistency with the 
rulings of Agenda 2000-06, on 13th of July, 2000. The programme was made 
operational less than a month after, on August, 3rd. On the 1st of September of 
the same year, the first financial transfers to farmers were delivered. The 
approval of the Rural Development Plan enforced the legal powers of the 
Lombardy region7 and gave the regional government a stronger position both in 
the relations with the other levels of government (central government on the one 
hand, local authorities on the other hand) and in front of stakeholders like the 
associations representing agricultural businesses8.
2.2 Setting to work a system of relations with local governments and 
reallocating the workforce
After the regional assembly of Lombardy had enacted the law on devolution in 
agriculture (Law Number 11 in 1998, or Law 11/98), the contacts between the 
regional and the local governments intensified. Sandro Cioccarelli, director of the 
organisational unit responsible of conducting the devolution process, and 
Alessandro Nebuloni, manager of the Struttura per i Rapporti con gli Enti 
Delegati, hereafter structure for the management of the relations with delegated 
entities9 (one of the structures supervised by Cioccarelli), together with their
7T w o  other juridical tools were the “Norms regulating regional interventions in agriculture” 
(regional law Number 7 in 2000), that repealed a great deal o f specific laws each providing the 
legal basis for the delivery of financial subsidies concerning some specific measures o f the 
government intervention in agriculture. However, most of funds in agriculture come from the EU 
level or are regulated at the EU level, thus, the scope of this law and its actual influence on role of 
the region in the policy field was limited. Another a juridical instrument was the Agricultural Plan, 
included in the Piano Regionale di Sviluppo, the Regional Development Plan containing the main 
term-of-office goals of the regional government. It consists of different sections, each relating to a 
policy domain. The section devoted to agriculture is the Agricultural Plan. Though formally the 
Rural Development Plan is part of the Agricultural Plan, the latter was substantially “empty” until 
the Rural Development Plan was approved.
8 A Rural Development Plan had already been prepared by the region in the previous years, but it 
was of limited significance and highly constrained: it was basically a document containing 
operational details about decisions already taken at the EU and state level and there was no real 
room in it for substantive decisions. The preparation of the Rural Development Plan was basically 
an act of compliance to the norms by the regional government. On this occasion, the Rural 
Development Plan provided the legal basis for the region to wield a substantive steering role in the 
policy field, and the regional top management showed a strong determination in catching this 
opportunity.
9 “Delegated entities” are the local authorities to which functions were transferred. It may be noted 
that legislative provisions distinguished between functions that were entirely under the 
responsibility o f local governments (so-called “transferred” functions) and functions that 
juridically had been only delegated, ultimate responsibility pertaining to the regional government.
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closest collaborators, started a series of meetings with representatives of local 
authorities. Talks were held on a bilateral basis: Cioccarelli and his collaborators 
met the political and administrative counterparts of each province on an individual 
basis. Meetings occurred in Autumn 1998.
Representatives of local authorities manifested their concerns about their new 
political and administrative responsibility, and the concrete powers that could be 
wielded. A recurring question was which one - between the regional and the local 
government - was going to be in charge of managing the relations with farmers’ 
associations; some local representatives asked whether after devolution it was 
the local government that would have the formal powers to call the periodic 
meetings with representatives of agricultural businesses, meetings that were at 
the time convened by the region. Explanations were required especially by 
officials of provinces led by governing coalitions opposite to the political majority 
in the regional government. The repartition of the competency between the 
regional and the local governments was based on a simple criterion: meetings 
with local level representatives of farmers’ associations were to be called by 
provinces, while the meetings with the regional level of farmers’ associations (that 
had a two-ties structure: regional and local) remained in the sphere of 
competence of the regional government.
On top of the agenda of the meetings, however, was not so much the 
specification of powers and tasks, as the resources to perform them. Requests, 
common to all provinces, included the premises, the financial resources and 
especially the personnel to execute the new tasks.
There was indeed a difference of attitudes in the local governments 
delegations between the political and the administrative component. On the side 
of politicians reactions to devolution were, all in all, positive. Especially 
commissioners in charge of agriculture affairs envisaged that devolution could 
remarkably enhance their status. Indeed, in many provinces a commissioner 
exclusively in charge of agriculture matters did not even exist before devolution. 
Most commissioners at the local level were appointed after the law on devolution 
was enacted. The new attributions of the provincial government enabled the 
newly established commissioners for agriculture to get into a policy field 
perceived as highly relevant in the political arena. Associations of farmers had 
traditionally been considered important actors because of their strong grasp on a 
solid and homogeneous electoral group. Though this was probably true much
However, the implications of this distinction for the delivery of the agricultural policy were 
substantially irrelevant.
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more in the past than at present, the expectations of significant political benefits 
ensuing from establishing systematic relations with the main stakeholders in the 
agriculture policy field emerged as a major factor spurring politicians to commit 
the provincial government to taking on the devolved tasks.
Public servants, much more than politicians, manifested concerns: the 
administrative risk involved in managing the delivery of subsidies to farmers was 
going to be passed to them as an effect of devolution. In a sector like agriculture, 
the case management of a large number of individual positions for the purpose of 
authorising the disbursement of conspicuous grants is a core activity. Thus, a 
consequence for managers in Local Authorities was that they were going to be 
charged with a significant administrative risk, epitomised by the fact that all of 
them (forty-one people, the managers of the eleven provinces and the thirty 
mountain communities of Lombardy) drew up an insurance policy protecting them 
against administrative errors. Several managers in local authorities repeatedly 
raised their concerns about the risks inherent in the case management of 
farmers’ applications for subsidies, in their talks with the staff of the structure for 
the management of the relations with delegated public entities.
In order to better understand some of the fears of the public servants, it is 
necessary to consider the profound effects of the national reform of the civil 
service that was enacted in 1993 (Legislative Decree 29/93, see chapter 1). One 
consequence of the reform was that in the delivery of subsidies (like in any other 
form of financial aid delivered by a public administration), political organs were 
impeded to have any formal involvement: all authorisations about individual 
beneficiaries were issued by managers (previously, it was common practice that 
the giunta - the council of commissioners chaired by the mayor or the president in 
provincial and regional governments -  formally approved the lists of beneficiaries 
of public funds).
Initially, the wide modifications in the rules concerning the responsibility of 
managers introduced by the legislative decree 29/93 did not have any significant 
impact in local authorities with regard to the administration of agricultural affairs. 
Tasks performed by local authorities before the regional devolution of 1998 were 
so limited in number and content that operational routines had not been modified 
in a significant way. But devolution was going to affect this state of affairs: the 
relevant amount of tasks devolved was going to make agriculture a significant 
business area in local authorities. In the words of the director of the technical 
service of the regional funding body, Luciano Fasano, “it was only when we 
decentralised the tasks about the delivery of subsidies to farmers that provinces
60
really had to implement the provisions of the legislative decree 29/93 and set into 
operation a different balance between politics and administration One source of 
fear for public servants was about the possible interferences by politicians in the 
case management process, which could find a more favourable ground in 
provinces, where personal contacts between the commissioner for agriculture 
and individual stakeholders were closer, and also the linkages between 
politicians and the permanent staff were potentially more direct, due to the 
smaller dimensions. Such contacts were looser in the regional government, due 
to the larger staff size, and also due to the territorial deconcentration following up 
the 1997 organisational revamping.
Later, an external support to public servants in local authorities for performing 
the new tasks came from the regional government, when it established the 
regional funding body (the story is narrated in paragraph 2.3). The regional 
funding body defined the procedures for the delivery of subsidies to agricultural 
businesses, to which local authorities had to comply, procedures based on the 
centrality of the tenured official in charge as manager of the agricultural 
organisational unit, who was recognised as the only responsible for the case 
management of farmers’ applications. Such procedures were common to both the 
regional and local governments in issuing any kind of authorisation (entitlement to 
receive a given kind of subsidy, etc.) to farmers, and were supported by an 
integrated information technology platform; computerisation undoubtedly 
contributed to “enforcing” compliance to the procedures designed at the regional 
level.
Besides the issue of the case management of farmers’ applications, the 
overall range of functions devolved made it evident that local authorities had to 
implement wide structural re-organisations and to effectively integrate personnel 
coming from the region if they were to execute the new tasks. Indeed, due to the 
very limited attributions in agriculture matters before the devolution, in many local 
authorities an organisational unit competent for agriculture did not even exist and 
was to be established ex novo. Even when it pre-existed devolution, agricultural 
offices had a staff of a very few people, that was to quadruple or quintuple after 
the allocation to the eleven provinces of the contingent of 260 people from the 
region.
In their efforts of convincing managers in local authorities to side with the 
devolution intervention, regional managers strongly committed to show that the 
regional government was entirely devoted to support the local governments in 
running the new tasks. Support was provided with continuity, as also the
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successors of Nebuloni and Cioccarelli, Vicenzina Lena, that relieved in 2000 
from Nebuloni the job of manager of the structure for the management of the 
relations with delegated public entities, and her general manager, Giorgio 
Bonalume, who took up in 2001 from Cioccarelli the task of directing the office in 
charge of dealing with local authorities (while Cioccarelli continued to “supervise” 
the process in his new stint as deputy director general of the agriculture 
directorate general), put a strong emphasis on supporting (or, in their words, 
“accompanying”) local authorities. In the words of Sandro Cioccarelli: “you can’t 
impose such a change to the staff in Local Authorities: they have to side with us 
and commit to the implementation of devolution”10.
The support of the regional government turned into a range of interventions. 
The Tavolo Istituzionale per I’Agricoltura, or inter-institutional table for agriculture, 
provided by the regional law on devolution, was established a few months after 
the enactment of the law and rapidly set to work. It was a venue to ensure that 
both elected and tenured officials of the regional and the local governments met 
on a monthly basis to discuss and resolve all major issues emerging in the 
course of the ongoing devolution process. Its declared purpose was the “steering” 
of the devolution process and, subsequently, it would become a permanent forum 
for the joint solution of problems by regional and local staff in the devolved 
institutional setting. Any formal deliberation (including, as we shall see, the 
contingent of staff to be transferred to local authorities) was going to be officially 
discussed during its meetings, also in those cases in which the formal 
responsibility for the adoption of a ruling on the issue remained entirely in the 
sphere of competence of an individual public entity (i.e., in most cases the 
regional government, or directly the director of the agriculture directorate general, 
in his autonomous powers of deliberation). On many occasions Cioccarelli 
committed himself publicly during the meetings of the inter-institutional table for 
agriculture to the establishment of a strong and enduring collaboration with local 
authorities. His voice was strongly reinforced by the direct presence and public 
commitment expressed by the regional president. The inter-institutional table, in 
fact, had a two-tier structure: the “technical” inter-institutional table for agriculture 
gathered top level civil servants of the agriculture sector of the different 
institutions and was chaired by Cioccarelli. The “political” inter-institutional table 
for agriculture gathered elected officials in charge for agriculture, in the first 
period after its establishment (in 1999) and until the regional elections in 2000, it 
was chaired directly by the president of Lombardy region, ad interim regional 
commissioner for agriculture. Thus, the chairmanship was undoubtedly strong:
10 Interview, 28th February 2003.
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the coincidence of the two figures of commissioner for agriculture and president 
of the regional government provided the political tier of this sectoral institutional 
mechanism (in charge of issues concerning the specific sector of agriculture) with 
the chairmanship by the top institutional figure as well as the political champion of 
devolution in the Lombardy political arena. With regard to the technical tier, the 
leading role performed by Cioccarelli in the previous phase of negotiation further 
reinforced the chairmanship of the table, and provided continuity to the process.
In the same period, informative meetings with the staff of local authorities were 
arranged by the structure for the management of the relations with delegated 
public entities, paving the way for the establishment of informal communication 
channels operating on a continuous basis between the staff of regional and local 
authorities (meetings of the inter-institutional table for agriculture were restricted 
to the top managers). Meetings facilitated the establishment of direct contacts 
between the regional staff and their counterparts in local authorities.
Soon after the reallocation of staff, Sandro Nebuloni and, subsequently, 
Vicenzina Lena activated a programme of training for personnel, partly financed 
with the European Social Fund. The structure for the management of the 
relations with delegated public entities promoted a number of training courses, on 
various technical and administrative topics related to administering public 
services in agriculture. These courses were to be attended jointly by regional staff 
and by the staff of local authorities, including the personnel just reallocated. The 
joint attendance of the courses facilitated the development of strong informal 
channels of communication between staff in regional and local governments.
How did the process of reallocation of personnel to local authorities unfold? In 
order to address the question we have to go back to the autumn 1998, when 
contacts between regional and local governments were occurring in order to 
agree the arrangements about devolution. The main request by representatives 
in local authorities was about being properly endowed with human and financial 
resources for the execution of the devolved tasks.
The negotiation tactic employed by the structure for the management of the 
relations with delegated entities was to convene meetings with representatives of 
local authorities on a bilateral basis, and subsequently draft a proposal for the 
allocation of resources. The proposal incorporated the most significant claims 
that emerged during the meetings, while at the same time made reference to 
some “objective” criteria, relating to the dimensions and other features (type of 
cultivations, etc.) of the agricultural sector in the territory of competence of each
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local authority, criteria that were integrated with small adjustments for adapting to 
specific issues that had emerged during the bilateral meetings.
The significant amount of resources made available by the regional 
government for the implementation of devolution, and the “appeal” the powers 
and attributions given to local governments by the reform could exercise, 
especially on politicians, contributed to the achievement of a settlement, which 
nonetheless required some further negotiation rounds after the drafting of the 
regional proposal. The outcome of the negotiation process was a formal 
agreement between the region and local authorities.
In parallel, another negotiation was being conducted with the trade unions. In 
conducting the negotiation, Sandro Cioccarelli, in close contact with Paolo 
Baccolo, and supported by a few selected collaborators and by staff from the 
personnel organisational unit (that provided the agriculture directorate general 
with the juridical and technical expertise for the negotiation with the unions), on 
the one hand committed in a public way to the point that the transfer to Local 
Authorities was compelling: on this there was no margin for negotiation. At the 
same time, he announced that incentives would be delivered to all the personnel 
that was going to be reallocated, and showed a willingness to discuss all issues 
raised by the unions concerning wage and ancillary benefits.
Various modifications in labour conditions were discussed. One regarded 
logistics. Most of personnel to be transferred was already working in the regional 
territorial offices. In this respect, staff did not have to move far away; on the 
contrary, in a number of instances they continued to work in the same premises, 
that were partly allocated to the provincial governments too. However, mobility 
within the territory of Lombardy became more difficult since, after the allocation to 
provinces, an employee willing to move would have to change the employer, 
shifting from the payroll of one local authority to another one, and no more just to 
ask for an internal transfer from one territorial office to another one of the same 
regional government; this was not an easy operation under the regulation of 
labour relations in the Italian public sector.
Though being an issue on the agenda of the negotiation, logistics was not the 
main topic debated in the talks with the unions. The central question were the pay 
schemes, that in the regional government were more favourable than the 
provision of the pay schemes in provinces. To the benefit of the reader, it may be 
added that in terms of national regulation, regions and local authorities had the 
same national labour contract; significant differences lied at the level of the 
individual organisation’s contract (the so called contratto integrativo aziendale),
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wage and ancillary benefits being in favour of regional staff and managers. To 
cope with this issue, an automatic promotion for all people transferred had been 
designed and agreed with the unions. Besides the automatic promotion to the 
upper assignation level, the personnel also received an una tantum grant.
This modality determined some problems in local authorities. The automatic 
promotion, in fact, contributed to the fears in the personnel already on the payroll 
of local authorities of being superseded by the “new-comers”. Being wage and 
assignation level interconnected, it had been necessary to promote transferred 
personnel to a higher assignation level to give them higher pays. In this way, not 
only they had a higher wage compared to personnel already employed by Local 
Authorities, but they were also better qualified and had therefore improved career 
possibilities. Correspondingly, career opportunities for personnel already 
employed by Local Authorities were reduced.
Drawing on the agreement with local authorities, on the one hand, and with 
the unions, on the other hand, the regional government issued a ruling, on the 
23rd of April, 1999 (ruling Number 42,596), on the reallocation of personnel to 
local authorities.
The transfer of personnel occurred in a smooth way. There were no hotbed of 
protest, neither at the level of the individuals directly affected by the transfer, nor 
by trade unions’ representatives. At the end of Summer, 260 former regional staff 
were in the payroll of the eleven provinces of Lombardy.
The design of the 1998 regional reform provided some tools that further 
facilitated the progress of the devolution process. The decision powers given to 
local authorities as regards the regulation of the economic sector were useful 
means to convince elected officials and, partly, top level civil servants that 
devolution was not only an increase of the administrative burden, but it entailed 
also a more qualified role for their government. Elected officials showed their 
evident appreciation for the prospective of performing a significant role in the 
agricultural field in the territory of their constituency; civil servants complaints 
were tempered by the enlarged powers they were going to exercise. Similarly, the 
attribution of formal powers of convening meetings with the local representatives 
of farmers’ associations helped in smoothing some of the resistances towards 
devolution.
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2.3 Reinventing the regional government
The devolution of tasks and personnel to local authorities had major impacts on 
the regional government. The first evidence of a transformation in the 
organisational structure of the regional headquarters was the establishment, at 
the beginning of 1999, of an organisational unit in charge of operating as the 
secretariat of the inter-institutional table of agriculture. Alessandro Nebuloni was 
appointed as operating manager of the secretariat, under the supervision of the 
deputy director general, Sandro Cioccarelli.
The organisation chart of the agriculture directorate general in 2002 had 
significantly changed. There was a new “agency”, the regional funding body, in 
charge of the disbursement of payments to farmers. Some organisational units 
had been deeply transformed, formally and substantively: the Unita Organizzativa 
Sviluppo delle Filiere had responsibility in terms of regulation of the development 
of the overall agricultural sector, supporting the deliberative processes of the 
competent organs. The Unita Organizzativa Programmazione e ricerca per le 
Filiere Agroindustriali had incorporated the structure for the management of the 
relations with delegated entities and performed the broad set of activities 
concerning the management of the relations with local authorities. Another task of 
this organisational unit was to promote the study of technical and economic 
issues related to the development of the primary sector in Lombardy, an activity 
that was directed to support the performance of the new regulatory tasks.
It was during the course of the reorganisation that the top management more 
and more frequently evoked the slogan “shifting from direct administration to the 
governance of the system”, for depicting the nature of the ongoing 
transformation.
In this respect, the issue of getting information about the execution of 
devolved tasks was growing in importance. The organisational impact of 
devolution for people who had remained at the headquarters, and had not been 
hit by the organisational trauma of being reallocated to another public entity, was 
plastically represented by the fact that information about what was happening in 
the execution of tasks that were previously directly supervised by managers had 
now to be demanded to the forty-one autonomous public entities (the eleven 
provinces and the thirty mountain communities, though the latter held minor 
tasks). Since the second half of 1999, the collection of data about the activities 
run by local authorities became a significant task of the structure for the 
management of the relations with delegated entities.
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Elected politicians shared the concerns of managers, though being less 
directly affected, and backed a project for establishing a new computerised 
information system connecting all actors in the policy field. An opportunity came 
from the enactment of a national ministry of agriculture decree (number 503 in 
1999), that provided the legal basis for regional governments to autonomously 
initiate and develop an inter-institutional computerised information system 
supporting public services delivery in agriculture, that would collect and elaborate 
data about the activities executed by local authorities. The new inter- 
organisational information system came to be considered by Baccolo, Cioccarelli 
and their collaborators as the instrument to address the growing information 
needs of the regional management: at first especially about volumes of outputs 
and financial flows, subsequently the inter-organisational information system 
would provide a platform for running more sophisticated performance indicators. 
The establishment of the Sistema Informativo Agricolo Regionale Lombardo 
(SIARL, or agricultural regional information system of Lombardy), as the new 
computerised inter-organisational information system was named, was approved 
a few months later by the regional government, that allocated a funding that met 
the financial requests of the managers. In the same regional ruling of 1999 that 
allocated the funds for the new computerised information system, it was made 
explicit that SIARL was to be conceived as the prototype of what the 
computerised information system of Lombardy should become in all policy fields 
affected by devolution.
Nebuloni, who had a background in computerised information systems and a 
strong sensitivity to organisational issues, was appointed manager of the new 
organisational unit in charge of developing the new inter-institutional 
computerised information system.
Another “information gap” concerned the type and amount of resources 
actually employed by Local Authorities for performing the new tasks11. The issue 
was at the heart of the heated discussions engaged with local governments in the 
negotiations that paved the way to the implementation of devolution to local 
authorities. Most of the bilateral meetings held in 1998 between the 
organisational unit headed by Cioccarelli and the councillors and managers in 
charge of agriculture affairs in local authorities were devoted to the issue of the 
proper estimation of the resources necessary to local authorities for performing 
the new tasks. However, the information gap was not perceived as such at that
11 The task of investigating these and other issues concerning the development of devolution in the 
Lombardy region was given by the regional president to a special commission, named 
Osservatorio per la Riforma Amministrativa ed il Federalismo (Observatory for the administrative 
reform and federalism).
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stage, when the regional top management could rely on a direct knowledge of 
cost structures of the regional territorial offices, that were in effect consulted 
during the negotiation rounds. It was in 2000 and subsequently12 that the issue of 
getting an insight into the cost structures of autonomous and differentiating public 
entities became more and more important, especially on occasions as the 
devolution of some further tasks, that occurred in 2000 and 2002. The legislative 
basis for a further transfer of tasks to local authorities was provided by the 
enactment of two specific laws, amending the law on decentralisation in 
agriculture (Number 11 in 1998) and adding the new tasks to the list of functions 
reported in the 1998 act. On that occasion, the regional staff of the agriculture 
directorate general had to negotiate about resources with counterparts in local 
authorities much more conscious of the costs determined by running the new 
functions13.
The same year (2000), the Lombardy regional government acquired further 
attributions from the central government concerning the administration of 
subsidies for end-users, a process that eventually led to the establishment of the 
regional funding body (narrated subsequently). This event increased the formal 
responsibility by the region in terms of accountability to the central government 
and to the European Commission about the advancement of the Rural 
Development Plan and the administration of the Common Agricultural Policy
12 An event related to the story of devolution in agriculture is the working of the committee for the 
monitoring of devolution. The committee was established on occasion of a plenary meeting, in 
2001, on the topic of decentralisation between the regional government (the president of 
Lombardy region and all the commissioners) and the presidents of all the eleven provinces of 
Lombardy. Agreements were reached about starting the devolution of tasks and resources in the 
fields of: energy, environment, water service, training for job, road network. On that occasion, the 
committee was established. It was a two-tier organ with the mandate of increasing co-ordination 
between the regional government and local governments. The technical tier was staffed with 
people from the presidency, selected directorates general that had been engaged in decentralisation 
efforts, close collaborators of the presidents of the provinces and of their economic and financial 
departments. The technical tier was in charge of analysing the problems that arose in the 
devolution in the fields o f agriculture and the job centres (the competences on the latter were 
transferred directly from the central state to local authorities), and whether the transfer of resources 
from the Regional Government had been satisfactory. The committee worked over the period 
September-December 2001. It produced a methodology for monitoring the resources employed by 
local governments for executing the new tasks, plus a set of recommendations about how to deal 
with potential difficulties that could arise in relation to the decentralisation o f tasks in the other 
programmatic fields mentioned. It also produced a more conceptual paper about guiding criteria 
the regional government could employ for assessing whether a function should be exercised at the 
regional level, or decentralised to local authorities, as well as for assessing the costs for running 
some of the functions that the national government was at least in principle oriented to devolve to 
regions.
13 During the bilateral agreements with local authorities in 1998, it was agreed that a negotiation 
about resources needed for the execution o f the devolved tasks was formally kept open, in 
response to the evidence about the actual “costs” of the execution of devolved tasks. This type of 
arrangement enhanced the significance of getting information about other entities’ performances. 
Such formal arrangement can be contrasted with other approaches, like the one adopted by the 
regional government of Tuscany, that put emphasis on the “one-shot” nature o f the negotiation 
with local authorities about the resources for executing the devolved tasks.
provisions at the regional level, especially in terms of monitoring the financial 
flows. This fact further pushed the rapid development of the Lombardy Region 
Agricultural Information System (the SIARL).
Major organisational transformations did not occur only at the headquarters in 
Milan: regional territorial offices were deeply affected by devolution. The human 
resources to execute the devolved tasks were provided to local authorities mainly 
by transferring most of the staff of the regional territorial offices to the list of local 
governments employees.
Regional territorial offices did not operate only in the agriculture sector: in 
principle, all directorates could rely on them for specific issues to be dealt with; 
but only some directorates had part of their personnel located in these peripheral 
offices, usually for performing the front office in the delivery of services. The 
organisational links between the agriculture directorate general and the regional 
territorial offices were especially intense because most of staff in them worked on 
agricultural affairs, and the personnel was functionally dependent on the 
agriculture directorate general.
The allocation to local authorities of the personnel in charge of executing 
administrative tasks in agriculture radically transformed these offices. After the 
downsizing, in fact, the regional territorial offices remained with a small portion of 
the initial staff and a very limited set of tasks to execute.
The new mandate of regional territorial offices was redefined along the lines of 
having a “sensor” of the region on the territory: a small organisational unit, but 
strongly interconnected with the region’s stakeholders in the territory. In the new 
organisational design, the responsible of a regional territorial office had the 
explicit mandate of being an “antenna” of the region in the locality as well as 
promoting local “tables”, that is venues for public and private actors to meet and 
decide about specific issues in policy domains in which the regional government 
had significant attributions
Another major event in the devolution from the central government to regions 
was the transfer of the function of disbursing the CAP subsidies to agricultural 
businesses, an event that had a major organisational impact on the regional 
government. In fact, in October 2000 a decree of the national ministry for the 
agricultural and forest policies enabled the regional governments to relieve from 
AGEA (the national funding body for agriculture) important tasks in the
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management of financial resources. The provisions of the decree, unlike many 
others in Italy, were not compulsory: regions could make themselves responsible 
of the tasks currently performed by AGEA, but they were not compelled to do so.
For the top management of Lombardy Region it was the opportunity longed 
for since 1997, when the national law on devolution in agriculture (143/97) 
formally attributed to the regions the competencies in the delivery of financial 
subsidies to agricultural businesses. In order to become enforceable, in Italy 
primary legislation (enacted laws) has to be integrated by secondary legislation, 
i.e. ministerial decrees containing the detailed regulation of the topic. After the 
issuing of the decree, the legal framework enabled the regional government to 
perform the function. In order to actually acquire from the national level the 
attributions concerning the delivery of the subsidies of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, the regional government established, at the end of 2000, a new entity 
named Organismo Pagatore Regionale (regional funding body); the regional 
funding body was in charge of receiving from AGEA most of the tasks in the 
execution of payments to end-users. In December 2000, an agreement between 
the Lombardy region and AGEA was signed.
The strategic significance for the regional government of this intervention was 
made explicit by Cioccarelli in an interview14:
“before the establishment of the regional funding body, notwithstanding the new 
regulatory powers, the region was the “operating arm on the territory” of AGEA in 
the management of the financial resources of CAP; after the establishment of the 
regional funding body, this entity became the operating arm of the regional 
government, while AGEA remained the interface with the central government (with 
an important responsibility in front of the EU), but the leading role on the territory is 
now performed by the regional government”.
The relevance of establishing a funding body at the regional level is (always 
in the words of Cioccarelli)
“highlighted by the highly differentiated behaviour of Italian regions: only five other 
regions in Italy15 have followed the same path and made themselves responsible 
for the management of financial resources within the framework of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. Look also at the differences in the models that have been 
employed: some regions have opted for an agency model, by establishing an 
autonomous agency in charge of delivering money to the farmers; one Region is 
studying the option of contracting out the tasks to an external entity; in one case no 
decision about the organisational model has been made yet. Such variations mean
14 February 2003.
15 Out of 20; the Regions are Basilicata, the only one to be located in the South o f Italy, Emily, 
Tuscany, Piedmont and Veneto (all located in the Centre-North of Italy).
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that it is not a kind of reform that simply requires regions to comply to pre-defined 
rules and tasks: only those regions that were really determined to design for 
themselves a new role in agriculture caught the ministerial decree of October 2000 
as an opportunity and ‘invented’ their own way of performing such new 
competence”.
How did the process that led to the definition of the organisational model for 
the new entity develop? A top level inter-sector team was appointed by the 
regional government at the end of 2000: the team included the secretary general 
of the region, the director general and the deputy director general of the 
agriculture directorate general, the directors of the general affairs and personnel 
directorate general and the budget directorate general, and members from a 
consultancy. The team had the mandate of specifying the possible alternatives 
with regard to the organisational solution for the management of the new tasks. 
Team members identified three available alternatives: contracting out the service 
to an external provider, establishing an independent “agency” (a sort of 
autonomous authority), establishing a public entity as the operating arm of the 
region (a funding body). The first model was at the time under consideration by 
the Piedmont region, bordering on the west side of Lombardy. Contracting out 
was a spreading solution in Italy since the first half of the previous decade; 
though not applied specifically to this kind of issues, many reform initiatives 
prompted the adoption of this model, that was becoming quite fashionable in 
those years. However, this option was quite immediately rejected because of a 
manifest incompatibility with a priority of the regional government: keeping a 
direct contact between the region and end-users, especially after the devolution 
of the case management of farmers’ applications to local authorities.
The second option lay in adopting another fashionable solution in Italy those 
years, i.e. establishing an agenzia autonoma (autonomous agency16), similarly to 
what were doing some of the other regions in Italy that were relieving from AGEA 
the administration of financial resources. Arguments raised by team members 
against the adoption of this kind of solution included one procedural aspect and 
some substantive issues. The procedural aspect lay in the fact that, in order for 
the region to establish an agency, it was necessary to address the regional 
parliament and wait for it to enact a regional law on the topic. This procedure 
required a longer time for the approval. Furthermore, it was not in line with the
16 Literal translation into English of the Italian Agenzia may be misleading (at least in this 
context): this model refers to a sort of authority, autonomous from the region; it was not intended 
as the operating arm of a core “department”, as the term (executive) agency is most commonly 
used, at least in the “post-Next Steps reform” United Kingdom (for an overview of the 
phenomenon of agencies in OECD countries and an analysis of some definitions o f “agency”, see 
e.g. Pollitt, Talbot et al., 2005).
71
style of governing by secondary legislation, which characterised many regional 
governments in Italy in that period17, and addressing the regional parliament only 
for highly political, broad-scope authoritative decisions. The second argument 
was based on economical considerations: estimated costs of an autonomous 
agency were significantly superior to those met in the case of establishing a body 
“internal” to the region, though with some operational autonomy. Since the overall 
devolution process was coming to be considered by elected politicians as an 
ideologically desirable enterprise but, all in all, also a very expensive one, cheap 
solutions were welcome.
The rejection of both alternatives left only one available solution: the 
establishment of an operating arm functionally dependent on the agriculture 
directorate general, but with operational autonomy and a global responsibility for 
the management of funds. The purpose was to achieve a high degree of 
organisational specialisation by establishing an entity with separate specific 
tasks, while keeping some form of organisational integration with the remainder 
of the agriculture directorate general. The key advantage of this solution was its 
consistency with the mission assigned to the regional funding body, as illustrated 
by Cioccarelli:
“the Region has not taken over the tasks about CAP funds from AGEA only to pass 
them to an autonomous authority: we don’t want to separate the function of 
regulating from the function of delivering funds”.
The comparison with other cases was a crucial source of learning for the 
team working on this issue. The comparison with the other Italian regions 
engaging in the decentralisation of tasks from AGEA provided the Lombardy 
region with a term of reference about the agency model. Once the agency model 
was rejected and an orientation in the sense of a specialised funding body was 
achieved, an important source of vicarious learning came from abroad. It was the 
European Commission that provided Lombardy region with a list of “regions” (or 
equivalent institutions) in countries throughout Europe that had adopted a similar 
model. Most of the names in the list were those of German Lander. However, the 
Lombardy region had another opportunity for getting in close touch with foreign 
experiences. Since 1988, four regional governments in Europe promoted an 
association named “The Four Engines of Europe”, including the German Land of 
Baden Wurttemberg, the French Region of Rhone Alpes and the Spanish 
Autonomous Province of Catalonia. The name of the association recalled the
17 The story occurred in the aftermath o f the enactment of the 1999 law that changed the electoral 
rules at the regional level and introduced the direct election of the Regional President. President’s 
powers were strongly enhanced.
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performances of the economy of these regions, which (at least in 1988) had the 
highest rate of increase of the regional Gross Domestic Product among the 
European Regions. As time went by, the network among these four regions 
consolidated and the exchange of experiences among administrators grew in 
importance18. Both Catalonia and Baden Wurttemberg were in the list provided by 
the European Commission. Linguistic affinity and the enthusiasm elicited by the 
high degree of autonomy achieved by Catalonia in Spain, a country that, like 
Italy, was engaging in a significant politico-administrative devolution process, 
made the team members incline to this model.
Vicarious learning from the Catalonia model proved especially significant for 
the design of the details of the model and for the implementation; however, as we 
have seen, it was not decisive in the selection of what model to adopt: such 
decision was taken before engaging in the study of the Catalonia model.
The regional funding body was formally established in July, 2001. In 
November of the same year the ministry of agricultural and forest policies 
authorised the new body. In January 2002, the European commission carried out 
the auditing of the new body, whose outcome was the formal approval of the 
procedures employed by the regional funding body for the assignment and 
delivery of subsidies to farmers (procedures had to be compatible with EU 
standards and a formal approval by the European Commission was a pre­
requisite). Subsequently, in March 2002, agreements were reached with each 
local authority. After the completion of this indispensable and final step, in April 
2002 the first payments were delivered.
Setting to work the regional funding body was not an easy job. As for the 
devolution to local authorities, staffing the new entity proved to be a demanding 
task. With respect to the experience of the transfer of personnel to the local 
governments, however, both the context and the actual devices employed were 
different. Logistical and contractual aspects did not show the same complexity. 
With regard to logistics, the regional funding body was established in the same 
building where the headquarters was. As to labour relations, staff of the regional 
funding body remained in the payroll of the regional government and had the 
same labour contract of regional staff.
The approach to the staffing of the new body was the opposite: the transfer to 
the regional funding body was on a voluntary basis, not a compulsory one. And 
recruitment of personnel proved difficult: a first internal bid failed because of the 
insufficient number of applications. A recurring explanation provided by the
18 See Ongaro and Valotti (2002, chap. 5).
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regional managers was that the prospect of performing operational tasks was not 
particularly appealing, especially in a period when the region was casting for itself 
a regulatory role. A powerful opportunity to solve this problem came from a 
concurrent story: the revamping of the regional executive agencies. The 
agriculture directorate general had five executive agencies performing some 
operational tasks.
As such, the overhaul of the agencies performing operational tasks in the field 
of agriculture represented simply the catching up with an overlooked issue. The 
Lombardy regional government was a latecomer: most regions had already re­
organised their agricultural agencies. Outdated managerial models and a 
plethora of redundant executive bodies and overseers characterised the system 
of agricultural agencies in many Italian regions since the beginning of the ‘90s. 
Vested interests determined strong resistances towards changing this system.
In 2001, a team led by Cioccarelli and consisting of staff from the agriculture 
directorate general was appointed in order to design the overhaul of regional 
executive agencies in agriculture. In its initial mandate, the purpose of the team 
was to design the reorganisation of each individual agency, without any 
integration of them.
In designing the revamping of executive agencies, the team adopted as 
guidelines the two ideas that “the region must have one single interlocutor” and 
that the labour division between the region and the new executive agency 
assigns all operational tasks to the agency, while the planning of the activities is 
competence of the region. The Piano della Attivita (plan of activities), a sort of 
“contractual” arrangement from an organisational point of view, connected the 
regional government and its agency; in the plan of activities, the regional 
government negotiated and determined all the tasks to be carried out by the 
executive agency in the budget year.
Though harsh debates occurred during the meetings that led to the enactment 
by the regional Parliament of the law establishing the new executive agency, the 
two basic principles were maintained and the regional law 3/02 eventually 
established the new agricultural executive agency. In the design of the transition 
phase from five to one single agency, incumbent presidents were confirmed as 
Commissario Straordinario (i.e., temporary director with all the powers of the 
board) of their own agencies. After the merger (technically, a merger without 
winding-up), all presidents entered the new board of the single agency.
On 1st July 2002 the new executive agency started up. By the end of 2002, the 
plan of activities for the year 2003 was prepared by regional officers.
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The organisation chart of the new agency was drafted by the team, supported 
by external experts. The revamping of the five executive agencies and their 
merger determined a surplus of workforce, that was eventually employed for 
staffing the Regional Funding Body. Paolo Baccolo, that was also director of the 
regional funding body, and Adriana Assegnati, the deputy director, after the 
failure of a first internal bid for vacant positions, exploited the revamping of 
executive agencies as an opportunity for staffing the regional funding body.
The decree of the national ministry for agricultural and forest policies issued in 
October 2000 and concerning the devolution to regional governments of the 
function of administering the disbursement of funds to farmers had another 
important consequence: the establishment by the regional government of a 
formal accreditation procedure for the Centri di Assistenza Agricola, or Centres 
for Agricultural Assistance (CAA). Agricultural businesses could resort to the CAA 
for assistance in the preparation of the application for CAP subsidies. At the 
same time, the CAA was in charge of performing part of the preliminary 
investigation phase of farmers’ applications, on behalf of the local government’s 
offices. Final responsibility as regards authorisation or denial remained under the 
responsibility of the regional manager.
Promoted by agricultural businesses’ associations, though formally distinct 
and with the statute of Limited Responsibility Companies, the CAA were 
contracted important tasks in service delivery. Indeed, the further devolution of 
some minor tasks, that occurred in 2002, was for the most part a transfer from 
the regional government to the Centres for Agricultural Assistance.
The issue of contracting out administrative activities to farmers’ associations 
was on the governmental agenda since the very beginning of the devolution 
intervention. An attempt of establishing forms of contracting out of the preliminary 
investigation phase of the case management of farmers’ applications for 
subsidies was tried in 1999, when a proposal, drafted by the collaborators of 
Cioccarelli, was submitted to the secretariat general. Legal advice given on that 
occasion was negative, basically because without a national-level decree such 
procedures were not legally viable, and the proposal was halted. After the issuing 
of the decree, the proposal was picked off the drawer and submitted to the 
regional government collegial executive body. Backed by both the commissioner 
for agriculture and the secretary general of the Lombardy region, it was 
eventually approved.
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Commissioners for agriculture as well as top managers showed a commitment 
to the systematic engagement of the associations of agricultural businesses since 
the very beginning of the devolution story. In 1998, in fact, the Tavolo Agricolo, or 
agricultural table, was established as the venue for engaging top managers in 
associations in a formal consultation procedure, activated whenever an important 
legislative bill was under discussion. Its meetings, however, were relatively 
limited in number. It met on the occasions of the discussion of bills, like the Rural 
Development Plan, the law 7/00 (“Norms regulating regional interventions in 
agriculture”), or the Agricultural Plan. On other occasions, external events like the 
BSE (“Mad cow disease”), urging a rapid and co-ordinated public-private 
intervention, led to convene a meeting of the agricultural table. But, all in all, it 
was the CAA story that proved especially significant for the unfolding of 
devolution, as argued in the next chapter, in which we move from the illustration 
to the explanation of the episode of devolution in Lombardy.
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3. Explaining case outcomes
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the transformations that occurred in the Lombardy region 
have been illustrated. How can the evidence be interpreted? Three points 
emerge as theoretically significant in the episode (for reasons that have been 
partly anticipated in paragraph 1.6 and are discussed in greater detail in the 
chapter): the entrepreneurial behaviour of regional top managers in the process 
of institutional change and the consistency over time of the decisions they made; 
the scale of realignment of the workforce from the region to local governments; 
the substantive difference of the new organisational arrangements from the 
previous ones. Questions have been formulated (chapter 1) as follows:
1) What explains the actual behaviour of regional top managers in the 
agriculture directorate general and the way they led the intervention of 
adaptation to devolution to determine the outcomes observed?
2) What explains the scale of re-alignment of the workforce from the region 
to local governments?
3) What explains the significant degree of difference from the previous 
organisational arrangements?
They are subsequently discussed.
3.2 Explaining the behaviour of regional top managers
The first of the three main questions is addressed to explaining the behaviour of 
regional top managers in the agriculture directorate general of Lombardy region 
and the consistency of the decisions that were made by them during the 
implementation episode, decisions that, it is reminded, for a significant part were 
not prescribed by the legislative act on devolution.
In order to set the problem, we can start from discussing what kind of 
behaviour could be expected of elected and tenured officials in governmental 
systems characterised by a strong administrative law tradition shaping the culture 
of governance, as is the case of Italy. A useful contribution for setting the problem 
comes from the analysis proposed by Capano (2003) about the implementation 
of administrative reforms in Italy. Drawing on studies adopting an approach 
grounded in historical institutionalism for explaining the variety across countries
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of the outcomes of implementing public sector reforms (Pollitt and Summa, 1997; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000 and 20041), studies that put a strong emphasis on the 
essential importance of the cultural variable in understanding why administrative 
reforms radically vary in nature (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993, Premfors, 1998), 
Capano interprets the trajectory of administrative reforms in Italy occurring in the 
‘90s as affected in a decisive way by the persistency of the hegemonic 
“administrative law paradigm”.
The administrative paradigm is constituted (in terms of fundamental values: 
the “hard core” of the paradigm, see pp. 783 and 786) around the 
institutionalisation of the administrative law (“juridification”) as a way of “being" 
and “acting” in public administration: “The centuries-old values inherent in the 
administrative paradigm are as follows: 1) the role of law as an inevitable 
expression of administrative action, 2) the prescriptive identification of the 
functions of the decisional process (general decisions, aims, implementation and 
control), 3) the separation of political decision-making from the administrative 
implementation of such decisions, 4) the principles of impartiality and neutrality, 
5) the principle of legality as an essential instrument needed to achieve the 
objectives of administrative law, 6) an emphasis on the overall coherence of the 
system (that is, of the legal system)”. As regards the historically established 
cognitive component of the paradigm, i.e. the series of cause-and-effect 
relationships by means of which participants formulate their general strategy of 
intervention and choose individual public policy instruments, the general 
approach to the formulation and implementation of a policy is characterised by: 1) 
the dominance of the specialised field of administrative law (that provides the 
basic skills and the pre-requisites for action), 2) a deductive, hierarchical- 
consequential relationship between input (regulation) and output (administrative 
action), 3) an emphasis on the importance of formal rules as the inevitable choice 
of instrument in administrative action, 4) the considerable importance given to 
formal organisational structure, compared to the little attention paid to policy 
delivery and the management of the change process implied by policy delivery, 5) 
the control of legitimacy (where the word “control” refers to a kind of “control of 
compliance to the law”; this meaning is especially evident in the Italian word 
controllo as used by public officials, who are used to employing English terms like 
“monitoring” when they want to distinguish more “managerial” forms of control).
1 This kind of analysis is, broadly speaking, consistent with a comparative research agenda carried 
on by a number of scholars in the fields of Political Science, Public Administration and Public 
Management about the influence of national traditions of governance on public sector reforms (see 
also Bevir, Rhodes, Weller, 2003a, and all the contributions in the special issue of Public 
Administration, Vol. 81, N. 1, 2003). A key underlying assumption in this stream of research is 
that ideas -  the culture of governance -  really do matter in explaining policy-making processes.
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The trajectory of administrative reforms in Italy occurring in the ‘90s has been 
interpreted as affected in a decisive way by the persistent hegemony of the 
administrative law paradigm, a cultural paradigm that has proved a considerable 
capacity for survival, due to the cohesion and manipulative ability of the 
administrative policy community, and also the absence of any alternative 
paradigm really capable of challenging it.
Other authors argue that, since the beginning of the ‘90s, the administrative 
paradigm has indeed found challengers and it has become “dominant”, but no 
more hegemonic, since it has been challenged by a rival paradigm. In the Italian 
academic debate on the topic (dating back to the 70s and the ‘80s, see 
Borgonovi, 1984) there is a significant stream of literature providing a critical 
review of the implications of this paradigm, in the light of an alternative, 
managerial paradigm, whose influence seems to have significantly expanded 
during the ‘90s (Del Vecchio, 2002, Pezzani, 2003, Valotti, 2000). It should be 
made clear that the discussion about the dominance of the administrative law 
paradigm is about its influence on the process of change in implementing 
administrative reforms in legalistic countries. It is not about the function per se of 
administrative law in different models of state, as when, for example, Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2004, pp. 99-100) argue that in some continental European countries 
public elites have pursued a distinctive reform model (to be contrasted with the 
reform model pursued by “NPM-inspired” elites in Anglo-Saxon countries), of 
which an important component is the reaffirmation of the role of administrative 
law (suitably modernised) in preserving principles like equality before the law, 
legal security, and the availability of specialised legal scrutiny of state action2; the 
authors refer to this distinctive model as the Neo-Weberian State. For the 
purposes of the present work, the point is that there is wide consensus in the 
Italian scientific literature as well as in the international one about the persistence 
of the overarching influence of the administrative paradigm, be it hegemonic or 
dominant, on the functioning of the Italian governmental system.
Expected behaviour of public officials in the Lombardy case consistent with 
the administrative law paradigm. What kind of behaviour could be expected of 
public officials in the light of the persistent influence of the legalistic paradigm? 
Given its basic features -  like, in particular, the role of law as an inevitable 
expression of administrative action, the importance attributed to the formal
2 In other words, it is concerning the process o f change that the persistent dominance o f the 
administrative law as a cultural paradigm, coupled with some features of the politico- 
administrative system, make formal compliance to the norms and a resulting substantive hollowing 
out of the substantive contents of the reform itself a concrete possibility -  an always possible 
“fate” of administrative reforms in Italy.
79
organisational structure compared to the little attention to policy delivery, and the 
emphasis on the overall coherence of the legal system -  and given that in the 
specific context of the case studied there was no legal mandate at the national 
level for performing programmatic activities like “providing advice and services to 
the local governments”, or “providing conditions for the engagement of 
stakeholders in policy formulation and delivery”, a more likely behaviour by 
regional managers was retreating to the new tasks devolved from the central 
government to regions, rather than engaging in performing not prescribed 
programmatic activities like those that could be observed.
Moreover, given such features of the approach to the implementation of a 
policy - like in particular: a) the hierarchical-consequential relationship between 
regulation (that comes first) and administrative action (that follows consequently), 
and b) the emphasis on formal rules as the inevitable choice of instrument in 
administrative action -  a very limited degree of improvisation in leading the 
intervention could be expected of the regional management, and outcomes of the 
devolution process like the support provided to local authorities (outcome 4) and 
the significant engagement of stakeholders (outcome 5) could be hardly 
explained by such a legalistic behaviour. Improvisation (the reference is to Weick, 
2001, pp. 57-91 and 284-304) is interpreted mainly in the sense of “ingenious 
adaptation” as in the contribution of Baez and Abolafia (2002) on bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship: “using creativity, intuition and flexibility to fundamentally 
change a relatively structured situation”; a simplistic but direct, commonsensical 
understanding of improvisation in this context is “behaving in such a way to go 
well beyond strict compliance to the legal mandate and finding new solutions for 
adapting the organisational arrangements of the Lombardy region to the 
devolved institutional setting”.
Explaining the course of action that top managers in the agriculture directorate 
general undertook. The question thus becomes: what explains the actual 
behaviour of regional top managers in the agriculture directorate general? In fact, 
what was observed in the Lombardy case in agriculture is not consistent with the 
predictions about the Italian trajectory of reform ensuing from the dominance of 
the administrative law paradigm.
A different, more complex identity of key top managers in the agriculture 
directorate general in the regional government of Lombardy over the period 
1998-2002 could be observed: people with a significant entrepreneurial 
approach, a strong orientation to exploiting opportunities in order to “create public
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value” (Moore, 1995); all in all, persons very different from people observed in 
other instances of devolution.
How were they sorted out? Traditionally a field where public sector 
intervention is significant and political sensitivity high (paragraph 1.5), agriculture 
was the first policy field in which a law on devolution had been enacted at the 
national level, soon followed (over the period 1997-98) by a number of secondary 
legislation acts about devolution in other sectors. We remind the reader that the 
issue of devolution was at the time very high on the governmental agenda of both 
the central and the regional governments throughout Italy and there was ongoing 
tough political competition between the central government and the Lombardy 
regional government (run by a coalition opposite to the ruling one at the national 
level). In this frame, agriculture was to be the “shop-window” of how the regional 
government of Lombardy was making the devolution agenda progress in a 
substantial way. Moreover, the Lombardy regional government, almost 
independently of the political orientation of the incumbent ruling party coalition, 
was traditionally used to aspiring at proposing itself, in times of change, as an 
“administrative model” to be followed by the other regions in Italy.
Another influential previous event is the major intervention of reorganisation 
that was carried through in 1997 (and started the previous year, following up the 
1995 elections and the settlement of a new government). As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, a divisional organisational structure was introduced, in which 
each division - the directorate general - had a substantial degree of autonomy. A 
formal system of definition of the targets to be pursued and their internal 
hierarchy joined with a form of “responsibility budgeting” was introduced, a 
management system whereby substantial decisional authority is decentralised to 
agents within the frame of well specified rules determining how agents will be 
rewarded for their efforts. Formal evaluation procedures were established and a 
performance-related pay system was introduced (monetary incentives, the 
flexible part of the salary, became a substantial part of the wage for middle to top 
managers). A new internal regulation was adopted that strongly enhanced 
flexibility in the appointment or removal of civil servants by elected officials.
Major internal transfers occurred, especially during and in the aftermath of the 
1997 reorganisation. In the agriculture directorate general, before or during the 
period of observation (spanning from 1998 to 2002), there was a complete 
turnover in the six top positions (the director general and the directors of the five 
Organisational Units in the directorate), and in 2002 fourteen out of the twenty 
persons with managerial responsibilities were new to the stint. Especially in the 
key positions -  for the devolution process to occur -  of the director general
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(Paolo Baccolo) and of the responsible of the structure for the management of 
the relations with delegated entities (Sandro Cioccarelli, and later Giorgio 
Bonalume) were appointed people with reputation, skills and an orientation to 
interpret in an “entrepreneurial” way their role. Previous identities of the people 
appointed provide part of the explanation of the actual behaviour of regional top 
managers. However, in seeking an explanation of the course of action that the 
top managers in the agriculture directorate general undertook by analysing it in 
terms of a logic of appropriateness, we also need to understand how they 
perceived (construed) the situation and interpreted their role3.
In the agriculture directorate general in that period there were some 
presumptions attached to the role of director general and of manager of the 
organisational unit in charge of implementing the law on devolution in agriculture 
about how their role-occupants should act. With devolution very high on the 
governmental agenda and normative acts having been enacted, in agriculture, 
both at the national and at the regional level -  whilst in most other policy fields, in 
1998, regional legislation about devolution was still to come -  people in charge in 
the agriculture directorate general should take care that the devolution act be 
rapidly and thoroughly implemented; for these people, implementing devolution 
was indeed the raison d’etre of their appointment. Moreover, also given the 
dynamism of the national government in promoting important reforms in 
substantive areas of public management (that were putting a strong emphasis on 
the improvement of the three “es”: efficiency, effectiveness and economy, and on 
reduction of “red tape”, see paragraph 1.5), people in charge of implementing 
one of the first major reforms promoted by the regional government of Lombardy 
should take care that the reform be implemented in such ways that the societal 
forces (agricultural businesses and their representative associations) were 
actually satisfied about the new state of affairs. This interpretation of the situation 
entailed for role-occupants in key positions for implementing devolution in 
agriculture to put a strong emphasis on the “good functioning” of the devolved 
institutional setting.
The reader could find a bit puzzling the employment of the logic of 
appropriateness for explaining change, rather than stability -  but besides any 
theoretical argumentation about the logic of appropriateness being a framework 
for explaining decisions in general (March, 1999, chap 2, and 1988), it should be 
reminded that since the biennium 1991 (the year of the referendum that struck 
down multiple preference voting) to 1992 (the start of the campaign against
3 In fact: “understanding the sense-making strategies or organisational actors is key to 
understanding their entrepreneurial behaviour” (Baez and Bolafia, 2002).
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corruption -  so-called clean hands inquiry, and the emergency measures 
introduced by the Amato government for preventing a state financial crisis) and 
for the entire period of observation Italy has been a case of intense political and 
policy-level change, in which “the explanatory problem of the Italian political 
system has been transformed, from inertia to change” (Radaellli, 2004). In this 
context, in many circumstances “implementing change” more than “maintaining” 
might be interpreted as an appropriate behaviour. Having said that, we agree that 
explanations based on previous identities may be partial or insufficient. The 
mechanism of the logic of appropriateness seems to have worked in 
concatenation with the mechanism of actor certification. Certification (McAdam et 
al., 2001, p. 145) refers to the validation of actors, their performance and their 
claims by external authorities4. In the case, presumptions about the behaviour of 
role-occupants in the agriculture directorate general were reinforced by the 
explicit recognition by the regional president and commissioner for agriculture (it 
should be reminded that the regional president, Roberto Formigoni, was between 
1999 and 2000 also directly in charge as ad interim regional commissioner for 
agriculture) and other key elected and appointed top officials. Regional managers 
interpreted their situation as one of both pressure and permission to improvise in 
the management of the intervention.
This general mechanism was strengthened by the existence and actual 
utilisation of evaluation procedures and the increased flexibility: Cioccarelli was 
subsequently appointed deputy director general of the agriculture directorate5 
and Sandro Nebuloni was appointed manager of the organisational unit in charge 
of developing an inter-institutional computerised information system6.
The concatenation of mechanisms provides an explanation about why top 
managers in the agriculture directorate general -  all new to the stint -  adopted a 
course of action conducive to undertaking a major intervention of organisational 
reinvention in the course of the implementation of the devolution act.
This explanation may be contrasted, on the one hand, with the expected 
behaviour according to the literature on the legalistic, administrative law paradigm 
dominating in Italy. At another level of analysis, the explanation provided acquires
4 McAdam at al. (2001) employ diffusely the mechanism of actor certification in explaining the 
dynamics o f contentious politics.
5 And later, in 2005, he became the director general, while Paolo Baccolo was appointed director 
general o f the industry directorate.
6 In this respect, the organisational design, and specifically the routines for the evaluation of the 
performances of managers, contributed to determining the distribution of resources, and not only 
the vice versa (following the line of analysis proposed by Weick, 2001, pp. 65-66 and aiming at 
replacing the architectural metaphor for organisational design, with the metaphor of organisational 
design as improvisational theatre). More broadly, the conception of organisational routines as a 
source of change (Feldman and Pentland, 2003) is an important part of the explanation proposed in 
the present contribution.
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interest in the light of some of the predictions at which (in our interpretation) the 
bureau-shaping model proposed by Dunleavy points with regard to phenomena 
of devolution. According to a bureau-shaping perspective, in fact, if an exercise of 
devolution is on the governmental agenda and a window of opportunity for a 
major reallocation of tasks is opened, expected priorities of senior managers are 
the delegation of routine tasks (like the delivery of services of technical 
assistance to farmers, the execution of controls of compliance, etc.) to other 
organisations in order to be able to concentrate on high-status tasks, like the 
provision of advice to elected officials, “policy analysis” and the management of 
“diplomatic” relations with other bodies, and to focus on increasing the prestige of 
their organisation, as well as on operating whenever possible with small, collegial 
work units, and possibly with congenial people in them (Dunleavy, 1991, pp. 200- 
205 in particular).
This perspective on the one hand provides a powerful explanation of part of 
the behaviour of regional top managers: a focus on the provision of advice to 
elected officials, an organisation of labour based on small teams (small groups 
were among the characteristics of the Lombardy region after devolution) are all 
evidences consistent with the bureau-shaping perspective. On the other hand, 
however, it does not seem to provide an entirely satisfactory explanation of 
outcomes such as the establishment of a function of delivery of support services 
to local authorities. Nor it explains (and indeed the bureau-shaping model does 
not intend to do so) the efficacy of the flow of decisions that were made and 
eventually led to the previously identified set of outcomes.
We can summarise findings so far as follows: political competition, that in the 
Lombardy case made devolution in agriculture become a shop-window of the 
regional government, coupled with the majoritarian conventions of governance 
(introduced in Italy only a few years before) that favoured the stability and 
cohesion of the dominant coalition in the Regional Government, and with the 
existence of a human resource management system that increased flexibility and 
provided incentives to performance-oriented behaviours, enabled a selection 
process that led to appointing public managers with an entrepreneurial approach. 
This process, concatenated also with a mechanism of actor certification, 
reinforced the adoption of a course of action conducive to the effective 
implementation of devolution (where “effective implementation” is shorthand for 
“implementation in such ways to meet the functional requirements of devolution 
and, in the specific case, produce the outcomes previously identified”). These 
findings may explain outcomes that are unexpected in a legalistic country in
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which the culture of governance tends to induce resistance, or at least 
“resilience”, to consistent and durable improvisation-based, entrepreneurial 
approaches to the management of interventions of devolution.
To conclude this first section, we should note that the appointment of people 
with an entrepreneurial orientation is an important qualification of the situation 
investigated that it is worth characterising and is part of the explanation of the 
case outcome -  as it is the concatenation of mechanisms that may reinforce the 
adoption of a flow of consistent decisions during the unfolding of the devolution 
process. However, the fact a pool of people with reputation, skills and an 
orientation to go beyond the legal mandate and run certain risks in implementing 
devolution was formed, spurred (and permitted) to improvise and adopt a certain 
course of action does not by itself explain the efficacy of the decisions that were 
made. This task is undertaken in the remainder of the chapter. In the following 
section, the successful realignment of the workforce across jurisdictions is 
analysed.
3.3 Explaining the scale of realignment of the workforce across 
jurisdictions
In the previous chapter, an illustration of what happened in the reallocation of 
personnel has been reported. Realignment proved to be a smooth, unchallenged 
process that unfolded over a short period of time. In order to explain this case 
outcome, we can at first employ a rational choice approach and try to explain the 
change process in terms of decisions and behaviours by individuals maximising 
their utility7.
In a very simplistic way, we can at first interpret the story we have observed as 
follows. The personnel of Lombardy region involved in the transfer to local 
governments, in order to choose whether to accept or resist change had to 
assess the monetary and other rewards offered for accepting the transfer (i.e.: an 
automatic promotion to a higher assignation level, plus a una tantum grant), 
against the long-term “costs” entailed by their transfer. These costs can be 
summarised in less career opportunities, a less favourable labour contract, and a
7 This starting point is consistent with Boudon’s (1991) discussion of Katz and Lazarsfeld’s Two- 
Step Flow model as a way of replacing a mechanical model of resistance to change with one 
modelling resistance to change as a strategic choice by actors; according to the model, once faced 
with the new scenario, actors start screening the scenario by looking at cheap, reliable sources of 
information. Assuming, on the basis of the interviews conducted, that enough information was 
available to the regional staff (e.g. due to their links with the staff in provincial Governments they 
were in close touch with) for achieving an acceptable knowledge of the future consequences of 
being transferred, they could calculate benefits and costs in, roughly, the way illustrated.
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loss of status and prestige associated with working for lower levels of 
government.
In calculating benefits and costs, in fact, three factors should be taken into 
account; factors that are contingent to the situation, but far from being unique. 
First, provinces were at the time curtailing their top level positions, and the 
chances of improving, or at least maintaining, the expected career path after 
being transferred to provinces were very limited. The two higher-level categories 
were formally those of “manager” and “cadre”. On average, agriculture sectors in 
provinces had one manager and two to three cadres, compared to an average 
staff ranging from fifteen to about fifty people. Against this ratio of top level 
positions compared to the total staff number, achieving the top positions was 
undoubtedly difficult. Second, the labour contract in local governments was much 
less favourable than the regional one, in terms of accessory benefits and other 
aspects. Though the national labour contract for regional and local government is 
the same, in fact, important differences could derive from the so-called contratto 
integrativo aziendale, the contract agreed with the trade unions at the level of the 
individual public entity. Labour conditions (ancillary benefits, health insurance, 
etc.) were much more favourable at the regional level. Moreover, the mobility 
between provinces was more difficult than mobility between territorially located 
offices of the Lombardy regional government, thus restraining for part of the staff 
the practical possibility of being assigned to a more favourable locality. Third, 
moving from material to more intangible but equally significant benefits, working 
for lower levels of government was in Italy associated with a lower social status 
and prestige; a feature that is, at least in part, due to the legacy of the Napoleonic 
administrative tradition.
In the light of these considerations, top managers operated a careful selection 
of the staff to be transferred, composed mainly, though not exclusively, by staff in 
charge of operational tasks and working in the regional territorial offices of the 
Lombardy government, of which there was one in each province. This meant, on 
the one hand, that this part of the staff was less affected by the transfer; ceteris 
paribus, in fact, costs of transfer for them were inferior: they were not going to 
change in a significant way their job description; from a logistical point of view, 
they often remained in the same premises; and they showed a marked sensitivity 
to monetary rewards compared to other staff in the regional government, being 
instead more sensitive to benefits in terms of status, empowerment, variety and 
content of tasks executed.
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All in all, however, it can reasonably be argued that overall costs strongly 
exceeded benefits, considering the long-term impact of losses8. A rational choice 
argument does not appear to be enough to explain the transfer of personnel in 
the Lombardy case, a “smooth” and basically undisputed process that unfolded 
over a relatively short period of time. An indirect counter-proof could be provided 
by the evidence of the many contemporaneous implementation failures in the 
transfer of personnel that could be observed - both from the central government 
to the regions throughout Italy and from the regional governments to local 
authorities, including, in other policy fields, the same regional government of 
Lombardy. The context provided the staff with means, ranging from organised 
lobbying to going on strike - the latter being a very effective means in Italy, that 
usually entails very limited costs for actors employing such instrument - whereby 
they could effectively resist pressures (in the form of exercise of formal authority) 
to change the employer. As an example, in a field closely related to agriculture, 
the transfer of the Corpo Forestale dello Stato (or “Forest Corps”, specialised 
teams operating in the protection of woods and natural parks) from the state to 
regions, prescribed by a law enacted about the same time, was resisted and 
eventually abandoned (no transfer occurred: see also Table 4.1 -  indeed, further 
legislation was later enacted that definitely repealed the law on devolution of the 
Forest Corps).
In explaining the case outcome of the Lombardy experience, a processual 
explanation is proposed: it is based on the analysis of a concatenation of social 
mechanisms that seems to have been at work and determined the case outcome. 
The analysis hypothesises the triggering of a mechanism operating at the 
individual level -  the threshold-based mechanism -  and the contemporaneous 
inhibition of a mechanism operating at the level of social groups -  the mechanism 
of attribution of threat. The starting point is the forming of a belief about the 
inevitability of devolution.
The forming of a belief about the inevitability of the process of devolution was 
attentively induced by the regional top managers in the agriculture directorate 
general, and took place in part of the staff at the critical moment of shaping 
actors’ collective strategy towards the new situation, a strategy whose content 
could have been instead determined by a mechanism of attribution of threat by 
the staff to be transferred, that represented a potentially-in-formation social group 
(see below). This was especially important with regard to those individuals that 
could more easily trigger organised resistance to change -  first of all, trade union
8 Though, evidently, a univocal demonstration passes through the analysis of the actual preferences 
structure of the actors (and in particular the importance o f promotion as a motivator, and of the 
relative balance of monetary and non-monetary compensation).
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members. The forming of a belief about the inevitability of devolution shaped the 
boundaries within which decision-making by the staff to be transferred occurred; 
in particular, as regards the specification of decisional alternatives, those 
associated with the course of action of “opposing resistance until implementation 
of transfer is dropped” tended to be ruled out as “impossible”. The perspective 
assumed is that of sense-making as an organisational dimension of change, as in 
Weick (20019). Once a belief (hypothesis) is formed in people’s mind, “people 
tend to look for evidence that confirms it. This evidence is especially strong if 
people are under pressure to act quickly and if it is hard for them to find time to 
question their initial beliefs10” (Weick, 2001, p. 460). Unless a belief about the 
inevitability of the process of devolution is formed, a “sense that nothing 
substantive will happen” may tend to prevail, partly because participants might be 
looking at the many other instances of devolution that were in a stalemate, partly 
because of their consciousness of a very long history in Italy of unaccomplished 
reforms. At the same time, behaviours emphasising the formal compliance to the 
normative act, by way of producing secondary legislation (regulations) or other 
formal administrative acts, might tend to prevail: considered a pre-condition of 
administrative action in legalistic countries, these behaviours might substitute for 
(in a typical means-ends inversion), and eventually entirely replace the 
substantive implementation of the goals of devolution11.
What factors did affect making sense of the inevitability of the new situation of 
devolution? According to Weick, there are seven properties having an important 
effect on sense-making: (a) social context, (b) personal identity, (c) retrospect, (d) 
salient cues, (e) ongoing projects, (f) plausibility, (g) enactment12. These 
properties “have an effect on the willingness of people to disengage from, discard 
or ‘walk away’ from their initial story” (in the case, the story, for the personnel, 
could sound like: “transfer of personnel will not occur here, exactly as it does not 
in so many other instances of devolution”) and adopt a newer story that is more 
sensitive to the particulars of the present context (in the case, the story is about 
the inevitable eventual implementation of devolution). According to Weick, these
9 “It is important to separate sensemaking from decision making because sensemaking sets the 
frame within which decisions are made. In many cases sensemaking may even do the bulk o f the 
“deciding” that is present in any organized activity. So-called decisionmaking may simply ratify 
what was made inevitable much earlier when an innocent appearing o f judgements mapped an 
issue out of a much larger set of possibilities that has now been forgotten (Weick, 2001, p. 460).
10 A statement that, inter alia, might provide an argument for explaining the importance of 
succeeding in the transfer over a relatively short period of time, after which the likelihood of 
succeeding reduces and eventually vanishes.
11 Though, as evident, regulations may sometimes be a necessary component from a technical 
point of view of the substantial implementation of a reform.
2 A synthetic illustration is in Weick, 2001 (pp. 461-63); a detailed one in Weick, 1995 (pp. 17- 
62).
88
seven properties are straightforwardly linked to issues of organisational design13. 
If the design maintains or strengthens these seven resources for sense-making, 
then people will be able to continue making sense of what they face. If the design 
undermines or weakens these resources, then people will tend to lose their grasp 
of what may be occurring. The maintaining or strengthening of such process of 
sense-making can be analysed by addressing the operational questions 
proposed by Weick within the specific context of the way the regional managers 
led the intervention of devolution. The proposed set of seven questions is 
succinctly discussed tailored to the circumstances of devolution in Lombardy.
a) Social context: Does the organisational form encourage conversation? The 
setting up of the inter-institutional table of agriculture as well as of conditions for 
providing support and advice to civil servants in local authorities seem to have 
provided an important contribution to creating those “social anchors” (“sensible 
meanings tend to be those for which there is social support, consensual 
validation, and shared relevance”) that contribute to making sense of the new 
story.
b) Identity: does the form give people a distinct, stable sense of who they are 
and what they represent? The attentive creation of the perception of remaining 
part of the regional policy network contributed to make the staff sense to be “a 
center from which judgement of relevance and sense fan out” within the frame of 
the new story.
c) Retrospect: does the form preserve elapsed data and legitimate the use of 
those data? A sense of continuity was created and there was no breakthrough 
with the previous experience by civil servants with regard to their role and sense 
of the results their work produces for the community.
d) Salient cues: Does the form enhance the visibility of cues? Among the “tiny 
indicators that people elaborate into full-blown stories” there was undoubtedly the 
transplant of a number of specific procedures from the region to local authorities 
that created a linkage between a “particular” and a “general” (the general being 
overall stability in the routines) that confirmed in people an overall diagnosis of 
the situation as characterised, contrarily to what might be expected, by a 
relatively high degree of stability.
e) Ongoing projects: does the form enable people to be resilient in the face of 
interruptions? Staff were provided with signals about the fact that their transfer 
was only a part of a broader course of action aimed at the radical redesign of the 
programmatic system of agriculture that contributed to shaping an overall
13 “These properties are affected by organizational designs [..] There appears to be organizational 
conditions that facilitate sensemaking and conditions that thwart sensemaking”.
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perception of things moving in one direction -  notwithstanding the possible 
obstacles.
f) Plausibility: does the form encourage people to accumulate and exchange 
plausible accounts? Weick proposes on the point a set of sources of grounding 
(like agreement with others, the recent past, visible cues, etc.) which appear, 
though in quite different degrees, to have been present in the case.
g) Enactment: does the form encourage action or hesitation? Interpreted as 
encouraging experimentation by staff, the organisational solutions appeared to 
have favoured action - though only in a partial way that, however, all in all did not 
thwart the process.
All in all, organisational designs seem to have provided substantial grounding 
to making sense of the inevitability of the new situation of devolution, at least in a 
significant part of the staff.
The overall argument (based on the adoption of the perspective of March in 
conceiving sense-making as an input to decision-making - March, 1999, p. 25-26) 
is that the forming of a belief about the inevitability of the process of devolution 
made a number of people restrain the consideration of alternative courses of 
action and tend to rule out those associated with the eventual non­
implementation of devolution (in other words, it deeply shaped the alternative- 
specification phase of the decision-making process). Regional managers enacted 
an environment for the staff to be reallocated; it required some time for followers 
to make sense of the new situation (Baez and Abolafia, 2002), but then it 
powerfully affected the course of events of the story of the reallocation of 
personnel in Lombardy.
The forming of a belief about the inevitability of devolution seems to have 
worked in concatenation with another mechanism operating at the individual 
level. The hypothesised mechanism for the explanation of the smooth transfer of 
personnel is the operating at the individual level of a threshold-based behaviour 
(Granovetter, 1978) about whether to accept or resist change. This mechanism, 
belonging to the class of rational imitation mechanisms (the most famous 
mechanism of this class being probably the self-fulfilling prophecy -  see Box 3.1 
below) is based on the idea that “an individual’s decision whether or not to 
participate in collective behaviour often depends in part on how many other 
actors already have decided to participate [..] An actor’s threshold denotes the 
proportion of the group which must have joined before the actor in question is 
willing to do so” (Granovetter, 1978, elaborated in Hedstrom and Swedberg, 
1998). The acceptance of the transfer by some individuals increased the
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proportion of people willing to participate, thus induced the final acceptation by 
the others; in other words, the fact that a significant part of the people to be 
transferred accepted the new situation may have induced others to participate, 
which in turn induced somebody else to participate, and so on.
To the benefit of the reader, a few more words may be spent in illustrating this 
mechanism (drawing on Granovetter, 1978). The mechanism applies to binary 
decisions: whether to join a given situation (the example employed by 
Granovetter is the decision about whether to join a riot). Individuals are assumed 
to be rational: given their preferences and perception of the situation, they act so 
as to maximise their utility. The key point is that costs and benefits for an 
individual depend in part on how many others make which choice. The threshold 
is the proportion of the group that an individual would have to see join before he 
would do so. A threshold may be the result of some different combinations of 
costs and benefits (so individuals with different structures of preferences and a 
different anticipation of possible future consequences may have the same 
threshold). It should also be noted that threshold models do not give information 
about the utility to an individual of each possible equilibrium outcome; they only 
allow to predict outcomes from the knowledge of individual threshold. Many 
factors affect the determination of the threshold, but only the knowledge of it is 
necessary to predict outcomes (threshold are situation specific).
How could threshold-based behaviour have worked in the Lombardy case? 
The key point is that for individuals to be only in a few number to resist 
dramatically increased the costs: even those with low costs of resisting (low 
propension to compliance, high willingness to keep the expected benefits from a 
career developing in the region) had to incur very high costs because so many 
others had already joined, while, for the same reason, the likelihood of obtaining 
something was drastically reduced. The forming of a belief about the inevitability 
of devolution induced a number of staff to accept transfer; this in turn induced 
others (those with a lower threshold) to join, and eventually costs of resisting 
became too high and the remainder joined.
This analysis of the dynamic of the system may appear a bit too mechanistic. 
In this respect, a variant of the mechanism could perhaps provide a richer 
explanation of the smooth transfer of personnel. A plausible explanation of what 
happened may lie in the fact that, in the selection of personnel, top managers 
jointly with the managers of the territorially located offices operated a careful 
selection of individuals to be transferred, by focusing those more influential on 
others, those capable of signalling to others the behaviour to be adopted. 
Threshold-based behaviour may incorporate influence of social structure. The
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typical example is that of friendship, where threshold is determined by the 
number of people that have already joined, revised by taking into account the 
relative weight of the people that have joined (in which friends weigh more than 
“anonymous” people). However, it may be that the influence of carefully selected 
people has played a more subtle role in determining the outcome than the one 
that can be “treated” by a variant of threshold-based behaviour. If this is the case, 
part of the explanation may probably be sought in the effect of “social leaders” 
whose trust by others has affected their likelihood of acceptance of the “join” 
option. The two mechanisms may have operated as alternative explanations, or 
may have worked jointly, interactively, amplifying the achievement of the final 
effect.
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Box 3.1. Rational Imitation Mechanisms. According to Hedstrom (1998, chap. 12) and 
Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998, pp.18-21), self-fulfilling prophecy, threshold-based 
behaviour, network diffusion processes, and others all belong to the class of rational 
imitation mechanisms. The prototype and most famous rational imitation mechanism is 
the self-fulfilling prophecy. The basic idea of the self-fulfilling prophecy (we follow 
Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998, elaborating on Merton, 1948) is that an initially false 
definition of a situation evokes behaviours that eventually makes the false conception 
come true. The key example that Merton uses to illustrate his argument is a run on a 
bank. If a rumour of insolvency somehow gets started, some depositors will withdraw their 
savings. Their withdrawal will strengthen the belief in the rumour, partly because the 
withdrawal may actually hurt the financial standing of the bank, but more importantly 
because the act of withdrawal in itself signals to others that something indeed might be 
wrong with the bank. This produces even more withdrawals, which further reduces the 
trust in the bank, and so on.
In the perspective of rational imitation mechanisms, individuals are goal-directed and 
an individual’s propensity to perform an act at time t (Pit) is an increasing function of the 
individual’s belief (bit) in the value of performing the act: Pit = f(bjt). More specifically, the 
proposed mechanism states that individual ts  belief in the value or necessity of 
performing the act is a function of the number of other individuals who performed the act 
at time f-1 (Merton’ bank customers based their judgement about the solvency of the 
bank on the number of other customers withdrawing their savings). That is: bit = g(nt-i) , 
where nt-i = number of individuals performing the act at time t-1, and g is an increasing 
function. Inserting this expression into the former one we have: P  ^ = f[g(nt_i)], which 
suggests that an individual’s propensity at performing an act is an increasing function of 
the number of other individuals who already have performed the same act. The core 
characteristic of these mechanisms is the general belief-formation mechanism, which 
states that the number of individuals who perform a certain act signals to others the likely 
value or necessity of the act, and this signal will influence other individuals’ choice of 
action. The main difference between social mechanisms of the rational imitation class is 
centred on the form of function g, which provides the fine-grained details of the link 
between bit and nt.i. In threshold-based behaviour it is the individual threshold, in network 
diffusion processes g is a function of the socio-metric ties, in self-fulfilling prophecy g was 
left unspecified by Merton and may accommodate different kinds of influence of other 
people’s signals on individual’s belief.
Finally, it can be argued -  in hypothetical terms - that the triggering of 
mechanisms of rational imitation was made possible also by the 
contemporaneous inhibition of a mechanism of attribution of threat Attribution of 
threat is an activating mechanism (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001, p. 43 and 
95) responsible for the mobilisation of previously inert populations (or social
93
groups in general); it involves (a) invention or importation and (b) diffusion of a 
shared definition concerning alterations in the likely consequences of possible 
actions (or, on what that matters, of failures to act) undertaken by some “political” 
actors. In the case, attribution of threat to the new situation by the staff to be 
transferred14 might have led the staff to critically revise their understanding of the 
situation and ultimately reject the belief about inevitability.
The attentive creation of the perception of remaining part of the regional policy 
network (in particular by means of the fact that they were going to operate 
according to similar procedures that were going to be replicated in local 
authorities) and that their integration in the local governments to which they were 
going to be reallocated would be facilitated by a transplant of administrative 
procedures from the region to local governments, as well as by other organising 
devices (whose effects will be illustrated in the subsequent section), contributed 
to inhibit, or at least attenuate, potential attribution of threat to the new situation 
by the staff to be transferred.
Findings so far can be summarised as follows. The careful selection of 
personnel and the provision of correspondingly suitable incentives (determined 
according to actors’ utility) created conditions that attenuated the disadvantages 
for the personnel to be reallocated. But it was only the forming of a belief about 
inevitability of devolution concatenated with some form of social mechanism of 
rational imitation at the individual level (the hypothesised mechanism is 
threshold-based behaviour), and the contemporaneous inhibition of the 
mechanism of collective attribution of threat, that eliminated, or at least strongly 
attenuated, the resistance to realignment by workforce.
We can now turn to examine the overall devolution process, and address the 
question of explaining the significant degree of difference from the previous 
organisational arrangements.
3.4 Explaining the degree of difference from previous organisational 
arrangements
In order to explain the profound renewal of the organisational arrangements 
adopted in the Lombardy regional government, it is possible to start by focusing 
why the devolution process gained “momentum”, contrarily to what might be
14 Operating collectively as a potentially-in-formation social group.
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observed in other instances of devolution throughout Italy. Proceeding as for the 
explanation of workforce realignment, we can suppose at first a rational approach 
by actors affected by devolution in calculating benefits and costs associated with 
the new situation. A number of social groups, besides elected officials and 
regional top managers, were affected by devolution: the middle management in 
the region, elected officials in local governments, tenured officials in local 
governments, managers of agricultural businesses’ associations at the regional 
and the local level. For at least two groups benefits did not exceed costs (at least 
in a straightforward and univocal way): tenured officials in the staff of local 
governments, and managers at the regional level in associations of agricultural 
businesses. In local authorities, while elected officials had a favourable attitude 
towards devolution as especially commissioners in charge of agriculture matters 
envisaged that devolution could remarkably enhance their previously very limited 
status, for tenured officials devolution represented mainly a significant transfer 
under their responsibility of routine, “boring” tasks; in addition, these tasks 
conveyed a high degree of administrative risk embodied in their execution; as to 
the massive reallocation of personnel from the region, it represented for them a 
concrete menace of being superseded by transferred regional staff, who had 
been promoted to a higher assignation-level as an incentive to transfer, and 
should therefore be assigned correspondingly higher-level duties under the 
labour regulation in force in the Italian public sector.
As to the managers of agricultural businesses’ associations at the regional 
level15, the issue for them was that they had to give away part of their 
competencies to the local organisational tier of their associations, “mirroring” the 
transfer of tasks from the regional to local governments, and thus redefine their 
room for manoeuvre, internally to the organisation as well as in the relations with 
public entities.
Also for other groups benefits were not exceeding costs in a clear-cut way. For 
the middle management in the region, devolution represented a mixed blessing: 
a change from a reassuring situation characterised by the supervision of a large 
number of staff performing routine tasks to a new job description partly enriched 
by the execution of professional tasks, like providing advice to elected officials, 
but also fraught with a higher degree of uncertainty and “fickleness” of the tasks 
to be executed.
15 Agricultural businesses’ associations had an organisational structure that mirrored public sector 
structure and repartition of competencies in agriculture, with a European (federative) level, a 
National central structure, a regional level and a Local one. As an effect o f devolution to Local 
Authorities, it was especially the regional level that had to redefine its mission and tasks.
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Since the engagement of all these groups proved important for sustaining 
momentum of the devolution process, a rational choice argument does not 
appear to provide a satisfactory explanation of change. In the line of 
argumentation so far employed a complementary, processual explanation is 
proposed. In this perspective, the two venues for co-ordination that were 
established at the beginning of the devolution process -  respectively the Inter- 
institutional table for agriculture for consulting elected and tenured officials in the 
locar governments, and the agricultural table supporting the engagement of 
representatives of agricultural businesses in policy formulation and 
implementation -  performed also another function beyond their institutional one: 
they acted as important mobilising structures, social spaces put at the service of 
interpretations of situations and objectives (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 102). The 
inter-institutional table for agriculture contributed to making sense of the new 
situation of devolution to elected and tenured officials in local governments; the 
agricultural table contributed to imposing sense of the new situation to managers 
in farmers’ associations. These groups were actively and continuously mobilised 
by regional managers by using these structures. This is an important, though not 
exhaustive, part of the story of how the favour of these two groups was won to 
the goal of implementing devolution, thus leading to a radical and stable change 
of the regional organisational structure and to the performance of new 
programmatic activities (Outcome 4 and 5).
However, there is a difference in the functioning of the two tables: while the 
inter-institutional table for agriculture used to meet on a regular basis (over the 
first two years, it used to be convened every second Thursday of the month with 
the managers from provinces, and every third Thursday of the month with the 
representatives of mountain communities), the agricultural table was convened 
on a more episodic basis. As regards the engagement of farmers’ associations, a 
key category of stakeholders in the policy sector, in the perspective employed of 
a processual explanation of sustained momentum of the devolution intervention 
the establishment of the Centres for Agricultural Assistance (CAA) performed an 
important function. Run by agricultural businesses’ associations, the CAA 
performed on a contractual basis the delivery of important public services for 
agricultural businesses. Established in 2001, when the devolution process was 
halfway, they represented a way of linking the agenda of businesses’ 
representatives to the devolution agenda carried on by the regional government. 
The social mechanism of brokerage seems to have been at work. Brokerage can 
be defined as “the linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a 
unit that mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet other sites [..] it
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can become a relational mechanism for mobilisation [..] brokerage reduces 
transaction costs of communication and co-ordination among sites, facilitates the 
combined use of resources located at different sites, and creates new potential 
collective actors” (MT&T, p. 26 and 102). Associations benefited of these new 
arrangements in two ways: the remuneration for the services they delivered was 
satisfactory, and the direct contacts with users represented an opportunity for 
establishing closer links with agricultural businesses. The benefits gained by 
businesses’ associations contributed to winning the favour of their managers, 
both at the local and at the regional level. The agenda of managers in agricultural 
businesses associations thus became linked to the progression of the regional 
devolution agenda. In fact, the devolution of further operational tasks that 
occurred in 2002 was for a significant part addressed directly to the CAA, and 
only the execution of a limited set of administrative tasks was devolved to local 
authorities. CAA were financed, for the new functions, directly by the region, thus 
employing financial resources, relatively abundant in the agriculture sector within 
the framework of the very “rich” Common Agricultural Policy, and saving on 
personnel resources, critical in the public sector at that period.
In this way, two further effects were obtained, that activated a loop with the 
ongoing transformations in local governments: first, local authorities were not 
overloaded with too many tasks -  having already received a wide range of 
attributions from the regional government. Second, part of the administrative risk 
was moved away from local governments’ staff, and transferred outside the 
public sector16. The backing of the devolution agenda by tenured officials in local 
governments was thus reinforced, with eventually a positive effect on the 
progression of the regional devolution agenda.
A third organising device proved important for the progression of devolution. 
Regional top managers jointly took part to all or most of the intra- and inter- 
organisational working groups that were established for implementing the 
different interventions required by the devolution agenda. To cite some: the 
working group for the management of the transfer of personnel to local 
governments, the working group for the design of the regional funding body, the 
working group for the assessment of the economic and financial impact of 
devolution on local governments, etc.. The intense and continuous presence of 
regional top managers in all relevant interventions proved important for
16 The allocation of tasks to appointed private bodies is a phenomenon of decentralisation, not 
devolution, according to the definitions introduced; but the key point within the frame of our 
analysis is that, by activating a mechanism of brokerage, it contributed to the progression of the 
devolution agenda, facilitating the consolidation of the functioning of tasks already transferred to 
Local Authorities, as well as the effective integration o f the new, selected ones that were 
transferred in 2002.
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maintaining over time validation of the intervention. The presence of top 
managers of the agriculture directorate general and, in the two important cases of 
the transfer of personnel and of the establishment of the regional funding body, 
also of top managers from the presidency of the Lombardy region determined the 
activation of the social mechanism of actor certification: the validation of actors 
and their performances by external authorities. Attitudes that, in brief, we can 
label as “consistent with the strategic reorientation of the Lombardy regional 
government to a role of steering of other actors (the local authorities, the funding 
body, the CAA, the same associations of agricultural businesses, etc.) in a 
devolved policy subsystem” came to be recognised as socially acceptable. 
Acceptability “contributes to explaining what kind of organisation, identity and 
collective interaction are prescribed, tolerated, and forbidden” (McAdam et al., 
2001, p. 145) and can provide part of the explanation of the contribution by the 
regional middle management to the adaptation of the organisational routines to 
the new situation, and of the support it provided to local governments in 
executing the new tasks, thus contributing to the advancement of the devolution 
agenda.
Wrapping things up, we can conclude that the concatenation of the social 
mechanisms of appropriation of mobilising structures, brokerage of the devolution 
agenda with key stakeholders’ agenda, and actor certification by top managers of 
new and different behaviours in the middle management determined a sustained 
momentum of the intervention of adaptation to devolution, as well as provided an 
important contribution to increasing intra- and inter-organisational co-ordination.
Findings so far provide elements for the understanding of the process 
dynamics of the implementation of devolution under conditions determined by the 
features of the institutional and policy system, as well as the constitution of the 
organisations involved. These results are discussed in chapter 4, and applied to 
the elaboration of practices for the management of devolution processes in 
chapter 5.
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4. The dynamics of organisational change in the 
implementation of devolution: a discussion on 
the basis of the Lombardy experience
4.1 Results of the case study of devolution in Lombardy
The in-depth study of the Lombardy case has provided significant elements for 
explaining devolution in the Italian context and more broadly for elaborating a 
tentative theorisation1 about the dynamics of devolution processes.
In Italy, the persistence of the administrative law paradigm and some key 
features of the politico-administrative system inherited from the Napoleonic 
tradition had a significant influence on the devolution process. In such tradition of 
governance there seem to be some general context conditions (like the social 
status associated with working for higher levels of government) that, broadly 
speaking, thwart the implementation of devolution; in many respects, these 
features seem to operate in the direction of impeding, or at least slowing down 
the implementation process: they could be labelled as “counteracting factors” that 
would naturally inhibit or sap the devolution process -  and in this sense they 
constitute a “management problem” that public managers have to deal with: this 
is the issue examined in chapter 52.
However, “zooming in” the Italian trajectory, we have found significant 
differences in the implementation of devolution. The Lombardy case of agriculture 
is a course of events alternative to the one that seems to be more consistent with 
the politico-administrative system and the dominance of the administrative law 
paradigm. Indeed, some key crossroads have been examined that, combined,
1 Theorisation implies the elaboration of a set of interrelated statements about the phenomenon 
investigated, drawing from one or a small number of cases -  a kind of research work that has its 
outstanding examples in the contributions of Weick (see e.g. his analysis about the dynamics 
leading to disaster: the Mann Gulch Disaster and the Tenerife Air Disaster, collected in Weick, 
2001, pp. 100-124 and 125-147). There is a difference with the approach, in other respects very 
close, of investigating case histories in order to draw limited historical generalisations about 
relevant phenomena in public management (Barzelay, 2003 and 2001, pp. 174 and 176); the main 
difference hes in the fact that limited historical generalisations can be drawn from the investigation 
of “significant portions” o f the phenomenon about which to generalise; theorisation is based on 
(theory-intensive) analysis of one or a small number of cases.
2 By stating the problem this way, we assume that individual agency does have a role as a cause of 
change in shaping the direction that the implementation of administrative and managerial reforms 
will take -  providing a role for individual agency in the explanation of trajectories o f reform is 
advocated by scholars in public administration and public management like, inter alia, Bevir et al., 
2003a and 2003b).
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can determine a plurality of alternative trajectories of the reform: the way top 
managers in key positions are selected and provided incentives for adopting 
certain behaviours; the way the reallocation of personnel is managed; the way 
the engagement of some key social groups in the devolution process is 
conducted.
A first tentative statement is that the joint presence of a) functional features of 
the executive government that favour the stability and cohesion of the dominant 
coalition3 and b) human resource management systems4 capable of providing 
incentives to performance-orientated behaviours and allowing flexibility in the 
appointment of top managers, enables a selection process likely to lead to 
appoint public managers with an entrepreneurial approach and to provide 
incentives that - especially when concatenated with a mechanism of actor 
certification - enhance the likelihood of them adopting a course of action 
conducive to the effective implementation of devolution.
Stability of the Lombardy regional government has contributed to keeping the 
cohesion over time of the dominant coalition, which in turn has ensured continuity 
of action and provided credibility to making sense of the inevitability of the new 
devolved institutional setting (which in turn proved to be important for the 
progression of the overall devolution process). Stability was due in part to the 
recently modified majoritarian electoral systems. Though a widely-known counter­
argument is that consensual systems take longer to make a decision but once it 
has been made its implementation is favoured exactly by the broad consensus in 
favour of the decision determined by the engagement of all or most of the 
stakeholders, the point that, to put it “very crudely [..] the speed and severity of 
management reform have declined as one moves from [majoritarian to 
consensual systems]” (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, p 47), can in our opinion be 
made for devolution reforms too, whose actual and rapid implementation seems 
to be affected by the presence of a majoritarian executive government leading 
the devolution intervention5. In the Lombardy case, the kind of executive 
leadership provided by the regional president, Roberto Formigoni, also had an 
influence in determining the stability and cohesion of the dominant coalition over
3 Under circumstances in which the issue of the effective implementation o f devolution is high on 
the governmental agenda. The explanation of why this occurs is out of the scope of the present 
study (on the topic, see Brusis, 2002, and Christensen, 2000), though in the specific case of 
Lombardy, as we have seen (chapter 3), some form of political competition between central and 
local governments seems to have played a role.
4 A factor at the individual organisation level, that in turn depends also on the government-wide 
rules in the area o f personnel and labour relations.
5 A study of devolution at the national level in three countries provides evidence that, prima facie, 
seems to support the argument (see Fedele and Ongaro, 2005) - on the other hand, the claim that 
the institutions o f majoritarian democracy are a more favourable environment for intense reforms 
has undergone different criticisms (Yesilkagit and De Vries, 2004).
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the entire period of the devolution episode6. Whatever the underlying causes, 
stability and cohesion appear to be an important (functional) requirement for 
devolution processes to occur in a rapid, radical and thorough way.
The second key factor is the human resource management (HRM) system of 
the public entity leading the devolution intervention. Forms of performance- 
related pay and promotion seem to provide effective incentives to discard 
“formalistic-compliance-to-the-norm” behaviours that have in other instances 
sapped the devolution process and adopt entrepreneurial, result-oriented 
behaviours that seem to be more consistent with the implementation of the 
reform7. The effects of a performance-oriented HRM system seems to be 
reinforced when coupled with the social mechanism of actor certification. The 
statement -  drawn from the analysis of the Lombardy experience -  can be 
interpreted, first, in the sense that effects of performance-oriented systems are 
significantly reinforced when coupled with other mechanisms (like actor 
certification); second, effects of performance-oriented systems are not to be 
intended in a mechanistic way. Indeed, there is evidence in literature that the 
general trend to performance-related pay in the public sector (OECD, 1993) has 
produced mixed and sometimes downright disappointing results (see, e.g., 
Gaertner and Gaertner, 1985, Halligan, 1996, Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). 
Moreover, the politicians-bureaucrats “deal” is a much more complex game than 
any mechanical representation of it could provide (as the studies of, inter alia, 
Dunleavy, 1991, and Hood, 2000 and 2002, illustrate). However, provided the 
overall picture is considered (cohesion of the dominant coalition, concatenation 
with actor certification), there seems to be room for advancing the proposition 
that forms of performance-related pay and promotion do orient to entrepreneurial 
behaviours. The picture should be completed by the consideration of the 
importance of a relatively high managerial autonomy: managers in the Lombardy 
region were “free” to adapt their stance to the evolving circumstances and employ 
a wide range of instruments without any significant constraint to their “room for
6 To add an insider’s view to buttress the argument about evidence of the dominance o f Formigoni 
on the Lombardy political landscape during the period considered, a leading article from the most 
renowned Italian newspaper reports that “for ten years, politics in Lombardy has been one person: 
Roberto Formigoni. His incredibly strong position in the Lombardy political landscape has many 
reasons: his personal talents, his skilled team of friend-collaborators, the highly complex political 
elaboration that was inspired by Comunione e Liberazione (Communion and Liberation, a Catholic 
movement of which Formigoni is a leader -  note of the translator), so mature that it has been 
transformed into many concrete provisions: the healthcare reform, the voucher-system for social 
care and in the education sector. With the help of an adequate electoral law, and a significant 
degree of unscrupulousness in the management of the relationships with the Assembly, for years 
one thing was uncontroversial: nothing has been decided in the Lombardy government without the 
approval, or at least tolerance, by the governor44 (Cornere della Sera, 16 July 2005, p. 51, our 
translation).
7 Performance-oriented routines for the evaluation and reward of personnel were introduced in the 
Lombardy regional government the two years before die devolution episode started.
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manoeuvre” by elected officials (who entrusted and widely protected them from 
external interferences).
All in all, key to understanding the phenomenon seems to be the way the two 
aspects interacted. Public managers in key positions for the devolution process to 
occur were on the one hand strongly put under pressure to implement the 
process, while at the same time provided a “degree” of managerial autonomy that 
allowed the quick and flexible exploitation of available means, that allowed to 
carry out interventions conducive to the effective implementation of devolution 
(see chapter 5). This raises a controversial point, widely echoed especially in the 
debate about the New Public Management in which argumentations about the 
feasibility and desirability of each of the two “competing principles” of making 
managers manage and letting managers manage have been proposed and 
criticised, sometimes harshly (Aucoin, 1996, Kettl, 2000); entering such debate is 
well beyond the purposes of the present work; however, it seems that some form 
of “sustainable” integration, or at least co-existence of the two logics, is 
undoubtedly an important ingredient in the implementation of complex policies, 
like devolution.
The other main feature of the HRM system, as it evolved in the years before 
the devolution episode, concerns the flexibility in the appointment of managers by 
the executive government -  that in many respects resembled a “spoils system” 
logic, in the upper reaches and also downwards across the hierarchical layers. 
This topic too is widely debated in literature. Arguments in favour of spoils system 
logics put emphasis on the internal consistency of the organisational apex, in 
which elected and tenured officials, because of the relationship based on trust, 
(should) have the same agenda about the interventions to be carried on. 
Counterarguments include a) the risk of disruption and radical reversals any time 
the executive government is changed, and b) the danger of an increasing number 
of “yes-men” (and “yes-women”) replacing career civil servants capable of 
providing “frank and fearless” advice (an overview of the debate is provided in 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, pp. 50-52 and 78-79). Drawing on the experience 
studied, a line of argumentation that could be put forward and proposed for 
further investigation is the following8: flexibility in the appointment of officials by 
executive politicians is one ingredient (by itself insufficient, as it interconnects 
with the other features of HRM systems, as well as with other mechanisms that 
might be activated) that may facilitate the implementation of policies that aim at a 
radical degree of innovation and departure from previous arrangements (as is the
8 The caveat already recalled about the complexity of the politicians-bureaucrats deal that require 
to rule out any over-simplification in the interpretation of such phenomena apply.
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case of devolution, which represents a main reshaping of the structure of the 
state). In those cases, the risk of a radical reversal is somehow taken into 
account, as radical change is exactly what is looked for, and the advice of 
“experienced” civil servants that have long operated in a consolidated setting may 
be more of hamper than of help in innovating.
A second set of claims that may be drawn from the analysis of the Lombardy 
experience is that monetary incentives or promotions are important but likely not 
to be enough for making the reallocation of personnel to lower levels of 
government a smooth process in countries in the national tradition of governance 
in Italy - in which the status is higher and, quite often, the contractual conditions 
are much more favourable in the upper tiers of government. The forming of a 
belief of inevitability and the contemporaneous inhibition of a mechanism of 
attribution of threat, and the triggering of forms of rational imitation at the 
individual level are important ingredients for explaining the realignment of 
workforce. The combination of these psychological processes and social 
mechanisms provides an interpretation of why and how workforce realignment 
can occur in a smooth way under circumstance that should otherwise hamper the 
process.
The realignment of workforce is a process sensitive to factors like the culture 
of governance and the high status and profile of career paths associated with 
working in higher tiers of government in the national tradition of governance in 
Italy (as well as probably in other countries with a similar administrative tradition, 
namely the “Napoleonic” countries, including France and the number of nations 
that inherited its administrative model, see also OECD, 1997), which, broadly 
speaking, work in the way of making it more difficult. The “entity of the gap”, in 
terms of average wage, additional benefits, etc. between the labour contract in 
the higher and in the lower levels of government may be extremely different from 
country to country and, within a nation, from sector to sector and group of 
professionals -  but overall the direction of the gap is clearly in the sense of wage 
and labour contract conditions being favourable in higher tiers of government. 
Social status, even more straightforwardly, is higher in the central state, and also 
partly in the regions, than in local authorities.
The realignment of workforce is also sensitive to the set of options available to 
managers to lead the intervention, like the articulation of the legal instruments by 
which staff can be rewarded (determined by the current regulation of pay 
schemes in the public sector); and by the set of options available to staff to resist 
change, which include means ranging from organised lobbying to going on strike.
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The efficacy of such means vary considerably from country to country and within 
the same country: it is especially when means available to managers and means 
available to staff are balanced that the identified social mechanisms and their 
concatenation may prove relevant in determining the outcome of the process. 
The set of options available to managers is also affected by the current trend in 
public sector employment (with later trends in many OECD and other countries, 
at the time this work is being written, showing a curtailing of staff and managerial 
positions9).
It can also be argued -  though only in hypothetical terms - that certain initial 
conditions in which personnel to be transferred work affect the likely resistance to 
realignment. The Lombardy case was in an intermediate position between two 
situations: the split of the organisation of the public entity devolving tasks and the 
“transfer of a portion of it” to the recipient entity, in which the reallocated units 
(the “offices”) are merged, on the one hand, and the reallocation of an external 
organisation or body (like an agency10) from the control of the upper tier of 
government to the control of the lower tier. The Lombardy case was for the most 
part -  though not entirely -  a reallocation of personnel from the field offices of the 
regional government -  distributed throughout the territory of Lombardy - to the 
hierarchical structure of the Province. It was a case of devolution from a 
deconcentrated organisational structure11 (in fact only a small portion of the 
personnel that worked at the Milan headquarters was reallocated, while most of 
the staff in territorial offices was transferred) combined with the merger of the 
devolved units into the structure of the lower-level governments. It may be argued 
that difficulty increases if personnel has to be “picked” from within the 
organisation, while it decreases if staff works in a deconcentrated organisational 
structure and even more if it works in an “external” agency. It may also be argued 
that difficulty increases if the personnel has to be integrated in a new 
organisation, while decreases if the personnel is set to work in an agency or 
some other form of relatively autonomous body that is simply reallocated under 
the supervision of the lower-level government. As additional, complementary 
elements, it may be argued that difficulty in reallocation of personnel decreases in 
case of modifications to the job description are of limited extent (cetreris paribus,
9 See Country Files in OECD/PUMA (www.oecd.org/puma) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004, p. 
113, Table 5.5, Changes in Government employment -  referred to twelve OECD countries over the 
last two decades).
10 We refer to an agency as a structurally disaggregated and relatively autonomous organisation -  
see Pollitt and Talbot (2004), Pollitt et al. (2005), Verhoest et al. (2004a and 2004b).
11 We adopt the conventional notion of deconcentration as a form of organisation based on 
territorially-located offices that have the purpose of allowing the organisation to get “closer” to 
users while at the same time keep uniformity in the policy delivery throughout the territory 
(OECD, 1997).
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transfer is more difficult if significant changes occur also at the micro-level of the 
job description of the reallocated staff); another element to be considered is the 
logistical one: the transfer from one locality to another one (with the related 
inconveniences for the worker and his/her family) may make the reallocation of 
personnel more difficult.
A confirmation to the argument proposed is provided by the case of devolution 
of the centri per I’impiego (hereafter welfare-to-work centres) from the central 
government directly to the provincial governments, that occurred about the same 
years in Italy. It was a case of transfer of external bodies to the supervision of 
local authorities, without any significant impact on their internal structure and 
routines: personnel reallocation was not so critical as in other instances of 
devolution.
An overview of data about personnel reallocation in different policy sectors in 
Italy seems to provide further empirical evidence that can make the above 
argument plausible or at least worth considering. Table 4.1 provides data about 
personnel reallocation in Italy (at the date of May 2005).
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Policy sector Personnel Gap
Contingent to 
be reallocated
contingent
actually
reallocated
Energy 45 37 8
Subsidies to the commercial 
sector
20 4 16
Environment 0 0 0
Road network 4,396 4,083 313
Public transportation 304 277 27
Civil Protection 44 14 30
Water infrastructure 
maintenance (state 
property)
80 0 80
Public works 387 322 65
Public housing 0 0 0
Hydrographical and 
cartographical services
143 141 2
Healthcare (monitoring 
services)
27 9 18
Services for disabled 
persons
257 113 144
Administrative police 23 23 0
Education 83 0 83
Training-for-job 330 330 0
Agriculture (Forest Corps) 5,300 0 5,300
Welfare-to-work 6,000 6,000 0
Local public transportation 30 30 0
Land register 4,000 0 4,000
Total 21,469 11,383 10,086
Total (%) 100 53.02 46.98
Table 4.1: reallocation of personnel from the state to regions and local 
authorities -  gap between designed and implemented (Source: Ministero 
degli Affari regionali and II Sole 24 Ore, 23 May 2005)
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On the one hand, interpretation of data seems to provide at least some 
underpinnings to the argument illustrated above (welfare-to-work and training-for- 
job were services run by relatively autonomous agencies distributed on the 
territory). On the other hand, data are far from being univocal in their
interpretation (with many sectors showing a gap -  but very differentiated in
percentage terms): it is by examining what happens at the “micro” level of specific 
experiences of devolution that a better understanding of the process may be 
gained.
Returning to the Lombardy experience in agriculture, another factor that 
seems to have had an influence on the realignment of workforce is the culture 
bias of the organisation devolving the staff. An element of theorisation that may 
be drawn from the experience studied is that the sensitivity to monetary 
incentives is affected by the prevalence of values relating to individual 
remuneration, while at the opposite values relating to job enrichment and skills
development may reduce the motivational impact of monetary incentives;
eventually, the culture bias affects the influence of such incentives. Moreover, the 
“distance” between the culture bias in the devolving and the recipient 
organisation may affect the integration of personnel in recipients organisations. 
Complex organisations may have the contemporaneous presence of more 
professional groups and related culture bias -  a characteristic much dependent 
on the features of the policy sector in which devolution occurs (this aspect is 
further discussed in paragraph 4.3).A third set of claims that can be drawn from 
the Lombardy experience regards the importance of the concatenation of three 
social mechanisms for sustaining momentum of the implementation process (as 
well as providing an important contribution to increasing intra- and inter- 
organisational co-ordination); appropriation of mobilising structures by the top 
management in the public entity leading the devolution intervention, brokerage of 
the devolution agenda with key stakeholders’ agenda, and actor certification by 
top managers within the devolving Government of new and different behaviours 
in the middle management.
The interpretation of the inter-institutional table for agriculture as a mobilising 
structure means that it performed a function in the change process in addition to 
the co-ordination function usually attributed to this type of organisational 
instruments. A similar mobilising function was performed by the agricultural table 
as regards the engagement of stakeholders in the devolution process. As regards 
stakeholders, another institutional device performed a key role: the Centres for 
Agricultural Assistance (CAA). The CAA were a way of linking the devolution 
agenda to the agenda of key groups in agricultural businesses’ associations. By
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linking the two agendas they triggered the mechanism of brokerage: social sites 
previously unconnected were connected, the CAA provided additional labour 
resources to the system, while at another level their “parent” associations 
provided political support to the process. The corporatist nature of the agriculture 
sector (a feature common to the agriculture sector all over Europe, given the 
nature of the Common Agricultural Policy: see Wallace and Wallace, 2000, 
chapter 7) may have favoured brokerage -  in other policy sectors such linkages 
might be more difficult to obtain1*.
Middle management may be a source of inertia, if not outright resistance, to 
the devolution process. In the Lombardy case, a mechanism of actor certification 
seems to have contributed to winning the support by the middle management, or 
at least ensuring an adequate degree of “compliance to the reform” by this key 
social group. The middle management is likely to be a key actor in devolution 
processes (and probably more generally in the implementation of all major reform 
processes), whose commitment to the progression of the devolution agenda over 
long periods of time may require more than some monetary incentives (often of a 
limited amount in both absolute and percentage terms) linked to the achievement 
of targets formally linked to the advancement of the devolution agenda.
In the following paragraph, we undertake the path of integrating these results 
in a broader framework. Drawing on the findings of the present study and the 
review of literature, a broad scheme of analysis of the factors affecting the 
implementation of devolution is proposed.
4.2 Factors affecting the implementation of devolution: a framework
Three groups of factors have so far been identified that affect the dynamics of the 
devolution process. A first group relates to the cultural dimension (conceived 
broadly the way Bevir et al., 2003a and 2003b intend the “national traditions of 
governance”, see also Capano, 2003) and the features of the politico- 
administrative system (see Lijphart, 1999 and Peters, 1988 - especially the way 
they have been revisited by Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004 - see also Keating, 
2001). This group of factors includes the administrative culture, the social status 
associated with working for higher or lower levels of government, the nature of 
the executive government, the set of options available to staff to resist change
12 Though corporatist systems are quite “common” in a number o f countries, at least in continental 
European countries (Kickert, 1997).
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and the means available to top executives to force the implementation of change. 
These kinds of systemic features- though obviously evolving over time like any 
aspect of a social system -  tend to change only gradually or infrequently and may 
therefore be regarded as relatively more stable features in the reformers’ 
environment: they somehow constitute the “house” in which devolution processes 
occur.
A second group of factors regards the rules and routines constraining the way 
financial, human, material, and informational resources can be acquired and 
utilised by public managers. The notion of public management policy is especially 
useful in this respect: outcomes of public management policies in a country are 
“government-wide institutional rules and organisational routines in the areas of 
expenditure planning and financial management, audit and evaluation, civil 
service and labour relations, organisation and methods, and procurement that 
guide, constrain and motivate the public service” (Barzelay, 2001 and 2003). 
Rules and routines in the area of personnel emerge as especially relevant for the 
implementation of devolution. In Italy, the major reform of the rules of the civil 
service in 1993 (Legislative Decree 29/93) enabled changes in human resource 
management, like the new internal regulation adopted in Lombardy in 1997, that 
led to a high level of discretion and flexibility in the appointment of tenured 
officials and introduced routines for the evaluation of the performances of 
regional managers. Rules concerning personnel and labour relations are 
influential on the dynamics of the devolution process also because contribute to 
shaping the means available to top executives to reallocate personnel to other 
levels of government.
The third group of factors regards the organisational configuration and the 
management systems at the level of the individual public entities affected by the 
devolution process. Specific relevance have the HRM system and the 
organisational structure. With regard to the latter, the degree of internal 
decentralisation (in the sense of Mintzberg, 1983) affects the autonomy of 
divisional managers - hence at least in part their room for manoeuvre; the 
existence of field offices (deconcentration) may facilitate the reallocation of 
personnel for reasons that have been previously discussed. Such aspects 
depend partly on public management reforms carried out at the national level, 
and partly on the specific history of the organisation and the way it has been run 
by elected and tenured officials.
These findings can be combined with the results of the study by Pollitt et al. 
(1998) in order to draft a broader scheme that might be useful for advancing our
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knowledge about the dynamics of the implementation of devolution processes. 
We have seen (paragraph 1.2) that Pollitt et al. (1998) have sketched an outline 
of a theory of “implementation habitats for decentralisation”, or, using a more 
conventional terminology, a scheme of the main factors affecting the 
implementation of decentralisation. The notion of “habitat” should be interpreted 
in the sense that the logic of the analysis is to identify whether each factor 
facilitates or hinders the implementation of decentralisation -  i.e. whether it 
determines a situation more or less “favourable” to decentralisation. Two groups 
of factors are identified by the authors: service characteristics and local 
characteristics.
The first building block of the outline of the theory of implementation habitats 
proposed by Pollitt et al. (1998) is the analysis of how some characteristics of the 
services delivered by public sector organisations in the policy sector under 
consideration affect decentralisation. More in detail, the authors argue that the 
nature of the contacts with users (their “frequency” -  from episodic to continuous 
- and “closeness” -  from face-to-face to remote) as well as other characteristics, 
like whether the service is universal or selective, and whether it is consumed on 
an optional or a mandatory basis, have an influence on the degree with which 
users of services will become influential actors in the change process. In the 
framework proposed in the present work, service characteristics are included in 
the broader category of the characteristics of the policy sector in which devolution 
occurs, and in particular the nature of the policy process and the way 
stakeholders affect public policy-making13. Another aspect regards the 
implications of the nature of the service in terms of being capital-intensive 
“versus” labour-intensive. In the present work, this feature is treated in a way 
which is partly different. Though agreeing with the argument that capital-intensive 
services may require an adequate size of the recipient organisations for the 
execution of the programmatic tasks devolved to be feasible, differently from the 
authors we argue that labour-intensive services may be the most difficult to 
decentralise as they entail massive workforce reallocation which, under 
circumstances present in Italy and probably common in a number of countries, 
may incur in a course of events likely to lead to a substantive halt of the process. 
This consideration does not entail that devolution in labour-intensive services is 
“doomed”: alternative courses of events may occur (paragraph 3.3), but they 
require the triggering of mechanisms counteracting other mechanisms that would 
otherwise sap the process (see also paragraph 5.3).
13 E.g.: the corporatist nature of the agricultural policy in the European Union countries.
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The second category of factors identified by Pollitt et al. (1998) are the local 
characteristics. In order to provide an integration with the findings of the present 
study, in the analysis of local factors we introduce a distinction between locality 
factors and the organisation constitution. By locality factors it is meant those 
factors like the socio-demographic composition of the community - the argument, 
as we have seen, is that a population mainly affluent and well-organised is likely 
to be in a stronger position either to support a reform of to offer “recalcitrance” to 
it - and the nature of party political competition -  the argument being that a less 
conflictual local political competition may facilitate the implementation of 
decentralisation. By organisation constitution it is meant the organisational 
culture, structure and routines of both the devolving and the recipient 
organisations. The characteristics of the routines for the management of human 
resources are especially significant as they may affect in a crucial way both the 
reallocation of personnel and the selection and appointment of public managers 
in the key positions for the devolution process to occur. Culture bias in the 
organisation affects inter alia the sensitivity to monetary incentives by the 
personnel to be reallocated (which in turn affects the likely magnitude of the 
resistance to change). The existence of territorially located offices may facilitate 
from the logistical point of view the reallocation of personnel.
Regarding the results of the study by Pollitt et al. (1998) about the influence of 
certain service and local factors, the Lombardy case is significant mainly for 
“adding confidence" to some of these results and as a way of expanding and 
integrating the claims that can be formulated about the influence of these two 
groups of factors on the dynamics of devolution and decentralisation processes, 
especially by considering the ways the organisation constitution of public entities 
both devolving and recipients of authority affect the devolution process14.
Besides the organisation constitution, the other two groups of factors identified 
and examined in the present work on the basis of the Lombardy experience seem 
to be related to a third broad category - distinct both from the category of service 
characteristics and the category of local factors - which we might refer to as the 
national politico-administrative context and path of administrative and managerial 
reforms15 of the country in which devolution takes place. The administrative
14 Though obviously the study was not suited to this purpose, as no variation in the policy sector -  
service characteristics -  nor in the locality -  local characteristics -  has been introduced.
15 On the distinction between public management and administrative reform, an interesting 
definition was, inter alia, originally provided by a practitioner (Keeling, 1972) who defined 
Administration as “the review, in an area of public life, of law, its enforcement and revision; and 
decision-making on cases in that area submitted to the public service” (the focus being on the 
“law”, and on the analysis o f decision-making procedures and, more broadly, processes), while
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culture prevailing in the country, the social status associated with working for 
higher tiers of government, the nature of the executive government (majoritarian 
or consensual) are all factors related to the cultural and politico-administrative 
context of a country: they combine with public management policies in affecting 
the dynamics of devolution processes in a given country.
All in all, three macro categories of factors emerge as affecting in a decisive 
way the implementation of devolution. The first category groups together the 
culture of governance, the politico-administrative system of a country, and the 
status of the public management policy. They have been labelled “National 
factors”, as they are country-specific and depend on the politico-administrative 
history of the nation. The second category has to do with the local characteristics. 
In Pollitt’s work this is mainly a “geographical” concept, referring to differences 
across localities; in our opinion, it should be integrated with the features of the 
individual organisations (organisation constitution) involved in the process of 
decentralisation. The third category has to do with the service characteristics and 
more broadly the policy process in the sector in which devolution occurs.
Jointly, these categories of factors allow to sketch a sort of model of the 
“implementation habitats" of devolution (which seems indeed to be in many 
respects applicable to a broader set of decentralisation processes).
In Figure 4.1 factors in the three categories are listed: the question is how 
each of them operates, individually and by interacting with the other factors in 
affecting the implementation of devolution: different concatenation s of such 
factors make alternative courses of events occur. Factors elaborated in the work 
of Pollitt are revisited and integrated in the light of the findings of the present 
study, and the results are subsequently illustrated.
(public) Management is “the search for the best use of resources in pursuit of objectives subject to 
change” (the emphasis being on the relationship between objectives and resources) -  the difference 
between the two notion lies mainly in the focus and orientation, not so much in the subject area. 
Dunleavy and Hood (1994) consider the two disciplines (public administration and public 
management) as providing a different mapping of the same field.
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NATIONAL FACTORS
POLICY SECTO R FACTORSLOCAL FACTORS
- Size of recipient 
organisations
- Nature of policy process 
(neo-corporatist/ liberalist) 
and of contacts with users 
(frequency, closeness, 
universal vs selective and 
optional vs. mandatory 
basis of service)
- Capital-intensive vs 
labour-intensive service
Locality characteristics:
- Socio-demographic 
composition of community
- Dynamics of party 
political competition
Organisation
constitution:
- HRM system
- Presence of territorially 
located offices
- Culture bias
Public management policies at the national level: 
- Labour relations and personnel regulation
Cultural and politico-administrative context
- Administrative culture
- Conventions of governance (majoritarian/consensual)
- Status associated with working for higher tiers of government
- Context-related means available to force/resist change
Figure 4.1: outline of categories of factors affecting the implementation 
of devolution
A general notation before proceeding with the detailed analysis in the next 
paragraph: we characterise the phenomenon in terms of alternative courses of 
events, which implies that these factors are not the only causes, and do not 
operate in a mechanical way; individual agency and individual organisations’ 
management strategy do have a role in determining which concatenation of 
mechanisms is actually triggered. W e did not investigate in this study the forming 
of beliefs in the individuals, nor the formation of the strategy in the devolving as 
well as the recipients organisations, but these processes are part of the 
explanation of the dynamics the of implementation of devolution (and other) 
reforms.
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4.3 Analysis of individual factors
We start from the left box and examine the influence of local factors. As regards 
the socio-demographic composition of the local community, the argument is that 
a population mainly affluent and well-organised is likely to be in a stronger 
position either to support a reform or to offer “recalcitrance” to it; at the opposite, 
a community internally divided and with problems of deprivation is in a weaker 
position to make citizens’ views felt.
Such feature strongly interacts with the nature of contacts with users (the 
frequency -  from remote to continuous - and closeness -  from face-to-face to 
remote). Devolution in Lombardy was not so much felt by the community at large 
(though the delivery of the agricultural policy may have a strong impact on it), as 
it was by the very specific socio-economic group of the agricultural businesses. In 
this respect the broad features of the local community may have had an 
influence, but this must not be overestimated -  especially when we consider 
devolution on relatively large, complex and differentiated territories (Lombardy 
has about 9 million people, and for size and complexity may in some respects be 
compared to a small country). The argument could be proposed in the terms of 
considering that if stakeholders are affluent and well-organised and the nature of 
contacts with users is continuous and face-to-face (in agriculture farmers have 
relatively frequent and often face-to-face contacts), then they are likely to be an 
actor having a stronger influence on the devolution process. Clearly such 
argument is quite weak if proposed in a stand-alone way -  its influence should be 
examined by considering how these factors interact with the broader features of 
the decision-making process in the policy sector considered.
Turning to consider the nature of party political competition, at the local level 
and between local and national governments, there are multiple ways in which 
this factor can be characterised and its influence on reforms interpreted: Pollitt et 
al. focus the consensual-conflictual poles as features of the political scene at the 
local level and consider situations closer to the consensual pole as being 
relatively more facilitating habitats for implementing decentralisation reforms than 
circumstances characterised by conflictual politics. Indeed there is evidence that 
the sort of pax augustea introduced by the dominance of Formigoni on the 
Lombardy scene those years facilitated devolution.
Focusing that specific type of decentralisation that are devolution reforms, the 
vertical dimension (local-central) is likely to be significant too. A certain degree of 
political competition -  between the central and regional governments, as well as 
among regions - may perform the function of setting and maintaining the issue of
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the effective implementation of devolution high on the governmental agenda16. 
This seemed to be the case in the Lombardy experience -  though also other 
factors may perform the function of setting and maintaining the issue of the 
effective implementation of devolution high on the governmental agenda. While it 
may be common knowledge that the making of an authoritative decision about a 
policy is not enough for it to be actually implemented, due to a variety of causes 
brilliantly investigated since the beginning of the 70s when the stream of studies 
known as the “implementation approach” - or simply implementation studies - 
was started in the USA (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; for an overview, Hill and 
Hupe, 2002), in order to better appreciate the importance of maintaining the issue 
of the effective implementation of devolution high on the governmental agenda it 
should be considered that in legalistic countries like Italy the enactment of the 
norm is what matters, much more than the actual implementation, a phase that 
usually deserves very little political attention. Moreover, and probably even more 
important, a likely behaviour by managers in charge of implementing devolution is 
retreating to the formal compliance of the tasks prescribed by the devolution law, 
and a substantive hollowing out of the reform by de facto overlooking the 
organisational implications for the effective performance of the devolved 
authority. In this sense, vertical political competition, by maintaining the issue of 
the effective implementation of devolution high on the governmental agenda of 
both the devolving and recipient level of government, may be interpreted as a 
factor forcing the implementation of devolution17. In fact, in the case devolution is 
on the political agenda of both central and regional governments, political 
competition may stimulate the quick adoption of the secondary legislation 
necessary in legalistic systems to carry out implementation (in the case, the 
regional law 11 in 1998 was the piece of secondary legislation that made 
devolution progress in Lombardy) and the appointment of entrepreneurial figures 
in the key positions for the devolution process to unfold18, hence it can affect the 
overall implementation process19.
16 Though important, the explanation of why (in what cases) devolution is set and remains high on 
the governmental agenda over a long period of time (a phenomenon that in another study has 
been generically referred to as the “background support” for the devolution reform, Guess, 2005) 
is beyond the scope of the present study.
17 The concept must be distinguished from conflictual local politics, which is likely to hamper the 
reform.
18 In the case o f agriculture, this was the case, at least with regard to devolution from the region to 
local governments.
19 However, it may be argued that a distinction must be drawn between political competition and 
politically conflictual relations, likely to hamper also the central-regional devolution process. We 
assume that whether politics is closer to the conflictual or the collaborative pole is a feature that 
tends to characterise in an endurable way a political system, while political competition about the 
policy issue of devolution is part of the dynamics of the specific policy-making process under 
consideration (Kingdon, 1994).
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Considering the organisation constitution, the study has focused the 
importance of the human resource management system in the public entities 
involved in the devolution process. It affects the selection of the top officials 
conducting the devolution intervention, the alignment between tenured and 
elected officials and the room for manoeuvre for civil servants to conduct the 
intervention. However problematic is the linkage between performance-related 
pay systems, promotion by “merit”, flexibility (political discretion) in the 
appointment of top executives, and autonomy of managers, on the one hand, and 
the actual behaviours of top managers, on the other hand, there seems to be 
room for advancing the claim that a mix of these ingredients - under 
circumstances similar to those present in the Lombardy experience and 
summarised above - are consistent with entrepreneurial behaviours conducive to 
the effective implementation of devolution. As already pointed out, regulation of 
labour in the public sector and the HRM system in the devolving organisation also 
affect in a decisive way the set of options available for reallocating personnel, as 
was in the design of the reward scheme for the personnel to be reallocated.
The culture bias of the public sector organisation devolving authority affects 
the initial expectations of personnel about the likely outcomes of the devolution 
process in terms of the balance between benefits and costs for them. 
Organisational culture is here intended mainly as the set of assumptions 
prevailing in the organisation considered and determining its overall orientation -  
at the level of both the “explicit” values and, more in depth, the basic assumptions 
that permeate an organisation and are shared by its members (assumptions that 
are elaborated on the basis of the past experience of the organisation, and for a 
significant part have been shaped by the executive leadership); a key reference 
is Schein (1984 and 198520); see also Doherty and Horne (2002) for a discussion 
focused on public sector organisations. It is also on the basis of these 
expectations that personnel will define their individual strategies in the face of the 
new circumstances. Prevailing values affect, inter alia, the sensitivity of the 
personnel to monetary rewards, and consequently how effective monetary 
provisions will be in terms of reducing resistance to transfer. Culture bias 
ultimately plays a role in determining the intensity of the likely resistance to 
transfer. In Lombardy, selection of staff to be reallocated focused on personnel 
particularly sensitive to monetary rewards.
20 Though it is relatively common - even in brilliant reviews of the history o f organisational 
studies (e.g.: Bonazzi, 2000) -  to consider the contributions of Weick and Schein as antithetic, we 
assume that they can and must be integrated for the effective understanding o f the dynamics of 
complex organisational change processes.
116
Another element that emerged from the Lombardy experience concerns the 
“distance” between the set of values prevailing in the devolving and the recipient 
organisations, or at least in the portion of the organisation affected by devolution. 
It seems sensible to assume that the distance between the culture bias in 
territorially deconcentrated offices and local governments was relatively “low” (as 
was “physical” distance from a logistical point of view), while it was undoubtedly 
higher for personnel working in the regional headquarters in Milan, the core 
government of a public entity entrusted with legislative powers, much different 
from “service providing” local governments. It may reasonably be assumed that 
the larger the gap, the more difficult the integration of personnel in the recipients 
organisations.
An aspect related to the organisation constitution (and influenced also by the 
nature of the delivered services) is the organisational complexity: large and 
occupationally diverse institutions (like hospitals) can be contrasted with mono­
professional, low-technology institutions like schools (to cite the kinds of 
institutions investigated by Pollitt et al., 1998). Agriculture seems to be in an 
intermediate situation (a variety of administrative outputs, but a limited 
technologically-driven organisational change). More in detail, organisational units 
(the “agriculture sector offices”) in charge of performing the administrative tasks 
are relatively complex recipient organisations; the mono-professional funding 
body that executed the tasks previously exercised by the analogous mono­
professional national agency for the subsidies in agriculture seems to be 
relatively simple from an organisational point of view. The argument that the 
greater the organisational complexity, the higher the relative difficult of the 
implementation process seems to be added confidence by the evidence of the 
relatively low level of managerial attention required by the process of devolution 
to the funding body compared with the higher level of managerial attention in the 
case of the process of devolution from regional to local governments.
Another aspect related to the organisation constitution that may be argued to 
have an effect on devolution is the expertise and organisational knowledge 
accumulated by the devolving entity in running the functions it is going to 
devolve. In the Lombardy case, the regional government had a relatively long 
tradition in the management of the agriculture policy field (as concerns the tasks 
it was going to devolve to local authorities). As an effect of this historical legacy, 
the organisational knowledge, partly embodied in well-consolidated 
organisational routines, may have provided “intangible assets” that facilitated the 
performance of interventions like the running of the tables with local governments 
and farmers’ associations, or the rapid development of the computerised inter-
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organisational information system (SIARL), interventions that in turn provided a 
significance contribution to the overall implementation process.
Finally, we should consider financial, logistical and other resources available 
at the level of individual organisations, as well as the resources, if any, made 
available by the reform package and allocated for sustaining the implementation 
of the reform. They affect especially the process of personnel reallocation, in the 
terms of the “affordable” entity of monetary compensation that may be delivered 
to the personnel to be reallocated. The importance of the resources available 
must not be overestimated, as it is the activation of alternative concatenations of 
mechanisms that affects the devolution process, and even relatively large amount 
of resources may be unable to overcome resistance to reallocation or anyway 
alter the course of events21. Additional resources may be necessary for running 
the devolved public sector once it is established -  though it should be added that 
-  whatever the amount of resources required for implementing devolution (and 
assessing the costs of different designs of devolved settings is out of the scope of 
the present study) - the way the implementation process is conducted may affect 
the functioning of the devolved setting and the kind of collaboration and 
collaborative capacity among public sector organisations, hence at least in part 
its costs; the topic is discussed in chapter 5.
We can now move to the right box in Figure 4.1. - to the service characteristics 
which, in the present analysis, are encompassed within the broader category of 
the “features of the policy sector”.
Beyond the nature of the contacts with users, other characteristics like 
whether the service is universal or selective, and whether it is consumed on an 
optional or a mandatory basis, seem to have an influence on the degree with 
which users of services will become influential actors in the change process. 
Whether the service is universal (open to and used by all or most citizens) or 
selective (limited groups of citizens are the only recipients of services) seems to 
be significant with regard to the numerousness and internal cohesion of the social 
groups affected by the policy in which authority is devolved; broadly speaking, in 
selective services users are likely to be more influential. Similarly, whether the 
service is optional or mandatory affects the cohesion of the social group; in 
optional services users are likely to be more influential. These features somehow 
combine with the previous characteristic concerning the nature of contacts with
21 Though drawing policy design implications -  like criteria for estimating the resources to endow 
a policy process with - is out of the scope of the present chapter.
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users. Pollitt argues that an important difference is whether they are associated 
(like in education, in which associations of parents are relatively common, and in 
agriculture) or interact with the service provider on an individual basis (like in 
hospitals’ services): if associated, users will be, ceteris paribus, a more influential 
actor in the implementation process. In agriculture, users of the services, that as 
we have seen are strongly connected to their associations, interact with the 
service providers collectively, and this is undoubtedly a reason of their influence. 
However, determining under what conditions users are likely to be more 
influential is the solution to just one problem. The key problem for the progression 
of a research agenda on the implementation of devolution is not so much under 
what conditions users of services are influential: it is how this influence can be 
wielded.
Analysis of the mechanism of brokerage may provide a contribution in the 
direction of a better understanding of how users of services -  when in the 
condition of being a potentially influential actor -  might actually affect the course 
of events. Assuming the point of view of the public managers committed to 
implementing devolution, the triggering of a mechanism of brokerage is a way in 
which public managers can link the agenda of such an influential actor to the 
devolution agenda. The design of the Centres for Agricultural Assistance (CAA) 
in the Lombardy experience was a consensus-building intervention that could 
have been activated also in the case attributions remained at regional level, but 
its significance lies in having linked it to the progression of the devolution agenda.
A distinction may be drawn between users and stakeholders -  the latter being 
a larger category that includes all actors having a stake in the policy process. In 
the agriculture sector users are among the key organised stakeholders, and the 
distinction may be of relative importance. In other sectors, however, such 
distinction may be of central importance as influential stakeholders may be 
groups other than the users: in that case, the triggering of a mechanism of 
brokerage should be done by employing means different from engaging the 
users-stakeholders in service delivery, as in Lombardy.
Another useful distinction is the one between liberalist and corporatist policy 
sectors (Kickert, 1997, Kickert et al, 1997). In corporatist policy fields, 
stakeholders may be subdivided quite easily into two categories: those 
performing a central role in the public decision-making process, and those 
substantially excluded or with limited influence on it. Agriculture in Italy is a 
corporatist sector (as is agriculture more broadly all over EU countries, see 
Rieger, 2000) and the linking of the agenda of the three key associations 
representing almost the entirety of agricultural businesses with the progression of
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the devolution agenda contributed to its implementation. In non-corporatist policy 
domains, the identification of stakeholders may be more difficult and their 
influence on the policy process radically lower22.
Another factor considered in the analysis of Pollitt is the time scale of the 
relationship with users -  that, for example, is long in schools, a sector in which 
the interactions between providers and users (students and their parents) unfold 
over cycles of many years, and short in the case of hospital services, in which 
many services (though by no means all, if we consider the patients under long­
term treatments) are consumed on a one-shot basis. Time scale of relationships 
with users in agriculture is in an intermediate position: farmers on the one hand 
have long term relationships as regards some types of public interventions, but 
on the other hand an important part of services (as the case of subsidies given 
for specific purposes) is consumed on a short term relationship basis. Again this 
feature may affect whether users will be an influential actor in the implementation 
process -  but it evidently combines with the broader features of the policy 
process, agricultural businesses having a stronger influence on the policy 
process than pupils’ parents because of the corporatist nature of the policy 
sector.
Pollitt et al consider also size in the range of factors affecting devolution. The 
issue of size is relevant as a design feature of the devolution intervention, 
affecting its feasibility; more problematic is the influence of size on the dynamics 
of the implementation process23.
An aspect closely related to size is whether services are capital-intensive or 
labour-intensive. The argument is that capital-intensive services may require a 
sort of “critical mass” for the service to be delivered at a decentralised level, at 
least in the sense that the equipment required for the delivery of service must be 
available at the decentralised level (a result which may be achieved also by 
establishing forms of joint utilisation of the resource, and not necessarily by 
duplicating the equipment in all the decentralised units), though the issue 
appears to be more relevant as a feature in the design and analysis of feasibility 
of the devolution intervention, while problematic is determining its influence on 
the dynamics of the implementation process. Considerations in part analogous
22 Roughly speaking, focusing OECD countries, public policy making processes patterned 
according to the liberalist model tend to prevail in Anglo-Saxon countries, while in continental 
European countries the policy making process is, in many though by no means all the policy 
sectors, patterned according to corporatist logics.
23 Selection o f the provincial, and not the communal, level o f government was a key guideline of 
the Lombardy regional government devolution policy: municipalities were considered too 
numerous (there were 1524 municipalities in the Lombardy territory), and on average too small in 
size to perform the functions in agriculture -  only associations o f municipalities (i.e. the mountain 
communities) were devolved a limited range o f tasks.
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can be made as regards the feature of the “technological embeddedness” of the 
service, i.e. whether service delivery is radically dependent on a technology and 
its evolution.
Finally, the third category of factors is the one we have labelled “national 
factors”. They have been long discussed in the first paragraph; for this reason, 
treatment of such factors is correspondently brief in this section.
A major dichotomy is between systems characterised by majoritarian and 
consensual conventions of governance. As already discussed, the argument is 
that the implementation of administrative reforms is more intense where the 
nature of the executive government is mainly majoritarian.
The administrative culture is another factor having an influence on the 
intensity of devolution. The reason seems to be twofold. First, the centrality of 
administrative law could lead to a “formalistic” implementation of reforms; 
reforming may be considered more about changing laws (i.e. the ways things 
should work), than changing the way of functioning of public organisations (i.e. 
the way things work -  on the point of the influence of the administrative law 
cultural paradigm on the implementation of administrative reforms see chapter 3 
and the contribution of Capano, 2003). It may also be argued that the 
implementation of administrative reforms in general in countries based on the 
administrative law meets an additional problem. Once a major reform act is 
established, implementation has to be carried out by adapting, at the different 
levels of government, the secondary body of laws which regulates each sector. In 
such a context a good reform package is not enough. Some interesting empirical 
evidence comes from the Italian case: after the major reform act (law 59/97), four 
acts had to be promulgated for the detailed regulation of relevant policy sectors; 
then, every regional government had to implement the reform through the 
promulgation of regional laws for each sector. This process, all in all just a legally 
binding pre-condition for the devolution process to be implemented, was not 
entirely completed at the end of 2004 -  though it should be added that this broad 
issue is out of the scope of the investigation.
We have already examined how the status associated with working for higher 
tiers of government is influential, and the relevance of the means available to 
staff to resist change and to top executives to force reallocation. They combine 
with the regulation of personnel and labour relations in influencing reallocation of 
staff, and provide part of the explanation of why and how momentum of the 
devolution process may be sustained.
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4.4 Discussion of findings and main limitations
In the previous paragraph a tentative integration of the findings of the Lombardy 
case study with previous contributions in literature has been elaborated, with the 
purpose of outlining a framework of factors affecting the dynamics of devolution 
and decentralisation, and proposing some tentative arguments about how such 
factors operate.
More robust confirmations to the theorisation proposed about the 
hypothesised concatenations of mechanisms could be drawn by undertaking 
comparative studies of experiences of devolution in countries with a similar 
politico-administrative system, more consolidated majoritarian conventions of 
governance (France and Spain -  Italy being in an endless transition since the 
1992-94 crisis, see Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004), different degrees of political 
competition (like in the Spanish case where Catalonia and Basque regional 
governments are in tough political competition with the central government, 
differently from other regions) and a different status of human resource 
management systems in different regions.
In interpreting the limitations of the claims proposed, it should be taken into 
account that Italy is a case of devolution to already existing institutions -  the 
dynamics of devolution may be radically different in case the regions are jointly 
established ex novo (“institution building process”) and devolved authority, as 
was the case of the Scottish experience of devolution in the United Kingdom (and 
the Welsh experience, though in that case devolution was much more limited in 
extent), or some recent experiences of devolution in Central-Eastern European 
countries (Brusis, 2002).
In considering the findings so far, the specific contents of the design of 
devolution in Italy and specifically in Lombardy should be considered, which add 
to the limitations of the study. Processes of devolution are deeply affected by the 
specific features of the design of the reform: the “reform package”. Differences 
may arise from the contents of what is devolved, whether decision powers (the 
authority of enacting laws or issuing regulations), or service delivery tasks, or 
both; moreover, tax collection may remain centralised, or at the opposite taxation 
powers may be devolved too. The devolution from the central government to the 
Lombardy regional government included some decision powers and a number of 
administrative tasks (delivery of financial subsidies to agricultural businesses; 
control over proper spending of subsidies and on production processes in 
agriculture businesses; the setting of health standards, etc.); no personnel was
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reallocated from the central to regional governments (differently from the massive 
reallocation of personnel from the region to the local governments), but some 
money to compensate for the costs in running the new tasks were delivered. The 
regional government devolved to local authorities limited decision powers (mainly 
the list of issues that the provincial rural development plans could regulate), a 
significant amount of administrative tasks, including the case management of 
farmers’ applications for eligibility to CAP and Rural Development Plan funding, 
the execution of on-the-field inspections, the delivery of a number of services. It 
was not a case of devolution of taxation powers.
Moving from the contents of the reform package (what is devolved) to the 
modes of implementation prescribed by the reform package (how should 
devolution interventions unfold), design of the reform may in this respect refer to 
aspects like (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, pp. 93-96, Guess, 2005) the systems 
for implementing the package (Have new organisations and structures been 
created specifically to advance the reform? Has a system for monitoring the 
implementation been established? Have training initiatives been activated for the 
personnel affected by devolution?), the sequencing of the phases of devolution, 
the guiding ideas of the reform. In the Italian case, the answer to the first question 
about whether specific systems were set to work for implementing devolution is 
basically negative as regards all three the aspects (organisations specifically 
established to advance the reform, training initiatives, monitoring system), though 
there were partial exceptions regarding the monitoring system (an example being 
the elaborations produced by the general accounts office and the ministry for 
regional affairs, like the one reported in Table 4.1). The sequencing of events 
was mainly dictated by the internal juridical logic: the “framework” law (59/97) 
being followed up by the delegated decrees issued by the government by groups 
of policy sectors.
The design of devolution by the Lombardy government differed from the 
national design for the existence of a monitoring system (the Observatory on the 
Administrative Reform and Federalism) active on the scene since the very 
beginning of the devolution process, and the emphasis on training initiatives 
(reported in chapter 2). No specific organisation (with the exception of the 
Observatory, who acted in part also as a catalyst of some interventions in the 
devolution process) for implementing devolution was set to work. Sequencing 
was improvised: the sector of agriculture (and to a more limited extent the sector 
of training for job) became the shop-window of how the regional government of 
Lombardy was making the devolution agenda progress in a substantial way. A
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guiding idea was the conception of “Lombardy as the region of subsidiarity24” 
(implying a competitive relations with other regions in Italy, as well as with the 
national government).
Another key feature in the design of the implementation process is the amount 
of resources available to finance it. They were in general very limited, given the 
strains on the public budget due to meeting the convergence criteria for joining 
the European single currency. However, the field of agriculture, that relies on 
conspicuous EU funds, and commits national states to the agreed (at the EU 
level) budget of public spending for the sector, is comparatively “rich”. Thus, in 
the sector financial resources were available at satisfactory levels. The issue of 
the financial dimension of the conduction of the intervention of devolution is 
briefly discussed in the final part of chapter 5.
Limitations identified may suggest future lines of development of the research 
for improving our understanding of the dynamics of the organisational 
transformations in the implementation of devolution. Another significant question 
is how to utilise knowledge about factors at work (affecting how alternative 
courses of events may unfold) in order to produce a practical knowledge that can 
enlighten the policy-making process and support public managers in conducting 
interventions of devolution in different contexts. This final and central question is 
addressed in the subsequent chapter. The aim of this research effort is to draft a 
“menu of practices” that can be employed in conducting the implementation 
process -  and that might also provide some insights for the design phase of a 
devolution reform25.
24 The ideological basis lied in the specific interpretation elaborated by the movement of 
Communion and Liberation drawing on the social doctrine o f the Roman Catholic Church, though, 
as we have seen, scholars o f different ideological background from a number o f universities 
contributed, in the capacity of advisers, to the works of the Observatory.
25 In fact, knowledge provided in the next chapter in terms o f practices, besides being employed by 
managers in the implementation phase of devolution (main purpose), may also inform the pre­
decision and decision phase of the policy-making process (especially the alternative-specification 
process) as regards the inclusion of conditions facilitating the functioning of the practices in the 
design of the modes of implementation of the reform Also, they can enlighten policy-makers 
about the feasibility of the implementation of different options of the policy package.
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5. The management of devolution processes: 
practices
5.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, the main focus has been on developing a social science 
understanding of the dynamics of devolution processes, based on the analysis of 
the Lombardy experience of devolution. This kind of knowledge can now be 
oriented to address the issue of how top executives can shape the process 
dynamics of the organisational transformations occurring in public entities in the 
implementation of devolution in such ways to perform policy delivery efficiently 
and effectively after the conclusion of devolution. Contributing to the 
advancement of an agenda concerned with lesson-drawing for public 
management in the context of devolution is a key goal of the research 
undertaken in the present work; the research question: “how should the strategic 
apex of public entities devolving authority lead an intervention of adaptation of 
public sector organisations to devolution?” is directly addressed in this final 
chapter.
The main issue regards what practices can be employed by top executives for 
leading an intervention of devolution in such ways to establish a devolved setting 
in which policy delivery is effective (given the circumstances they operate in, and 
the specific features of the devolution policy package).
The first issue addressed regards how to conduct the extrapolation of 
practices from the experience investigated. A specific approach (the smart 
practices analysis) is introduced and discussed in the light of recent criticisms 
addressed to current research conventions in public management (paragraph 
5.2). Drawing on the understanding of the Lombardy experience acquired in the 
previous chapters, a menu of practices for the management of devolution 
processes is elaborated (par. 5.3). Limitations are discussed and some broader 
issues concerning the management of devolution processes are examined (par. 
5.4). Some concluding remarks about the path covered in the present study are 
proposed.
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5.2. How to conduct extrapolation: the smart practices approach
5.2.1. The problem o f extrapolation
A recently revived debate on the “best practice research” (Bardach, 2004 and 
Barzelay, 2005; see also Bardach, 1994 and 1998; Lynn, 1996; Overman and 
Boyd, 1994) has raised the issue of whether current research conventions in 
public management are effective as regards the identification and supple 
elaboration of “best” practices to be used for addressing key problems in the 
management of public sector organisations, i.e. whether analysts in public 
management can properly address the “extrapolation problem”: improving the 
performance of public sector organisations in one situation (target site) by 
employing experience acquired elsewhere (source site). Learning from second­
hand experience (the extrapolation problem) is more complex than ascertaining 
whether a given practice is effective in the source site (the evaluation problem); it 
is also more complex than editing lists of practices that have been deemed to be 
effective in the source site; extrapolation is the process of learning from vicarious 
experience and designing practices fitting the (new and diverse) circumstances to 
which the practices are to be applied.
In the present work, we address the methodological problem of how to 
conduct extrapolation by adopting a sophisticated method, the “smart practices” 
protocol of organisational analysis (Bardach, 1998), identified as an approach 
capable of addressing the main issues raised in the debate about current 
research conventions in public management. The first issue is the excessive 
emphasis given by many analysts in public management on generic “principles”, 
or generic “instruments”, without an adequate understanding of how the system 
(on which the principle/instrument intervenes) works. At the core of the smart 
practices analysis there is the strong integration of the “technical”, design 
dimension, the understanding of the results that should characterise the 
operation of a practice truly apt to solving a managerial problem (how the practice 
works and what results it produces), with the motivational and behavioural 
dimension, the understanding of how the practice was activated and became 
mature (how the practice can be set to work, so that it can produce expected 
results). Champions of the smart practices approach argue that works in 
management literature too often underestimate the innovation process. Another 
qualifying aspect is that this method carefully relates practices to the context 
conditions to which their performance is sensitive, thus avoiding inaccurate 
generalisation of the domain of applicability, i.e. the error of elevating to the 
status of “best” some practices that are instead applicable only to a very specific
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set of circumstances. The assumption is that this protocol of analysis, though it 
too has some risk areas that are discussed subsequently, is capable of 
answering serious criticisms commonly addressed to the “conventional” research 
on best practices. In fact, “\T]he goal of “best practice” research -  namely 
widening the range of solutions to [social] problems -  is simply too important to 
defer, even though the supporting methodology has been frustratingly slow to 
develop" (Bardach, 1994, p.260). The quotation from Bardach highlights the 
emergence in the academic debate of a serious disappointment about success- 
centred research on public management. At the same time, it stresses the 
importance of what is at stake: understanding success in order to enlighten public 
policy-making related to public management.
A severe criticism has been addressed to a strand of literature, typified by 
Behn’s leadership Counts (1991), that had emerged from US public policy 
schools in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s (see Barzelay, 2000, p. 250) and has been 
classified by one of its main critics, Lynn (1996, p. 140), as “best practice 
research” tradition. In proposing the “smart practices” approach, Bardach makes 
his own criticisms to success-centered research on public management.
In this work it is argued that the smart practices analysis proposed by 
Bardach, on the one hand, provides convincing answers to the major criticisms of 
success-centred research and represents a strong contribution to the issue of 
understanding success in public management, while, on the other hand, it 
presents two “risk areas” that researchers engaged in such research programme 
have to deal with. In order to support such line of argumentation, it is necessary 
to dwell on the topic and, first, consider the criticisms to success-centred 
research and, second, identify the potential and limits of the smart practices 
approach.
5.2.2. An outline of the criticisms of success-centred research in public 
management
One, harsh, criticism to the best practice research conventions is in Lynn (1996). 
His criticism is basically concerned with the lack of theorised knowledge that he 
finds in the strand of scholarship emanating from US public policy schools in the 
late ‘80s and early ‘90s.
The structure of the criticism can be outlined (although in a very stylised way) 
by examining the treatment made by Lynn of the case of the “Illinois Department 
of Aging” (summarized in Lynn, 1996, p. 139ff.). The case narrates the successful 
renewal of the department by its new director, Victor Wirth, who succeeded in
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refocusing the operations of his department on client service, while complying 
with the governor’s directive to cut the department budget.
In the case, the approach of an “archetypical” best practice researcher is 
compared by Lynn with his own approach in explaining why Wirth was 
successful. In Lynn’s approach, analysis of the case must be underpinned by a 
strong theoretical framework in order to gain a robust insight in the internal 
dynamics of the system under observation (step 1). In the case, game theory was 
employed and the division managers proved to be the key obstacle to achieve a 
client-oriented outcome for the agency as a whole.
The understanding of the internal dynamics of the system allows the 
identification of the levers available to the decision-makers in order to affect the 
behaviour of the system (step 2). Provided that the decision-makers somehow 
prioritise their set of preferences, in order to “weigh” the outcomes of alternative 
interventions (step 3), a course of action can be identified (step 4), well grounded 
in the insight into the dynamics of the system provided by the employment of 
theorised knowledge.
Lynn then makes a comparison with a “standard” explanation that might have 
been provided by a “best practice researcher”: Wirth’s success was due to the 
emphasis on customer satisfaction or, in other words, on the application of the 
principles of “having a specific, clear goal” and “walking around and reiterating 
his goal until it was understood and adopted”. In Lynn’s words (p. 135): “I doubt 
that practicing managers will find more than superficial inspiration [in generic 
‘principles’ as those listed above] when confronting management problems”. 
Practitioners not equipped with theories1 will not be able to move from a “best 
practice” management principle to the identification of the actual levers to employ 
in order to affect the behaviour of the target system (in the case, the Department 
of Aging). Thus, the subsequent steps that lead to the identification of a course of 
action become impossible.
Bardach’s criticisms, although quite different from Lynn’s, share a common 
concern about the fact that best practice research proceeds without sufficient 
methodological self-awareness or, when awareness is present, success2.
In this line, a first criticism (hereafter referred to as criticism a) draws on the 
results of Overman and Boyd (1994), who showed that in many cases the best 
practice research is “a-theoretical, unsystematic, generalises beyond the instant 
case without warrant and disregards tough questions about whether even in the
1 And, indeed, also with a strong framework that can make them capable of selecting, in different 
situations, the proper theory to be applied to the contingent case. As argued in the subsequent 
section, smart practices analysis can provide a different strategy to equip practitioners with 
instruments to tackle this difficulty.
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instant case the alleged best practice is really responsible for any observed 
success”. Thus, lack of extensive, theory-driven empirical testing is a first 
criticism (Bardach, 1998, p. 56).
A second criticism (criticism b) is about the method employed by best practice 
research approaches for the identification of “solutions” to problems. A flaw lies in 
the way the question is posed: “What works? [..] the rhetoric standard solution- 
seeking question is not well posed; it seeks too big an answer at once [..] it would 
be better to decompose it into two questions, one nested into the other” 
(Bardach, 1994, p. 263). Thus, the point is that in the research for practices “that 
work”, a first step lies in the understanding of how the system operates at all. In 
this way, an insight can be gained about the sources of high performance as well 
as about the modes of failure. A weakness of best practice research is that it 
shows too little insight into the nature of the opportunities of which the practice 
tries to make advantage (the qualitative strengths of the practice). Only once 
features of the opportunities have been analysed, the second question: “how can 
we make the system work better” can be fruitfully addressed. Setting the problem 
in terms of exploitation of “opportunities” means that potentialities are at the core 
of the analysis. But focusing the analysis on potentials and the exploitation of 
potentialities requires, according to Bardach (1994), the adoption of different 
epistemological bases “to recognize the limits of falsifiability as a test in model 
validation and to elevate tests involving fruitfulness, the capacity to organize data, 
and the ability to evoke surprise. [..] A different research programme may suit for 
public management”. The point is illustrated by making systematic reference to 
the physical sciences. For example, the concepts of potential thermal energy or 
potential kinetic energy are concepts ordinarily employed by physicians and 
engineers. Analogously, Bardach argues, the concept of “latent potential", which 
is not wholly absent in social sciences, could and should be used more in public 
management.
Before illustrating the smart practices approach and how it could address the 
issue of the exploitation of potentialities, a third criticism emerging from Bardach 
(1994) has to be reported (criticism c). Identification of best practices is a difficult 
task for researchers; in order to be “best”, a practice should be truly better than 
many or most of the practices: a rare thing, difficult and expensive to find, and, 
especially, likely to fit only a limited range of cases (characterised by the 
specificity of local resources and constraints). Thus, if in addition to the feature of 
“being truly better”, we intend to characterise “best” also as “being applicable to a 
wide range of cases”, then the combined application of the two criteria makes
2 Bardach, 1994, p. 260.
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“detecting” a best practice a highly difficult and expensive task; awareness of this 
seems to lack in most of best practice research tradition.
5.2.3. The analysis of smart practices
A practice can be conceived as a means to exploit opportunities, a method of 
interacting with a situation that is intended to produce results; what makes a 
practice smart is that the method also involves taking advantage of some latent 
opportunities for creating value; the overall value of a smart practice represents 
the net difference between the value of the opportunity itself and the costs, risks, 
vulnerabilities of the practice that exploits it (Bardach, 1998, p. 36 and 38).
In order to better figure the way smart practices research operates, an 
analogy can be drawn with the process of reverse engineering that “in its simplest 
form finds an amazing gizmo, takes it apart, and tries to figure out the clever trick 
that makes it work so well. [..] It may be noted that such a process, far from being 
simple and immediate, can involve a complex process of theoretical reasoning. 
Furthermore, the analogy must not be “stretched” too far: differently from the 
ordinary work of engineers, “smart practice analysis lack the capacity to 
thoroughly break down and reconstitute the gizmo3, [..n]or does it have access to 
the body of scientific and technical knowledge that permits engineers to arrive at 
a realistic understanding. Furthermore [..] for an engineer to generalize beyond 
the specimen at hand is often straightforward” (Bardach, 1998, p. 41).
A qualifying aspect of smart practices analysis is its focus on developing an 
insight into the way a given system works, in order to understand causes of high 
performance as well as modes of failures. At the core of smart practices analysis 
is the understanding of how features that constitute the design of a practice 
interact with one another in order to produce success or failures. Another 
qualifying aspect of smart practices analysis is that it combines “design” issues 
(analysis of the logic and mechanisms underlying the functioning of the 
investigated system) with a strong attention to individuals motivations and belief 
formation mechanisms. Change can come only by jointly considering the two 
sides4.
3 The point is that the reverse engineering process takes place in “laboratory” Conditions that 
cannot be entirely reproduced in social science investigations.
4 In a passage stressing especially the importance of individuals motivations, Bardach notes: “I 
was also interested in variants of the generic smart practice, that is, different ways o f implementing 
the smart practice that get slightly different results and serve as a menu o f options for actors 
working in different contexts [..] The most important variations in context have to do with key 
actors’ willingness to accept certain side-effects, run certain risks, or achieve certain subsidiary 
goals; the fiscal and partisan constraints on action; the career aspirations and personality 
characteristics o f key individuals (my emphasis)” (Bardach, 1998, p. 58).
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Applications proposed by Bardach of the smart practices analysis regard the 
problem of the development of forms of collaboration among public agencies, 
notably on the development of “inter-agency collaborative capacity”. Although 
extremely broad and relevant, this is only one category of smart practices. A 
development of smart practices approach is proposed by Barzelay and Campbell 
(2003) with reference to strategic planning and policy management in bureaus. 
The authors propose an operationalisation for conducting smart practices 
analysis, by identifying for each activity the related process design features and 
process context factors, and analysing the respective relations (that is, the way 
process context factors affect the functioning of process design features). The 
analysis of process context factors allows the identification of the “domain of 
application” of practices and enables the development of the research on a 
plurality of categories of smart practices. Such methodological innovation is taken 
up in the present work.
5.2.4. Answering criticisms
Does the smart practices approach answer the criticisms illustrated above? With 
regard to Lynn’s criticism (and to a large extent to Bardach’s criticism a) - 
concerning the lack of systematic employment of theory in order to get an insight 
into the dynamics of the organisation or system whose performances have to be 
improved - smart practices analysis provides a powerful approach by employing a 
reverse engineering “protocol” of analysis. A reverse engineering process is at 
the same time capable of making an intense use of theorised knowledge and of 
being very selective in it (in other words, of making a “cheap” use of theorised 
knowledge). This is possible since its starting point is the breakdown of the 
“practice that works”: it is the analysis of the relations among components of the 
practice that “leads” to the selection and employment of the proper body of 
theorised knowledge.
Criticism b) is about the method employed for the identification of solutions to 
problems. As noted above, the smart practices approach is construed and 
operationalised in order to systematically relate the (candidate smart) practice to 
the nature of the opportunities it seeks to exploit. By employing the concept of 
potentials that can be activated in order to manifest their causal power, and by 
looking systematically for them, smart practice analysis broadens the range of 
solutions to problems. Grounded on the analysis of the different ways in which a 
practice interacts with a situation and can produce (i.e.: it has the potential of 
producing) differentiated results (success as well as failures), categories of 
contingent solutions can be identified.
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Smart practices analysis addresses also the issue of the difficulty and 
“expensiveness” of identifying truly “best” practices (criticism c). Scholars 
engaged in this research programme will systematically relate identified practices 
to the process context factors in relation to which the practice allows the 
successful exploitation of opportunities. The analysis of process context factors 
(which is, in general terms, lacking in best practice research literature) enables 
the employment of the practice in its proper context, thus moving beyond the 
alternative of either having a best practice available (something which is very 
difficult), or being left with no instruments to deal with a problem. In this way, 
scholars as well as practitioners can be provided with sets of candidate smart 
practices to be employed and whose variants can be tested in further empirical 
work.
A further question can be raised: is it at all impossible to talk of “best” 
practices in a research programme based on the smart practices approach? An 
answer is that some practices could emerge not only as performing better than 
most of the others, but also as applicable to a wide range of situations and 
dependent only on very broad process context factors: as such, and only in this 
sense, they could be “elevated” to the status of candidate “best” practice - to be 
tested in further empirical work.
Do the above arguments provide thorough answers to the criticisms 
addressed to the best practice research? Bardach’s smart practices analysis 
appears to be very strong with regard to criticism c), while presenting two 
potential weaknesses, or at least two “risk areas”, that can be related to criticisms 
a) and b).
A first risk is to make the practices under analysis too much “intrinsic” to the 
case, thus facing the criticism at the opposite of the spectrum with regard to 
criticism a), but along the same dimension: while best practice research 
generalises with too little care, smart practices analysis could “over-contextualise” 
practices. This first risk area is at the level of operating smart practices analysis 
in ordinary research work; it does not lie in the conceptualisation of the approach. 
A careful identification of the process context factors that really affect the design 
of the process is an antidote to this possible drift.
The second risk area is mainly concerned with the conceptual issue of the 
exploitation of potentials. A practice is smart even if it failed in an actual 
(“historical”) case to exploit a potential, provided that this was due to 
uncontrollable circumstances; in other words, exploitation was missed by chance, 
not because of an inherent flaw in the practice. While this is coherent with the 
perspective adopted by the smart practices analysis, a risk is that it might
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become difficult to sort out what to elevate to the status of smart practice and 
what not (can we really state that, if the accident Z - a random event - had not 
occurred, the practice X would have exploited the opportunity Y?). This risk may 
occur especially in analysing variants of a smart practice. This is a critique 
directed to the epistemological basis of smart practices (which averts from strictly 
“positivistic” approaches), that in turn is a response to the criticism b) addressed 
to best practice research (i.e., that it shows too little insight into the nature of the 
opportunities of which a practice tries to make advantage). The task of treating 
potentials that, differently from the potentials managed by physicians or 
engineers, are extremely difficult to measure could find inadequate tools available 
in current research methodology. Strict protocol of testing cannot be met: thus, 
identified practices could be drawn too heavily on the subjective perceptions of 
the researcher.
Identified risk areas, in our view, do not undermine what has been argued 
previously, i.e. that the smart practices analysis represents an improvement in 
understanding success in public management. They basically work as caveat for 
researchers engaged in this research programme; the first one works as a 
reminder for researchers in their ordinary research activity; the second one is a 
substantive issue that demands to develop and/or improve some forms of 
measurement in dealing with potentials.
5.3. The management of devolution processes: practices from the 
Lombardy experience
After the devolution of functions and the acquisition of new ones, the 
“operations5” of the agriculture directorate general of the Lombardy region were 
deeply changed. Core tasks consisted of supporting the deliberative processes of 
the competent organs and running the broad set of activities put under the label 
of “steering and advising the local governments”, while only a limited set of 
services remained under the direct provision of the regional government, mainly 
the delivery of subsidies, a task executed by the newly established regional 
funding body.
Implementation of devolution requires to change the programmatic activities 
executed by both the devolving and the level of government recipient of 
attributions, to adapt the organisational arrangements to the performance of the
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new programmatic activities, and to reallocate the resources and especially the 
workforce where necessary. The Lombardy case is significant as regards all 
three the categories of case outcomes. How could the course of events that 
occurred in Lombardy be triggered in other circumstances? How can some 
practices - working “generally” in processes of devolution -  be extrapolated from 
the Lombardy case?
In order to address the questions, we start by considering the course of events 
that led to a specific but important outcome of the Lombardy experience: the 
reallocation of workforce to the level of government recipient of the devolved 
tasks. In chapter 3 we addressed the question of explaining the scale of 
realignment of the workforce from the region to local governments, and the fact 
that it was a smooth, unchallenged process that unfolded over a short period of 
time -  a puzzling outcome especially if it is compared with the numerous 
contemporaneous failure cases occurring throughout Italy in the implementation 
of the national law on devolution. To explain such case outcome, we employed at 
first a rational choice approach and interpreted the story as follows. The starting 
point was the fact that overall costs exceeded benefits for the personnel to be 
transferred to local governments. In order to counteract resistance to reallocation 
-  likely to be effective, given the means provided by the context - top managers 
operated a range of interventions. Besides the careful selection of personnel, by 
itself probably insufficient, the top management attentively induced the forming of 
a belief about the inevitability of the process of devolution. The forming of a belief 
about the inevitability of the process of devolution deeply shaped the alternative- 
specification phase of the decision-making process by making a number of 
people restrain the consideration of alternative courses of action and rule out 
those associated with the non-implementation of devolution (which, though 
preferable, came to be considered as impossible). It remains to be explained how 
this affected the whole of the people to be reallocated. The forming of a belief 
about the inevitability of devolution worked in concatenation with another 
mechanism operating at the individual level. The hypothesised mechanism for the 
explanation of the smooth transfer of personnel is the operating of a threshold- 
based behaviour. In brief, the acceptance of the transfer by some individuals 
(whether because the monetary rewards made benefits exceed costs or because 
resistance was deemed as an impossible alternative) increased the proportion of 
people willing to participate, thus induced the final acceptation by the others; in 
other words, the fact that a significant part of the people to be transferred
5 In Mintzberg’s terms (1983), referring to the activities directly addressed at producing an 
organisation’s outputs.
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accepted the new situation may have induced others to participate; the increased 
proportion of the group of people willing to participate to being reallocated, in 
turn, induced somebody else to participate, and so on. Finally, it has been argued 
that the triggering of mechanisms of rational imitation was made possible also by 
the contemporaneous inhibition of a mechanism of attribution of threat. The 
attentive creation of the perception of remaining part of the regional network and 
the perception that their integration in the local governments would be made as 
smooth as possible was facilitated by the transplant of administrative procedures 
from the region to local governments that contributed to inhibit, or at least 
attenuate, potential attribution of threat to the new situation by the staff to be 
transferred.
Findings can be summarised as follows. The careful selection of personnel 
and the provision of correspondingly suitable incentives (determined according to 
actors’ utility) created conditions that attenuated the disadvantages for the 
personnel to be reallocated. The forming of a belief about inevitability of 
devolution concatenated with some form of social mechanism of rational imitation 
at the individual level, and the contemporaneous inhibition of the mechanism of 
collective attribution of threat, eliminated, or at least strongly attenuated, the 
resistance to realignment by workforce.
How could such practice work “more generally”? The practice counteracted a 
likely chain of events according to which calculation of costs and benefits 
associated with devolution by the personnel to be reallocated would lead to 
resistance towards the reform which, at least given the means -  ranging from 
lobbying to going on strike -  available in Italy to resist transfer, could lead the 
overall reform to a halt. On the contrary, the forming of a belief of inevitability 
about devolution and the triggering at the individual level of a threshold-based 
mechanism made the reallocation process gain momentum and eventually be 
completed, over a short period of time, in a smooth way. The combination of 
inducing a belief of inevitability, the careful selection of personnel to be 
reallocated, and monetary incentives performed the function of reallocating the 
personnel. The point is that the move to another level of government affects the 
“implicit contract" between the personnel and the employer organisation. The 
practice intervenes on the system by constraining the available decisional 
alternatives and making a number of individuals exclude the “resistance” option; 
the triggering of a threshold-based mechanism leads to reducing the 
convenience of resisting the transfer for a larger and larger proportion of 
personnel, hence leading to the smooth implementation of the process.
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The functioning of the practice occurs under some relatively specific 
circumstances (or context factors). First, reallocating personnel across levels of 
government is a problem in countries in which working for a higher tier of 
government is associated with a higher status, and better contractual conditions -  
if this does not apply than the process may be smooth simply because people are 
“willing” to be reallocated to a lower level of government. Second, preferences 
structure of personnel (those selected for reallocation in the larger number of the 
staff of the devolving organisation) affects the relative weigh of monetary 
incentives and overall the balance of costs and benefits for personnel to be 
reallocated. Third, perception of inevitability can be induced only if circumstances 
“make it credible”.
For all these reasons, it should more properly be stated that the practice has 
“the potential” of intervening on the system in the way illustrated -  though it may 
be noted that even little differences in context may inhibit the actual triggering of 
such course of events.
Moreover, variations in the practice, like e.g. whether a block transfer of 
personnel is put into effect, as in the Lombardy case, or a gradual transfer of 
personnel, occurring in subsequent phases, is chosen, may significantly affect 
the way the practice works. Block transfer over a short time period may facilitate 
the forming of a belief of inevitability, or at the opposite hamper it if too small a 
proportion of the people selected for reallocation has a sufficiently low threshold. 
The gradual transfer over the time period of devolution may allow circumventing 
the situation of too small a proportion with a low threshold in the overall 
contingent of staff, provided that a careful definition of the composition of the lots 
of personnel to be reallocated is made, but it might facilitate the activation of 
persistent patron-client networks, which in turn may lead to some of the 
personnel avoiding the transfer. Furthermore, some interventions as the 
automatic promotion of personnel to be reallocated may determine side effects 
like a perception of being superseded in the staff already in the payroll of the 
local governments -  hence another source of resistance in another locus of the 
policy subsystem.
The practice examined is capable of leading to an important outcome of the 
implementation of devolution as the reallocation of personnel, thus performing an 
important function. A question is what other functions lead to the overall 
implementation of a devolution exercise (functions can in this respect be defined 
as sub-processes of the overall change process that need to be performed if the 
overall change process is to be implemented, see also Barzelay and Campbell, 
2003, chap. 5). As a first step, functions leading to the changes in the
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programmatic activities, the structural arrangements, and the reallocation of 
resources and especially personnel, can be characterised, in a very conventional 
way, as in Figure 1.
F1.2)
Engaging
stakeholders
(organising
participation)
F1.1) 
Engaging 
governments 
recipients of 
devolution
F3.1)
Reallocating
personnel
F3.2) 
Adapting 
structure and 
routines in 
public 
organisations
Implementing
devolution
F1) Creating 
momentum
F2) Sustaining 
momentum 
('Keeping the 
cohesion within the 
top management)
F4)
Institutionalising
change
F3) Establishing 
the devolved 
setting
Figure 5.1: functions in implementing a devolution intervention
In fact, complex change processes unfolding over a long a period of time require 
momentum6 to be gained (function F1) and sustained (F2). Engagement and 
support by public and private stakeholders of the process (in the case, local 
governments recipients of the devolved tasks, and farmers and their 
associations) is central for achieving momentum, as well as for sustaining it7. 
Sustaining momentum over a long period of time also requires keeping the 
cohesion within the top management in the organisation leading the intervention 
-  in the case, the Lombardy regional government.
Performing the new programmatic activities requires the reallocation of 
resources -  personnel being especially critical -  and the adaptation of structure 
and routines in the public sector organisations that have changed their 
programmatic tasks (F3).
6 In this frame we refer to momentum in a broad way, as a set of interconnected causal scenarios.
7 Such process can be referred as the “building and steering o f the policy implementation 
network”, in the terms o f Kickert et al. (1997, see also the contribution of O’Toole, Hanf and Hupe 
in the same work).
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Finally, once the new situation has been achieved, the new organisational 
configuration has to be consolidated (or “institutionalised”, F4). Here we 
schematise change according to the very conventional -  and quite simplistic -  
model of a change process as a three-phase process: the unfreezing of a 
previously stable situation (F1), change (trajectory from the initial to the end 
“state” -  F2 and F3) and then consolidation (“freezing”) of the new achieved 
configuration (F4). Functions may obviously differ, at least in part, according to 
the specific features of the devolution policy package: differences may arise from 
the content of what is devolved, whether decision powers (the authority of 
enacting laws or issuing regulations) or service delivery tasks, or both; moreover, 
tax collection may remain centralised, or at the opposite taxation powers may be 
devolved too. Differences are also determined by the way the implementation 
process is designed in the reform package itself. It should be noted that, for 
example, F2 may have more sub-functions, according to the circumstances -  the 
sub-function identified (keeping the cohesion within the top management) was 
performed in the Lombardy experience, and in those circumstances was capable 
of sustaining momentum. However, the scheme seems to be general enough to 
encompass a broad range of variations in the policy package and identifies key 
functions of the implementation of a devolution exercise.
It should also be added that F4 was performed mainly by managing some 
symbols (signalling that change was accomplished) and the use of authoritative 
means -  in other words in the specific circumstances it was achieved without 
resorting to any especially significant practice (like those described below with 
regard to the other functions).
What practices could allow to perform such functions (and their component 
sub-functions)? The Lombardy experience has provided some interesting 
candidate smart practices. The procedure used for identifying the features of the 
practice at work for the reallocation of personnel -  the function labelled “F3.1” 
according to the scheme outlined in Figure 1 - can be employed more broadly for 
drafting a set of practices for performing the defined functions.
Practices extrapolated from the Lombardy experience are reported in Table 1 
and succinctly discussed in the remainder of the section.
The logical structure of Table 5.1 is as follows. First (column 1), each practice 
is related to the function it performs8. In general, the practice employs one or 
more social mechanisms in order to counteract other social mechanisms that 
would “naturally” inhibit or counterweigh the unfolding of the devolution process.
8 Or, in other words, a practice is a way to perform a function.
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A major distinction (Elster, 1998, p. 46) is between type A Mechanisms (they are 
mutually incompatible: when one is triggered, the other is not -  in this case the 
practice has to inhibit the mechanism) and type B Mechanisms (they can be 
contemporaneously triggered -  in this case the practice has to produce a 
“favourable" net effect on the system). Mechanisms hindering the devolution 
process are referred to as “the problem addressed” by the practice.
The content of the practice is illustrated in column 2. The way the practice 
works is described (column 3) by addressing the two, distinct though interrelated 
questions of, first, how the system operates, and, second, how the practice tries 
to take advantage of the way the system operates (how it exploits latent 
opportunities lying in the system). Theory-based understanding of how the 
system works is the basis for characterising the practice and the way it works.
Effects or “results” of the practice is the way the outcome of running the 
practice allows performing the function (column 4). Practices are context- 
sensitive and, generally speaking, they have to be intended as having the 
potential of producing those effects -  the actual performance of the function is 
not deterministic and it will depend on the interplay of individual agency and 
context factors in the specific circumstances. The sensitivity of the effects of the 
practice to possible variations in running it are described (point 2 in column 4). In 
particular, the questions about what accounts for unusually satisfactory 
performance or, at the opposite, what accounts for possible breakdown 
determined by the practice are examined. Finally, and complementarily, possible 
side effects of running the practice, an aspect too seldom cared about in 
management literature, are investigated (point 3 in column 4).
Context factors of the change process are considered in column 5 (“Process 
context factors”). They determine the “domain of applicability” of the practice. It is 
the careful consideration of these “operating conditions” of the practice that 
allows to avoid unwarranted generalisations (hence the elevation to the status of 
“best” practice). Their identification, though mainly a craftsman work that cannot 
be done according to pre-codified, automatic procedures, is guided by the 
theorised knowledge acquired about the way the system works.
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(1) Function
(in brackets the 
problem addressed 
by the practice)
(2) Practice (3) Description
1. How does the system operate?
2. How does the practice try to take advantage of the 
way the system operate (design and innovation 
dynamics)?
(4) Effects
1. Main effects of the practice (Results)
2. Variations of the practice (what accounts for 
unusually satisfactory performances, what 
accounts for possible breakdowns?)
3. Possible side effects
(5) Key Process 
Context Factors
Fl-1
(“Attribution of 
threat” by civil 
servants in the 
devolving as well as 
the recipients 
authorities 
concerning the new 
responsibility and 
risks, that if  not 
counteracted might 
sap momentum of 
the devolution 
intervention)
P ll Setting to work 
loci for empowering 
communication 
channels and joint 
decision-making 
among public sector 
organisations (in the 
Lombardy case, the 
inter-institutional 
table o f agriculture)
1.The system
Attribution of threat or opportunity to the new 
situation.
The replace of intra-organisational, hierarchy-based 
mechanisms of governing the transactions with inter- 
organisational settings and network-based transactions 
mechanisms.
2.How the practice takes advantage of the way the 
system operates
By appropriating a mobilising structure to make 
the change be interpreted as an opportunity and 
not as a threat
By facilitating the development of inter- 
organisational teams and other structures and 
routines for inter-organisational co-ordination of 
transactions
1 .Main effects
Momentum of the devolution process is 
initiated (and sustained).
Network-based mechanisms o f governing the 
transactions are set to work.
2. Variations o f the practice
Training programmes attended jointly by 
personnel of the different levels of government 
and other procedures may further facilitate the 
development of the implementation network.
3. Possible side effects
Exclusion o f some actors may amplify 
attribution of threat -  on the other hand, a “too 
numerous, too-heterogeneous” composition in 
the consultation procedure may hinder joint 
decision-making.
Nature of the 
division of labour 
across levels of 
government and 
asymmetry in powers 
and the expertise 
(facilitating the 
creation and 
appropriation of 
mobilising structures 
by the upper level of 
government)
Nature o f the 
transactions to be 
performed by public 
entities in the policy 
subsystem
Fl-2
(Attribution of 
threat by relevant 
constituencies to 
the new situation)
P2J Setting to work 
loci for empowering 
communication 
channels between 
public sector 
organisations and 
stakeholders (in the 
case, the
“agricultural table”) 
and incentives for 
prompting 
stakeholders to back 
the devolution
1 .The system
The reshaping of electoral and non-electoral 
constituencies determined by the reallocation of 
decision powers and administrative tasks implied by 
devolution affects attribution of opportunity and threat 
by relevant stakeholders
2.How the practice takes advantage o f the way the 
system operates
By appropriating a mobilising structure (the 
agricultural table) to make the change be 
interpreted as an opportunity 
By linking (through the Centres of Agricultural
1.Main effects
Momentum of the devolution process is 
initiated (and sustained) by enhancing 
stakeholders’ consensus towards devolution. 
Network-type and market-type mechanisms of 
governing the transactions are set to work.
2. Variations of the practice
Linking the decentralisation agenda with other 
cross-sectoral, highly political loci for 
communication and joint decision-making may 
strengthen the effects (in the Lombardy case, 
the “pact for the development table” for
Nature of the policy 
process in the sector 
Characteristics of the 
internal organisation 
of the stakeholders
intervention (in the 
case, the Centres for 
Agricultural 
Assistance that were 
contracted out 
important public 
administrative tasks)
Assistance) the agenda of stakeholders to the 
devolution agenda performed by the regional 
government (brokerage mechanism)
By facilitating the development of network-type 
(the agricultural table) and market-type (the 
Centres of Agricultural Assistance) mechanisms 
of governing the transactions
consulting stakeholders in all the main 
economic fields).
3. Possible side effects
Exclusion of some actors may amplify
attribution of threat
F2
(in complex change 
processes, some 
interventions tend 
to lose the 
recognition by key 
actors of their 
significance for the 
progression of the 
devolution agenda
P3] Interconnecting 
the interventions 
required for 
implementing 
devolution by having 
top managers to take 
part to all or most of 
the projects teams
1.The system
Complex processes tend to split into a variety of 
distinct, though interdependent, adaptation efforts 
(“interventions”).
Actor certification / de-certification of the devolution 
interventions affects key actors’ commitment.
2.How the practice takes advantage of the way the 
system operates
By having the key actors to take part to all or 
most of the working groups, validation is 
maintained over time and interdependencies in 
the change process are governed
1 .Main effects
The variety of adaptation efforts are 
recognised and strongly interconnected, thus 
sustaining momentum and increasing co­
ordination
3.Possible side effects
Exclusion of some actors may amplify
attribution of threat
Nature of the 
interdependencies of 
the different 
adaptation efforts
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F3-1
(Problem: being 
reallocated is a net 
loss for personnel)
P4] Combination of: 
inducing a 
belief of 
inevitability 
careful 
selection of 
personnel 
monetary 
incentives
1.The system
The move to another level of government affects the 
contract between the organisation and its labour force: 
as a result, an unbalance between contribution and 
reward in the staff to be transferred is produced. 
Threshold-based behaviours about whether to accept 
or resist transfer may be operating
2.How the practice takes advantage of the way the 
system operates
By explicitly reducing the unbalance by 
providing a compensation 
By constraining available decisional alternatives 
By triggering rational imitation at the individual 
level
1. Main effects
Attenuation of resistance to transfer by the 
personnel.
2. Variations of the practice
The block transfer of personnel may either 
reinforce the process of hamper it.
The gradual transfer of personnel over the time 
period of devolution may facilitate the 
activation of persistent patron-client networks, 
which in turn may lead to some of the 
personnel avoiding the transfer.
3. Possible side effects
Attribution of threat connected with the 
perception of being superseded on the side of 
staff already in the payroll of the lower level of 
government.
“Social status” and 
labour contract of 
personnel at different 
levels o f government 
(a country-specific 
factor)
Organisational 
culture and 
preferences structure 
of personnel 
(prevalence of values 
relating to individual 
remuneration and 
upgrading the 
hierarchical chain vs. 
values relating to job 
enrichment and skills 
development)
F3.2
(Adaptation of 
structure and 
routines to the new 
tasks performed)
P5] Developing a 
“professional 
bureaucracy” 
organisational model 
for the public sector 
entity that devolves 
tasks, and 
establishing 
specialised bodies 
(“agencies”) for 
performing specific 
administrative/techni 
cal tasks (in the 
Lombardy case: the 
regional funding 
body for the delivery 
of subsidies to 
farmers)
Setting to work 
routines for
1.The system
New tasks are to be executed at the different levels of 
government, hence different organisational 
configurations are required. The reallocation o f tasks 
and power has a strong motivational impact on top 
executives, the middle management, and the staff. 
Fragmentation of competencies in the institutional 
setting increases the scope for opportunistic 
behaviours.
2.How the practice takes advantage of the way the 
system operates
By providing top executives with the 
organisational instruments for keeping the grasp 
over the overall policy process 
By empowering middle management and staff by 
enriching their job
By sharing information and thus reducing the 
scope for opportunistic behaviours
1. Main effects
Focus of the government devolving authority 
on its new core activities and grasp over key 
phases of the policy process is enabled.
3. Side effects
Inter-organisational computerised information 
system: risks of breakdowns when the 
hierarchical logic overextends and/or when 
information is used only according to a 
“negotiation” logic.
Contents of the 
reform policy 
package (nature of 
the devolved tasks, 
interdependencies, 
and overall features 
of the new division 
of labour across 
levels of 
government) 
Dynamics of the 
political system, 
especially regarding 
the relations between 
upper (devolving) 
and lower (recipient) 
levels of government
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collecting and 
processing 
information on 
performances and 
tasks execution in 
the entities of the 
policy subsystem (in 
the case, the new 
inter-organisational 
computerised 
information system)
Table 5.1: practices for the management of devolution processes
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Practice 1 performs the function of triggering momentum of the devolution 
process, by counteracting the mechanism of attribution of threat to the new 
situation which might sap the process. The Lombardy case provides evidence of 
a number of distinct social groups affected by devolution: besides elected officials 
and regional top managers (that initiated and led the intervention), and letting 
aside the personnel to be reallocated (discussed in relation to practice 4), there 
were the middle management in the region, elected officials in local governments, 
tenured officials in local governments, managers of agricultural businesses’ 
associations at the regional and the local level. For at least two groups benefits 
did not exceed costs (at least in a straightforward and univocal way): tenured 
officials in the staff of local governments, and managers of associations of 
agricultural businesses at the regional level.
In local authorities, while elected officials had a favourable attitude towards 
devolution (as especially commissioners in charge of agriculture matters 
envisaged that devolution could remarkably enhance their previously very limited 
status), for tenured officials devolution represented mainly a significant transfer 
under their responsibility of routine, “boring” tasks; in addition, these tasks 
conveyed a degree of administrative risk embodied in their execution (being the 
tasks concerned with administering large amount of funds according to rigorous 
and detailed EU procedures). As to the massive reallocation of personnel from 
the region, it represented for the staff a concrete menace of being superseded by 
transferred regional personnel, who had been promoted to a higher assignation- 
level as an incentive to transfer, and should therefore be assigned 
correspondingly higher-level assignments under the labour regulation in force in 
the Italian public sector.
In the face of such potential source of resistance, the workings of the inter- 
institutional table for agriculture performed an important function. The two-tier 
structure created an opportunity for tenured officials in the regional and local 
governments to meet on a monthly basis. Such way of working through 
systematic meetings held on a regular basis and interconnected with the formal 
deliberative moments within individual organisations made the inter-institutional 
table perform also another function beyond its institutional one: it acted as an 
important mobilising structure, a social space put at the service of interpretations 
of situations and objectives (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 102), interpretations that 
made the new situation be interpreted more as an opportunity than as a threat. In 
this way, top executives in the regional government could initiate and sustain 
momentum of the devolution process. The functioning of the inter-institutional 
table of agriculture and especially the procedures by which it interconnected the
deliberative moments of the different institutions facilitated joint decision-making. 
In terms of design of the institutional system, it also facilitated the creation of 
inter-organisational teams9. Interconnection of deliberative moments within 
individual organisations and inter-organisational teams allowed the replace of 
hierarchy-based mechanisms of co-ordination with inter-organisational, network- 
type mechanisms of co-ordination10 - the ones most fit to the policy setting 
determined by devolution. The decision powers held by the devolving 
government, and the expertise and organisational knowledge accumulated by the 
devolving entity in running the functions it is going to devolve are key context 
factors that may affect the establishment and effective running of such mobilising 
structure.
As to the managers of agricultural businesses’ associations at the regional 
level11, the issue for them was that they had to give away part of their 
competencies to the local organisational tier of their associations, “mirroring” the 
transfer of tasks from the regional to local governments, and thus they had to 
redefine their room for manoeuvre, internally to the organisation and in the 
relationships with public entities. Similarly to the previous situation, the potential 
triggering of a mechanism of attribution of threat by such an influential 
constituency might have sapped momentum of the devolution process.
In the Lombardy case, the agricultural table, that worked as a procedure for 
consulting farmers’ associations, performed the function of initiating and 
sustaining momentum of devolution12, by working as a mobilising structure 
(hence facilitating the shaping of the perception of the change associated to 
devolution as an opportunity). It also supported another mechanism: the 
brokerage of the devolution agenda with key stakeholders’ agenda, a mechanism 
that was triggered by the establishment of the Centres for Agricultural Assistance 
(the two mechanisms, though partly independent, together make up the Practice 
2). Run by agricultural businesses’ associations, the CAA were organisations 
created at the regional level (in the form of limited responsibility companies) that, 
once accredited, became in charge of performing on a contractual basis the 
delivery of important public services for agricultural businesses. Farmers had the
9 On the topic of effective team building in the public sector, see Doherty and Home (2002).
10 We assume the broad perspective that co-ordination may be achieved in three main ways: 
hierarchy, network or market -  see Thompson et al., 1991.
11 Agricultural businesses’ associations had an organisational structure that mirrored public sector 
structure and repartition of competencies in agriculture, with a European (federative) level, a 
national central structure, a regional level and a local one. As an effect of devolution to local 
authorities, it was especially the regional level that had to redefine its mission and tasks.
12 It should be noted that a practice may perform more than a single function -  in the case, Practice 
1 and Practice 2 performed primarily Function 1, and also Function 2.
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right of choice about which CAA to use to apply for subsidies and other services 
(though a large number tended to employ the CAA established and promoted by 
the association they belong to). They represented a way of linking the agenda of 
businesses’ representatives to the devolution agenda carried on by the regional 
government: the social mechanism of brokerage seems to have been at work. 
Brokerage is defined as “the linking of two or more previously unconnected social 
sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet other 
sites [..] it can become a relational mechanism for mobilisation” (MT&T, p. 26 and 
102). Associations benefited of these new arrangements in two ways: the 
remuneration for the services they delivered was satisfactory, and the direct 
contacts with users represented an opportunity for establishing closer links with 
the agricultural businesses (their actual or potential members). The benefits 
gained by businesses’ associations contributed to win the favour of their 
managers at the regional level. An important part of the agenda of managers in 
agricultural businesses associations thus became linked to the progression of the 
regional devolution agenda. In fact, the decentralisation of further operational 
tasks that occurred in 2002 was for a significant part addressed directly to CAA, 
and no more to local authorities. CAA were financed, for the new functions, 
directly by the region employing financial resources, relatively abundant in the 
agriculture sector within the framework of the very “rich” Common Agricultural 
Policy, and saving on personnel resources, critical in the public sector at that 
period13.
As a result, momentum of the devolution process was initiated (and sustained) 
by enhancing stakeholders’ consensus towards devolution14. Though brokerage 
may be triggered in a number of ways, depending on the circumstances, having 
stakeholders to perform a somehow “profitable” role in the execution of some of 
the tasks that are in the overall devolution package seems to be a quite general 
way to perform the function of engaging stakeholders.
The practice works under context factors that are relative to the nature of the 
relationships between governments and stakeholders - in the case, the 
corporatist nature of the policy process of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(Rieger, 2000), implying that a limited group of stakeholders was really decisive
13 This represented a positive side effect (side effect are not intended to be a priori necessarily 
negative). The establishment of the centres for Agricultural Assistance made new resources 
fungible: contracting out important tasks to the CAA represented a way by which the regional 
government utilised financial resources (relatively abundant) and spared on personnel (relative 
scarce in both the region and local authorities).
14 Public managers in the Lombardy region, in recognising that they needed to supplement their 
current authority and effective influence if  they were to succeed, performed what in Moore’s 
terms (1995) is political management -  a general function cross-cutting (in many respects) the 
specific functions of the devolution identified in this work.
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in the policy process, may have facilitated the identification and engagement of 
the key actors in the policy system. Also the characteristics of the internal 
organisation of stakeholders (in the case, the two-tier structure, regional and 
local, of farmers’ associations, and their organisational and financial capacity of 
giving birth to relatively complex organisations like the Centres of Agricultural 
Assistance) are influential factors.
The splitting over time of the change process into a variety of distinct though 
interdependent interventions15 may lead part of the staff to lose the recognition of 
the significance of each individual intervention for the overall advancement of the 
devolution agenda. The fact that key top executives took part to all or most of the 
working groups set up for different specific projects strongly interconnected these 
groups. The interconnection of the plurality of working groups may trigger actor 
certification of individual interventions, a mechanism which maintains the 
significance given by the staff to each of them. Practice 3 relies on this 
mechanism. Actor certification is the validation of actors and their performances 
by external authorities. Attitudes that, in brief, we can label as “consistent with 
the strategic reorientation of the Lombardy regional government and the 
adaptation of the organisational configuration to the circumstances of the 
devolved setting” came to be recognised as socially acceptable: at the opposite, 
some attitudes came to be recognised as “outdated” behaviours, not compatible 
with the new orientation of the regional government in the devolved policy 
subsystem. Acceptability “contributes to explaining what kind of organisation, 
identity and collective interaction are prescribed, tolerated, and forbidden” 
(McAdam et al., 2001, p. 145) and can provide part of the explanation of the 
support over time provided by the middle management to the devolution 
intervention and the commitment to implementing each individual intervention.
The interconnection of the plurality of working groups also facilitates the 
management of the interdependencies of the outcomes of individual 
interventions. Goodman (2000, pp. 30-42 and 125-138 in particular) provides the 
conceptual tools for the detailed analysis of how changes in activities and 
outcome in one unit or level affects changes in activities and outcome at another 
unit or level of the organisational space under investigation (organisational 
linkages). To put it in a very simplistic way, the missing (or mis-functioning) of 
organisational linkages is a reason for “failure” in change processes16. Presence 
of top managers in all or at least the most significant of the working groups,
15 An intervention is the process or set of processes by which an agenda is realised.
147
though time-consuming for top managers, may facilitate the coupling of the 
outcomes in such ways to sustain the devolution process.
We have already examined in detail mechanisms at work in the process of 
reallocation of personnel -  and the alternative courses of events that may occur 
according to what mechanisms are triggered -  that are at the basis of Practice 4. 
A combination of monetary incentives (by themselves often insufficient), of 
inducing a belief of inevitability and the careful selection of personnel may 
counteract the effect of reallocation being a net loss for personnel, at least in the 
institutional and cultural context of a number of countries. Context factors refer 
also to the preferences structure of the personnel to be reallocated.
Practice 5 is about developing an organisational model fitting the new tasks 
and environment -  an organisational model that might also provide top 
executives in the regional government with instruments for keeping the grasp 
over key phases of the policy process: an important motivational basis for making 
rational public actors adopt the new model17; and that may empower the middle 
management by enriching the job description: again performing also a 
motivational function. In fact, the organisational model of the professional 
bureaucracy, operating through groups of professionals, was apt to perform the 
broad set of activities put under the label of “steering and advising local 
governments”. Complementarily, the regional funding body, that operated under 
the direct supervision of the regional government, performed a key phase of the 
policy delivery process, i.e. the disbursement of funds to agricultural businesses. 
It seems that the professional bureaucracy model is in relatively general 
circumstances apt to organisations that have devolved operational tasks (when 
this is the content of the devolution policy package); also, “arm’s length” agencies 
may prove to be an adequate solution for executing sets of relatively 
homogeneous and specialised tasks that remain under the competence of the 
upper tier of government.
Another major problem of devolution is that the fragmentation of competencies 
among a plurality of organisations increases the scope for opportunistic 
behaviours. The inter-organisational computerised information system contributes
16 Though this straightforward conclusion is undoubtedly an over-simplification of Goodman’s 
brilliant analysis (and research agenda) on organisational change.
17 It may be contested that the fact regional government keeps the grasp over local authorities be a 
goal of devolution, but it may be an important motivating factor (though top bureaucrats behaviour 
is more complex than the representation of it in generic terms as being driven by “enhancement of
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to counteract this mechanism by sharing information, which, at least potentially, 
may reduce the scope for opportunistic behaviours. The inter-organisational 
computerised information system of the Lombardy experience was designed on 
the basis of the requirements identified by the regional government, that by such 
means influenced in a decisive way the circulation of information in the policy 
subsystem. It seems that keeping the control of the design and the running of the 
public inter-organisational computerised information systems related to the policy 
sector (when it exists) is on the one hand a way of “steering the system” by the 
upper level of government, but also, if procedures are designed in a co-operative 
logic between all the public (and private) entities involved, it may also be a way 
counteracting opportunistic behaviours. Its effects will depend on a range of 
context factors including the nature of the relations between levels of government 
(in particular whether collaborative or conflictual) and the nature and 
interdependencies of the tasks executed at the different levels of government in 
the devolved institutional setting.
5.4. Discussion of findings
5.4.1. Scope of the analysis
The analysis of the Lombardy case has allowed the extrapolation of practices for 
the management of devolution processes. Extrapolation has been defined 
(Barzelay, 2005) as an interdependent process of learning from vicarious 
experience (which entails conducting case analysis) and designing practices, 
having the purpose of improving the performance of public sector organisations in 
one situation (target site) by employing experience acquired elsewhere (source 
site).
Especially the phase of designing the practices poses the problem of the 
division of the intellectual labour between researchers and practitioners. 
Designing practices apt to solve extant problems is the daily concern of 
practitioners18. Consequently, in the present study, by the process of designing of 
a practice we mean the process of drafting practices apt to structure situations in 
motion according to given purposes (Barzelay, 2005) under circumstances 
defined in sufficiently general terms by a set of context factors (whose 
identification is based on the causal understanding of the phenomenon). Such
power” or “budget maximisation” - Niskanen, 1973 -  see Dunleavy, 1991, for a wider analysis of 
top bureaucrats behaviour).
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practices (like those outlined in section 5.3) can and must subsequently be 
tailored by practitioners to their specific circumstances by carrying out the 
detailed design. This means that the practices identified are not to be intended as 
“recipes”, ready for use. They are rather to be considered as “templates” to be 
employed under given context factors, that have to be adapted to the specific 
circumstances of the situation on which to intervene.
Important limitations apply to the extrapolation process conducted in the 
present work. A first one relates to the nature of the case investigated. Variation 
in locality characteristics is not considered in the Lombardy case, in which local 
politics (especially the relations between the regional and the local level of 
government) was relatively collaborative. Pollitt et al. (1998) predict that 
conflictual politics may hinder implementation -  hence the menu of practices 
should be extended and/or refined by encompassing, for example, practices that 
may allow to perform F1.1 in such less favourable circumstances.
Also service characteristics are influential. Agriculture is a policy field in which 
a corporatist logic is dominating (Rieger, 2000), at least in EU countries, thus 
making the identification and engagement of key stakeholders relatively easy. 
More generally, their influence on the policy process is very high: a more 
complete menu of practices should consider if and how to “engage” stakeholders 
in less structured, more pluralistic policy sectors (in other words: how important is 
F1.2, and how to perform it in pluralistic policy domains). Still, other 
circumstances, like the technical complexity of the services delivered, should be 
considered in drafting a more complete menu of practices for managing 
devolution in sectors deeply affected by the dynamics of the technological 
evolution.
At a more methodological level, another limitation is that the focus has been 
relatively more on the way the practice operates than the way the practice itself 
may be developed (Barzelay, 2005) -  for example, the focus has been more on 
the way the inter-institutional table of agriculture performs a mobilising function, 
than on the way such mechanism can be established and effectively set to work. 
Again, in the intellectual division of labour practitioners may be called to play an 
important role in this phase, i.e. in designing ways in which the identified 
practices may be developed.
18 Though, clearly, not all practices are designed on the basis of vicarious learning from other 
experiences.
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5.4.2. Some broader lessons that can be drawn from the Lombardy experience
Various issues emerge as significant for the successful implementation of 
devolution. First, it emerges that implementing devolution requires to develop and 
adapt the organisational arrangements of all the public sector organisations 
involved - both devolving and recipients of authority. This in turn means adapting 
the organisational culture, structure and routines of individual public entities, on 
the one hand, and developing the collaborative capacity19 to deliver the policy in 
the devolved subsystem, on the other hand. As regards the innovation of the 
organisational configuration of individual public entities, it emerges that 
organisational change regards as much the level of government recipient of 
authority as the level of government devolving powers and tasks. Both have to 
carry out a profound reorganisation. At the same time, circumscribing 
organisational change to the level of individual organisations obscures the whole 
picture. Collaboration among public sector organisations represents both a key 
requirement for implementing the devolution intervention and an outcome of the 
successful conduction of a devolution intervention (it is an intangible but crucial 
asset for the functioning of the devolved public sector20).
Second, conducting an exercise of devolution requires to establish a proper 
governance framework. Different perspectives may be comprised under the 
expression of “establishing a governance framework”. One is adapting the 
institutional setting, i.e. completing the design of devolution via secondary 
legislation - a process that is especially significant in legalistic countries, like Italy 
and most countries in the continental European tradition of the rechtsstaat culture 
of governance21. Once a major reform act is established, the implementation of a 
reform has to be carried out by adapting, at the different levels of government, 
the secondary body of laws which regulates each sector. In Italy, after the major 
reform act (law 59/97), four acts were promulgated to reform the most relevant 
policy sectors according to the major reform; then, any regional government had 
to implement the reform trough the promulgation of regional laws for each sector. 
This process, all in all just a legally binding pre-condition for the devolution
19 Bardach (1998) employs the notion of collaborative capacity, which is broader than actual 
collaboration in a given site and time, and considers it a key asset for the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the public sector in the modem era.
20 It is an aspect considered especially while examining practice 1. The significance of this topic 
emerges when considering the relation between “decentralisation” and a criticism (or at least a 
caveat) about a possible drift towards a “fragmented state” (and the consequent inconsistencies in 
policy delivery) as an effect of massive decentralisation processes -  fears often echoed in the 
literature examining the trends towards a decentralised public sector. In our view, the importance 
of using the process of devolution to create collaborative capacity among the public entities that 
will share powers and tasks in policy delivery after devolution is underestimated in the debate on 
the topic.
21A feature that may probably extend also to other OECD and especially non-OECD countries.
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process to be implemented, was not entirely completed at the end of 2004. 
Though this problem of design of the devolution policy package is not directly 
dealt with in the present study (the institutional design has in this respect been 
treated as a given), the issue is undoubtedly relevant in the study of devolution 
(and probably other) reform processes. Establishing the governance framework 
may also be intended along another significant perspective we have directly 
addressed in the study: engaging stakeholders in the implementation process. A 
perspective which may be interpreted as a key component of the “building and 
steering” of the implementation policy network (Kickert et al, 1997, Hill and Hupe, 
2002).
In the work, a third key issue has only indirectly been considered: the question 
of the resources required for sustaining the intervention. We have indeed 
examined an important aspect of the issue, i.e. the reallocation of personnel. 
Generally speaking, “financing” the intervention (in the broad sense of providing 
all the resources, financial, human, material) is a high-level function to be 
performed - and practices should be designed especially for circumstances 
characterised by tough financial constraints. This was not the case in the 
Lombardy experience. It is for this reason that in the present work financing the 
intervention has been mainly considered as given, an enabling and 
complementary function not directly investigated -  but further research on the 
topic should include this dimension of analysis too.
5.5. Conclusion
It is useful to summarise the path we have covered so far, i.e. producing some 
usable knowledge about the dynamics of devolution processes, in order to shape 
such dynamics in ways that may improve policy delivery in the devolved setting. 
Devolution is just one type of the broader phenomenon of decentralisation that 
has been reshaping the public sector over the last two decades or more.
In this work, there is no spur, nor any prescriptive drift towards 
decentralisation as a recipe per se capable of improving performance of the 
public sector -  on the contrary, we agree with Pollitt (2005) that the (often) 
unspoken alternative -  namely centralisation -  has all the titles for improving 
public policy in many and differentiated circumstances. However, decentralisation 
is the current trend, and this is the main reason why the implementation of 
decentralisation has been focused. It might also be argued that implementing 
decentralisation is more difficult than implementing a centralisation intervention;
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however, such a statement is unwarranted. We suspect the analysis carried out 
in this work may in some form be useful also for the analysis of the 
implementation of an intervention of centralisation concerning aspects like the 
conditions under which an entrepreneurial role is more likely to be performed by 
top managers, the way the reallocation of personnel (though it should be in 
general a smoother process) may be performed, how the consensus of different 
social groups affecting the dynamics of the process may be gained. Continuing in 
the list of what this work is not about, it is not about the performance of different 
institutional designs of decentralisation, nor -  as already made clear - is it about 
the assessment of whether decentralisation is a good recipe compared to 
centralisation22.
This work is about “how to decentralise well”: it aims at contributing to a 
knowledge about how to lead the implementation of an intervention of 
decentralisation in ways that are conducive to effective policy delivery in the 
devolved setting. The smart practices analysis may provide a contribution in this 
respect.
As regards some of the specific organising devices extrapolated from the 
Lombardy experience, it may be argued that some of the practices, suitably 
revised, could be applied to other phenomena like processes of agencification, 
intended as the transfer of operational tasks from a Ministry/Department to an 
agency - see Pollitt and Talbot (2004) and Pollitt et al. (2005) (agencification is in 
this framework considered as part of the broader phenomenon of 
decentralisation), that seem to present similar functional requirements: the 
reallocation of personnel, the reorientation to new core tasks, and the adoption of 
new organisational configurations both in the entity devolving authority and in the 
entity recipient of authority (Ongaro, 2005).
At another level of analysis, that of the methodology employed, the 
progression of the smart practices analysis research programme may provide an 
important contribution to public managers by equipping them with sets of 
practices for dealing with the key “challenges” of managing in the 21st century.
22 Economic studies have widely debated issues concerning the “ideal dimension” of the state, 
hence of its internal, “federal” or “centralised”, articulation. Similarly, studies in the field of public 
policy discuss, sector by sector, what degree o f decentralisation should determine what 
performances according to the given circumstances. We argue that also scholars in public 
management have their saying in that, especially in considering what management systems and 
what logics of accountability are capable of producing which effects at what level of government -  
a dimension traditionally (regrettably, in our opinion) less considered in the debate on the “proper” 
configuration of the state.
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Appendix: narrative structure of the episode and 
related descriptive questions, data collection
Descriptive questions (Type B1 questions)
B1-1-1) How did the regional managers prepare the transfer of authority to local 
authorities?
B1-1-1a) What was the attitude of elected politicians in Local Authorities 
about devolution?
B1-1-1b) What was the attitude of civil servants in Local Authorities about 
devolution?
B1-1-1c) How was the issue of the motivation of civil servants in Local 
Authorities dealt with? And, in particular, how was the issue of the 
administrative risk entailed by the execution of the new tasks dealt with? 
(answered pages 53-55)
B1-1-2) What was the impact of national reforms in the area of labour relations on 
the reallocation of personnel? (page 55)
B1-1-3) What organising devices were deployed in order to facilitate the transfer 
of authority?
B1-1-3-1) What sequence of events did lead to the establishment and 
development of the Inter-institutional table for agriculture?
B1-1-3-1 a. Why was it established?
B1 -1 -3-1 b. What was its mandate and scope?
B1-1-3-1c. What arrangements were put into practice in order for 
the inter-institutional table to work?
B1-1-3-2) What was the importance of joint training programmes attended 
by the regional and local governments staff?
(pages 56-58)
B1-1-4) How did the process of reallocation of personnel to local authorities 
unfold?
B1-1-4a) How did the personnel react to the prospect of being transferred 
to Local Authorities? What problems did emerge in the transfer of 
personnel to Local Authorities, and when?
B1-1-4b) How did regional managers deal with the issue of the morale of 
personnel to be transferred?
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B1-1-4c) How did the arrangements (incentives and disincentives) 
employed for facilitating the transfer of personnel to Local Authorities 
take shape?
(pages 58-60)
B1-1-5) What course of events did lead to the radical modifications of the 
organisational structure and routines of the regional government?
B1-1-5a) What major modifications to the organisational macro-structure 
did occur?
B1-1-5b) What modifications did occur to the job description of the staff? 
B1-1-5c) What changes did occur in organisational routines?
B1-1-5d) What course of events did lead to the rapid development of the 
new computerised information system for agriculture?
(pages 60-63)
B1-1-6) What transformations did occur to the regional territorial offices?
B1-1-6a) What was the importance of the regional Territorial Office for the 
implementation of devolution?
B1-1-6b) What issues did the “hollowing out” of the regional territorial 
offices (due to the massive transfer of personnel to local authorities) 
raise?
B1-1 -6c) How were these issues dealt with?
(pages 63-64)
B1-1-7) What course of events did lead to the establishment of the regional 
funding body?
B1-1-7a) How did the legislative provision by the National Government 
about the possibility of establishing a Regional Funding Body come to be 
interpreted by the regional managers as an opportunity for shaping a 
new role for the Regional Government in the field of agriculture? 
B1-1-7b) How did the process that led to the definition of the organisational 
model for the new entity develop?
How did alternatives come to be considered?
How did foreign experiences come to be considered? What role did 
the international projection of Lombardy Region perform in the 
consideration of foreign experiences?
B1-1-7c) How did the process of merging executive agencies interconnect 
with the establishment of the regional funding body?
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(pages 64-70)
B1-1-8) How did the relations with agricultural businesses’ associations evolve 
during the progression of devolution?
B1-1-8a) What sequence of events did lead to the establishment of the 
Agricultural Table?
B1-1-8b) What sequence of events did lead to the establishment and 
development of the Centres for Agricultural Assistance?
(pages 70-71)
Data collection
Data sources:
- documentary evidence,
- semi-structured interviews (37 between January 2003 and October 2003),
- participant observation (in my capacity as member and advisor of the 
observatory on the administrative reform and federalism of the Lombardy region 
in the period 2000-05; invited-observer in the Lombardy region committee for the 
monitoring the financial implication of decentralisation (2001); speaker to two 
internal meetings for managers the of Lombardy Region in 2002 and 2003)
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Figure A1: narrative structure
Previous events Contemporaneous events Subsequent / 
anticipated events
CE 1: public management policy-making
rz
CE 3: holding electoral rounds at 
the regional and national level
CE 2: enacting sectoral laws on devolution (national level), and the “federal” reform of the Italian constitution
PEI: setting 
devolution on 
top of 
Lombardy 
region
governmental
aeenda
PE2:
devolving 
functions in 
agriculture 
from the state 
to regions
PE3:
revamping the 
Lombardy 
regional 
government
CE 4: enacting national ministry decrees (secondary legislation) on devolution 
in agriculture (computerised national register, regional funding bodies)
CE5: setting a new regulation and arrangements in agriculture at the regional level
X
E l: setting to work a system of relations with local governments and reallocating the workforce 
E2: reinventing the regional government
RE1: operating policy delivery in agriculture
Related events
1997 July 1998 1999 2000 2001 May 2002
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